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I. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of many new chemicals into the Canadian environment
each year and the continued use of many existing substances has frequently
proceeded without adequate knowledge of possible adverse environmental or
human health effects. While many of these products have proven beneficial
to society, others, such as PCBs, mercury, and chlorofluorocarbons have been
shown to have the potential for causing serious ecological or human health
damage.' This paper briefly examines the nature and magnitude of the threat
posed by toxic chemicals to human health and the environment. It will out-
line existing legislation and policy, describe international developments in
the area and their implications for Canada and investigate possible improve-
ments in toxic chemical control strategies.
Because of the relatively new regulatory attention that has been paid to
industrial toxic chemical control, and also because of major new legislation
expected in this area, the focus of this paper will not include such other
matters as food additives, pesticides, radioactive substances, occupational
health, consumer product safety, and dangerous goods transport or related
areas of concern that have generally evolved a separate body of law and
policy.2 Hazardous wastes control, which could be partly construed as the
back-end of the toxic chemicals problem, is also developing a separate body
of law and policy that has been examined elsewhere and therefore will not
be reviewed here.8
II. THE EXISTING CONTROL REGIME AND ITS ADEQUACY
The federal government defines toxic chemicals as those chemical sub-
stances which, when released to the environment, or thereafter if chemically
transformed through combination or otherwise, could pose a significant
threat to natural ecosystems or to human health or well-being. Chemical
substances under this definition have characteristics which include: the ability
to become widely dispersed in air, land and water, great distances from their
sources and avenues of entry to the environment; the ability to remain highly
' See, e.g., "Organic compounds pose threat without controls, biologist says," The
Globe and Mail (Toronto), Apr. 24, 1974 at 2, col. 1.
:2 The Canadian Environmental Advisory Council, a body established in 1972 by
the federal cabinet to advise the federal Environment Minister on environmental threats,
priorities for Government action and the effectiveness of controls, notes that while cer-
tain categories of chemicals, drugs and pesticides have been regulated for some time,
about ninety percent of all manufactured chemicals did not fall into any regulated or
potentially regulated category until the coming into force of the Environmental Con-
taminants Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72 in 1976. See Hall and Chant, Ecotoxicity: Responsi-
bilities and Opportunities (Ottawa: Canadian Environmental Advisory Council, Report
No. 8, Aug. 1979) at 2.
Such other federal laws include: Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27 as am.;
Pest Control Products Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-10; Atomic Energy Control Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. A-19 as am.; Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1 as am.; Hazardous
Products Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. H-3 as am.; and Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act,
S.C. 1980-81, c. 36.
3 See, e.g., Castrilli, "Hazardous Wastes Law in Canada and Ontario: At the Skull
and Crossroads" (1980), 9 C.E.L.R. 152.
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resistant to natural degradation; the capability of causing biological changes
at trace concentrations; the ability to bio-accumulate and pass through food
chains; the ability to become more toxic when combined in the environment
with other chemicals; and the ability to become irretrievable once released
into the environment with effects that are largely irreversible. 4 Recent reports
indicate that human health and environmental damage from toxic chemicals
has been threatened in different geographic regions of Canada, through dif-
ferent environmental media, and from both artificial and elemental chemi-
cals.5 Each year new manufactured or imported substances join an already
4 Environment Canada, Toxic Chemicals Management Program (Ottawa: Env.
Cda., Feb. 1980).
G (i) A 1978 report to the International Joint Commission concluded that sub-
stances that are toxic, have widespread use, bioaccumulate and which are
environmentally persistent are now restricting multiple use of the Great Lakes.
The report noted restrictions on the use of Great Lakes fisheries because of
contamination from toxic substances such as PCBs, mirex and mercury. In-
creasing concern was noted regarding the health effects of using the Lakes as
sources of drinking water although they have long been described as containing
approximately twenty percent of the world's supply of fresh surface water.
The study group found that major problems are being created by past point
source discharges, urban runoff from which toxic substances have accumulated
in lake sediments, atmospheric inputs and usage of persistent pesticides; Inter-
national Joint Commission (IJC) Pollution from Land Use Activities Reference
Group, (PLUARG) Environmental Management Strategy for the Great Lakes
System (Windsor: I.J.C., July 1978). More recently the IJC's Great Lakes
Water Quality Board (GLWQB) concluded that "there is evidence that the
Great Lakes ecosystem is responding to the controls already in place." It
noted that "substantial reduction in organochlorine residues have been found
in small fish from Lakes Ontario and Erie. Similarly, PCB, DDT and Mirex
residues declined in herring gull eggs from both lower lakes in 1979. Declines
also reported for herring gull eggs from Lake Huron and Lake Michigan
while declines in eggs from Lake Superior were not as significant as from
the other lakes. These declines represent decreased loads of contaminants into
the ecosystem." See Great Lakes Water Quality Board, Report on Great Lakes
Water Quality to the International Joint Commission (Toronto: GLWQB,
Nov. 1980) at 2. However, the IJC appears to disagree to some extent with
the GLWQB. The Board's conclusions are based on reduced concentrations of
banned or severely restricted chemicals (e.g., PCB, DDT, Mirex). While the
IJC acknowledges that data from many of these "traditional" toxic sub-
stances show that these substances are generally declining in the Great Lakes
ecosystem in response to control programmes, it suggests that it would be mis-
leading to stop the analysis at that point. The IJC notes that "[o]n the other
hand, a number of other substances (often with unknown effects) have been
identified or *detected only recently in the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem.
Trace levels of dioxin, for example, were identified in 1978 in fish taken
from Lake Ontario and Saginaw Bay. PCTs (polychlorinated terphenyls)
have now been identified in Lake Erie herring gulls eggs, despite the fact that
these compounds have not been manufactured in the United States since
1971. PCB levels in fish continue to exceed Agreement objectives in many
areas throughout the Basin." International Joint Commission, Seventh Annual
Report on Great Lakes Water Quality to Canada and the United States
(Ottawa and Washington: IJC, Oct. 1980) at 16.
(ii) Between 1960 and 1972, a chlor-alkali plant at Dryden in Northwestern
Ontario, discharged an estimated nine thousand kilograms of mercury into
the English-Wabigoon river system. Sediments immediately downstream from
the plant showed mean mercury concentrations of above one part per million
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large pool of existing chemicals, resulting in the potential for ecological and
human health problems to develop." These problems may arise because many
(ppm) in the mid-1970's. While the Canadian safety guideline for mercury
in commercial fish is 0.5 ppm, certain fish species taken from lakes directly
downstream from the plant showed mean mercury concentrations of 7.8 ppm
as late as 1976. [Environment Canada, Environmental Protection Service,
Mercury in the Canadian Environment (Ottawa: Env. Cda., Apr. 1979)]. United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reports indicate that inorganic mer-
cury can be converted by micro-organisms in the sediments into methyl mercury,
an organic form of mercury that is a strong human nerve poison, and can be
readily bioaccumulated. [United Nations Environment Programme, "Environ-
mental Health: Heavy Metal Hazards," The State of the World Environment
(Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP 1980)]. The Science Council of Canada concluded
that exposure of native people in the area to methyl mercury through the eating
of fish caught in water contaminated by tie industrial mercury represented a
serious long term hazard to the people involved. [Science Council of Canada,
Policies and Poisons: The Containment of Long-term Hazards to Human Health
in the Environment and in the Workplace, Report No. 28 (Ottawa, October
1977)].
(iii) A 1969 federal health study released in 1975 found unusual health disorders,
including skin lesions, respiratory diseases and other related problems in mill-
workers and residents of Yellowknife, North West Territories. One possible
explanation given was the higher than average levels of arsenic in the air, soils
and water in the area. Arsenic, a toxic substance and carcinogen, is used in
the industrial smelting of gold in the region. [See, e.g., "Arsenic danger in
Yellowknife hinted in Ottawa study," The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan. 9,
1975 at 4 col. 4. See also National Research Council, Effects of Arsenic in the
Canadian Environment (Ottawa: Gov't of Cda., 1978)].
(iv) The potential for damage to the earth's stratospheric ozone layer by chloro-
fluorocarbon emissions may be much greater than previously suspected. If
emission of these chemicals, which have been widely used as refrigerants and
spray-can propellants, continues at the 1973 release rates, a fifteen percent
reduction in the ozone layer could be expected by the year 2000. Federal
atmospheric researchers have concluded that continuous release of such sub-
stances will have an effect on climate of uncertain magnitude; cause an
increase in skin cancer incidence; have mutagenic (mutation causing) effects
on plants and animals that cannot be protected from increased ultra-violet
radiation; and possibly cause ecosystem changes. [Environment Canada, At-
mospheric Environment Service, Anthropogenic Modification of the Ozone
Layer: The CFM Effect (Downsview, Ont.: Env. Cda., 1971); Environment
Canada, Current Status of the CFM Depletion of the Ozone Layer, Atmos-
pheric Environment Service Bulletin, (February 1979). See also Dotto,
"Scientist urges quick end to use of most-used aerosol propellants," The
Globe and Mail (Toronto), March 29, 1975 at 15, col. 7].
(v) Federal environmental researchers have recently discovered that toxic chemi-
cals used by industry and by agriculture are causing significant numbers of
mutations in some animal life in a major Saskatchewan lake. The high
incidence of mutations in one species of insect in the lake indicates that the
impact of contaminants on the lake's ecosystem is substantial and suggests
possible future environmental problems in the Prairies. [Environment Canada,
Environmental Protection Service, Tobin Lake Study: Background Information
(Regina: Env. Cda., Feb. 17, 1981). See also von Stackelberg, "Tests find
mutations in lake animal life," The Regina Leader Post, Feb. 18, 1981 at
A3, col. 2].
6 Federal government advisors indicate that since the end of World War II, the
growth in numbers and volume of chemicals has "exploded". [Hall and Chant. supra
note 2, at 3. One European commentator notes that organic chemical production in-
ecrased 800 percent in the western world between 1950 and 1970 (7 million tons to 63
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of these substances are new to nature which has had no time to evolve de-
fense mechanisms, or new to the human species whose enzyme system has
had no previous experience with them.7 Compared with the rapidity and
quantity of chemical development, human and animal biochemistry is only
"carefully developed over many centuries." 8
Bound up in the problems of the rapid growth of numbers and quanti-
ties of chemicals, their multiple pathways of contamination and the often
protracted latency periods before damage may be revealed, are related public
concerns respecting notions of risk, extrapolation of animal testing data to
humans and whether thresholds exist for carcinogens.9 These are among the
many environmental and human health issues facing a government agency
once it embarks on a programme of toxic substance control.
Federal and provincial regulatory initiatives regarding the many prob-
lems created by the presence of toxic chemicals in the environment have been
both positive and negative. More recent actions appear to be promising but
they are coupled with others that offer only partial solutions or that are vague
or unsystematic in their execution. Although it is clear that federal and
provincial constitutional jurisdictions overlap, no agreement on co-ordinated
million tons). By 1985, production volume was expected to increase approximately 300
percent more to 250 million tons. See Rehbinder, "Control of Environmental Chemicals",
in Trends in Environmental Policy and Law (Berlin, Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1980)]. The
federal government itself estimates that between 2 and 4 million chemicals have been
synthesized with some 50-100,000 in commercial production worldwide. Approximately
10,000 of these chemicals have an annual production rate of greater than 100 pounds and
9,000 are produced in quantities greater than one ton per year. [An address by Jacques
Gerin, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Environment Canada, "The Significance of Toxic
Substances - Canadian Concerns and Controls," presented at "A Short Course on the
Significance, Analysis and Control of Toxic Substances in Wastewater" (Edmonton, Oct.
18-19, 1980)]. More than 160 billion pounds of synthetic chemicals were produced in
North America alone in 1977 with a 7 percent annual rate of increase. [Id.]. While
estimates have been made that between several hundred [United Nations Environment
Programme, Annual Review (Nairobi, Kenya: U.N.E.P., 1978)] to 1,000 [Hall and Chant,
supra note 2, at 16] new chemicals are brought into commercial use every year, federal
officials argue that in Canada only a small number of new chemicals are developed
annually with much larger numbers imported for the first time each year. [R.M. Robinson,
Assistant Deputy Minister, Environmental Protection Service, Environment Canada.
Speech to the 10th Annual Canadian Science Writers' Association Seminar (Toronto,
Apr. 13-16, 1980). See also address by J.E. Brydon, Director, Contaminants Control
Branch, Environment Canada, "Environmental Contaminants Act - A 1978 Progress
Report," to the annual meeting of the Canadian Manufacturers of Chemical Specialties
Association (Ottawa, Oct. 1978). Dr. Brydon notes that of the 356 chemical com-
pounds reported to the federal government between April 1976 and September 1978,
only 2 or 3 were new to world commerce though chemicals new to the country through
import were suspected of being more numerous. Dr. Brydon added that: "The low
number of new chemical compounds is surprising to us, given the prediction in the U.S.
that there are some 500 to 1,000 new chemicals introduced into the market place each
year...."].
7 Hall and Chant, supra note 2, at 4.
8 Kayden, "Opening Remarks at the New York Academy of Science Conferences," in
Hammond and Selikoff, eds, 329 Public Control of Environmental Health Hazards (New
York City: New York Academy of Science, 1979).
9 See generally, supra notes 2 and 8.
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measures has been reached. Therefore, there are gaps in statutory and regula-
tory measures. 10
A. The Role of the Federal Government
1. Before the Environmental Contaminants Act: The Impetus for In-
creased Government Control of Chemicals
One of the principal origins of federal interest in toxic chemicals legis-
lation can be traced to the early 1970's when several governments, including
Canada, Sweden and the United States became concerned that the possible
massive use of a synthetic organic chemical, nitrilotriacetate (NTA) as a
substitute for detergent phosphates might contaminate major bodies of fresh-
water. At that time there were no standardized test procedures for screening
new substances such as NTA. Accordingly, all three governments required
that this compound be thoroughly tested and evaluated for possible environ-
mental health hazards." Due to the lack of testing precedents, however,
difficulties in testing and evaluating NTA eventually led to the view that there
were generally few existing satisfactory test procedures to evaluate most sub-
stances for possible environmental hazards prior to their marketing and
release into the environment. As a result, the federal government formed
several interdepartmental committees and task forces and proceeded to con-
sider what was needed to create systematic programmes of testing and con-
trol procedures.
12
As a result of the above and related concerns, a federal task force was
10Though not explicitly mentioned in the British North America Act, 1867, en-
vironmental affairs are frequently areas of overlapping jurisdiction. This is no less true
in the area of toxic chemicals control, with federal constitutional authority being
derived from such heads of power, under section 91, as peace, order and good govern-
ment and the criminal law power and provincial constitutional authority arising from
such heads of power under section 92 as property and civil rights and matters of a
local or private nature. However, proper chemical controls must often proceed from
manufacture through to disposal and re-use. As a result, authority for one government
to legislate for control and management of the full range of such activities through
which a substance might cause problems, has long been treated within governments as
a gray area.
11 MacLeod, Historical Development of Policy for Environmental Contaminants
Legislation, Appendix D, Can., Task Force Report on Environmental Contaminants Legis-
lation (Cross-Mission) (Ottawa: Gov't. of Cda., Sept. 1972) [hereinafter Cross-Mission
Report]. See also Appendix A: Report of the Scientific Sub-Committee: Scientific and
Technical Aspects of the Environmental Contaminants Problem, Cross-Mission Report.
12 Id. Other contaminants appear to have provided a concurrent stimulus to federal
government investigation of possible toxic substance control initiatives. These include
toxic metals such as mercury, cadium and lead as well as other synthetic organic chemi-
cals such as DDT and PCBs. Id., Appendix A.
The scientific sub-committee noted various instances of contamination in Canada
arising from the use of substances such as mercury as well as the economic costs associated
with this damage. For example, aproximately 10 percent of the Canadian freshwater fish
catch could not be marketed in 1970 and 1971 because of lake closures arising from
unacceptable levels of mercury in some fish species. Government compensation and
related special programs to fishermen were reported to cost several millions of dollars in
this period. Additional costs, estimated in the millions, were also reported for possible
remedial clean-up measures, such as those associated with dredging and disposing of mer-
cury contaminated sediments in the St. Clair River system. Id.
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formed in 1972 to report on the need for environmental contaminants legis-
lation.13 Reporting in September 1972, the Task Force made several findings
that were to be significant in subsequent government control efforts. In the
first place, it defined as well as characterized the common elements of envi-
ronmental contaminants.14 Second, it re-affirmed the basis for previous gov-
ernment concerns about the nature and magnitude of the potential threat
posed by such substances to health and environment. 15 Third, it confirmed
the frequent lack of data to assess the environmental effects of new chemi-
cals, although it noted that information about certain existing substances was
sufficient to illustrate the need for action. 16 Fourth, it highlighted the need
for pre-testing new substances and screening existing substances. 17 Fifth, it
found existing federal and provincial law to be inadequate.' 8 And finally, it
found that there were multiple constitutional powers which could be used
to support new federal legislation.' 9
13 ld., Cross-Mission Report at 1. In particular the Task Force was required to
define "environmental contaminants" for legislative purposes; identify regulatory strat-
egies and legislative approaches (for example, development of new law or amendment
of existing law); report on constitutional aspects; and consider socio-economic and
policy issues in relation to environmental contaminants control. Id. at 2.
1- Id. at 4. This definition and characterization is substantially the same as that
found at note 4 and accompanying text with respect to toxic chemicals. However, in
neither its definition nor its characterization, did the Task Force appear to explicitly
identify the possibility of a substance combining or becoming transformed into a toxic
or more toxic substance. Appendix A to the Task Force's report did note though that
"... scientific information on cause/effect relationships should be available, not only on
separate substances but also on substances in combination."
'5 1d. and Appendix A. Previous inter-departmental committee reports were also
appended to the final report of the Task Force. See Appendix C: The Management of
Chemicals of Ecological Consequence (Protocol Supervisory Comm., Apr. 1971). This
earlier research group concluded, for example, that humans and the environment were
"being exposed to and challenged by a large number of novel chemical substances, an
unknown proportion of which may have unanticipated deleterious effects."
10 Supra note 11, Cross-Mission Report, Appendix A.
17 Supra note 11, Cross-Mission Report and Appendices A, C, and D. In Appendix
C, the 1971 interdepartmental committee stated that while it appeared to be a "monu-
mental task" there appeared to be "no real reason why all chemicals of ecological con-
sequence cannot be identified, as well as tested and registered if necessary." In Appendix
D several background statements, including those of Ministers and senior government
technical experts, underscored "the need for test protocols for screening products which
are potential environmental contaminants, before they reached the market place."
18 Id., Cross-Mission Report at 5-6. The Task Force stated in part: "The need to
screen substances systematically to establish their potential for causing damage to eco-
logical systems is, to some extent, responded to in the case of pesticides and radioactive
materials. But federal legislation fails to address the need for a comprehensive policy
to prevent damage deemed unacceptable to ecological systems by screening substances
which are known or potential environmental contaminants. Generally, the existing legis-
lation reflects a single factor concern, for example the deposit of wastes in water or
the discharge of contaminants to the air. It is reactive rather than preventive and
essentially ad hoc in its approach. The foregoing comments also apply to the approach
taken by provincial legislation." This aspect of the Task Force's report had a separate
survey of existing legislation. See Appendix B: Report of the Legal Sub-Committee:
Legal Aspects of the Environmental Contaminants Problem.
19 Id., Cross-Mission Report at 6-7. The report concluded that federal controls were
justified because of: the national or transboundary effects of many environmental con-
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The Task Force recommended the enactment of an Environmental Con-
taminants Act which would contain certain key features including: a require-
ment that persons manufacturing or importing substances that are prescribed
in a regulation furnish the government with certain information" and screen
such substances according to government developed testing protocols,2 ' the
incorporation of provisions to encourage the public to identify substances of
concern, a provision for public access to data on quantity and distribution
of environmental contaminants, test results and evaluations22 and the vesting
in the Minister of authority to appoint independent advisory groups to report
on substance restriction proposals. 23 Also recommended was the establish-
ment of an agency with authority to recommend which substances should
be prescribed; to develop testing protocols; to gather relevant information;
to evaluate screening process results; and to recommend substance pro-
hibitions and restrictions to Cabinet for action.
24
In concluding its report, the Task Force argued that it was essentially
proposing legislation that would complement, not supplant, existing federal
and provincial law. The proposed Environmental Contaminants Act's en-
forcement mechanisms were residual, to be used "only where such other
authorities fail or neglect to implement appropriate controls."25 Legislative
proposals arising out of the work of the Task Force and its predecessors were
eventually submitted to Parliament in early 1974.26
The House of Commons considered the federal government's proposals
for an environmental contaminants bill extensively during the 29th and 30th
taminants; the need for multiple stress evaluations and the concern over total exposure;
the import, export and interprovincial trade in substances which may become environ-
mental contaminants; and the potential danger, albeit indirect, to human health and
well-being. Appendix B concluded that several heads of power under the British North
America Act, 1867 provided a basis for developing a substance-oriented piece of federal
legislation. These included: section 91(27), the criminal law power and section 91, the
peace, order and good government power. The report was careful to note that provincial
legislatures, through such powers as section 92(13) property and civil rights and re-
lated BNA Act authorities, would also have a substantial claim to controlling such
environmental hazards released in their environment.
20 Id., Cross-Mission Report at 7. The type of information the Task Force argued
was necessary included: trade name of substance or product containing substance;
chemical composition and molecular structure; known and intended use; amounts pro-
duced, processed or so intended; amounts released in effluents and emissions; by-product
description and disposition; inventories of amounts released or which escaped accidental-
ly to the environment; transportation; and testing protocols results. Id. at 8.
21 1d. at 8.
22 Id. at 11-12. The Task Force argued that "an informed and actively participating
public will support and contribute to the effectiveness of a comprehensive environ-
mental contaminants policy and process "and that restriction recommendations should
take into account public views."
23 Id. at 12.
24 Id. at 8-9. The Task Force noted that for those substances new to Canadian
commerce, manufacturers or importers might be required to notify the Minister of
intent "so many months in advance of manufacture or import" and to provide the
agency with appropriate information.
2-5 d. at 12-13.
26 Environmental Contaminants Act, Bill C-3, 1974 (29th Parl. 2nd Sess.).
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Parliaments in 1974-75.27 The main features of the federal bill, introduced
for first reading in March 1974, paralleled the earlier recommendations of
the Task Force in many respects. Bill C-3 gave the departments of Environ-
ment and National Health and Welfare information-gathering, testing and
regulation-making authority with respect to substances they suspected might
be dangerous to health or to the environment and that they were satisfied
would not be controlled adequately by other federal or provincial laws after
consultation with the provinces and other federal departments. 28
In principle, there was general all party support for Bill C-3, and its
successor Bill C-25, but one of the major objections to its early passage
quickly emerged during the debates on second reading-the lack of an ex-
plicit pre-market screening or notification provision, particularly for new
chemicals. The Opposition argued that the lack of such an early warning
provision would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Government to
know what substances to suspect for purposes of activating the operative
provisions of the Bill.2 The Government responded that it could not require
27 The background to Bill C-3's and its successor's passage through Parliament is
somewhat complex and deserves brief mention of the principal phases here. Introduced
for first reading in March 1974 during the 29th Parliament as Bill C-3, it was debated
at second reading in April 1974 and then referred to the Standing Committee on
Fisheries and Forestry. However, an intervening summer 1974 federal election resulted
in the Bill dying on the order paper. The legislation was re-introduced in October 1974
for first reading as Bill C-25 and was debated in Parliament at second reading in
November and December of 1974 and again in March 1975 at the opening of the 30th
Parliament. It was then referred to the Standing Committee on Fisheries and Forestry
which this time was able to commence overview hearings on the Bill in April and May
1975 and then clause-by-clause review and modification until the end of June 1975.
The House gave the Bill third reading in October 1975 and assented to it on December
2, 1975. The Act came into force April 1, 1976.
28Environmental Contaminants Act, Bill C-3, 1974 (29th Parl. 2nd Sess.). In parti-
cular, Bill C-3 and its successor Bill C-25, included provision for the departments of the
Environment and National Health and Welfare to gather information on substances
either department suspects are being or are likely to be released to the environment in
quantities or concentrations that may be dangerous to health or to the environment; to
consult with the provinces and other federal departments on actions possible under
their laws in order to eliminate the danger; to issue notices requiring persons engaged
in commercial, manufacturing or processing activity involving the substance to furnish
specified information; to require those engaged in manufacture or import of the sub-
stance to conduct specified tests; to appoint advisory committees to collect and review
data and receive representations from interested persons or concerned members of the
public on any substance; to recommend that regulations or orders be made under the
Act for controlling the substance where no other federal or provincial law will eliminate
the danger; to publish a draft of the recommended regulation or order in the Canada
Gazette, and; if a notice of objection is filed by an "interested person" within 60 days
of publication, to establish an Environmental Contaminants Board of Review to inquire
into the extent of the danger posed by the substance and related matters. Protection for
trade secrets, sales or production information was also authorized as well as require-
ments for: emergency abrogation of procedures where immediate action is needed to
prevent significant danger; inspections; seizures and detentions, and; offences for releasing
to the environment beyond maximum quantities and concentrations substances specified
in a schedule to be authorized under the Act.
29 John A. Fraser (Vancouver South) on Bill C-3, Can. H. of C. Deb. Apr. 24,
1974, at 1731. See also comments on Bill C-25 by Fraser Can. H. of C. Deb. Dec. 12,
1974 at 2213-15, 2221 and Joe Clark (Rocky Mountain) March 21, 1975, at 4386-90.
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information in advance on all chemicals manufactured in the country. The
large technical staff needed and the administrative work load that would be
created to advise industry within a reasonable time frame, would make such
a program unworkable. 0 Moreover, the government argued that industry
already undertook pre-market testing and could be expected to continue to
do so, thus avoiding government restrictions after substantial financial invest-
ments had been made or major damage suits commenced. 3'
Ironically, when introducing Bill C-3 for second reading, the federal
Environment Minister described it as if it would provide a pre-market screen-
ing mechanism. Mr. Davis said in part:
Bill C-3 ... will set up a screening process. It will ensure that man-made sub-
stances will be checked out thoroughly before they are produced in this country
and sold to an unsuspecting public... Government will call for certain kinds of
tests to be made and industry must make them. Industry must pay for the testing
procedures and it must produce information on the environmental consequences
of these ... products which government will be insisting upon before they become
commercially marketable ... [ln early screening process makes a lot of sense,
not only from an environmental point of view but also from an economic point
of view .... Bill C-3 is not unprecedented in the sense that we have similar
screening arrangements in respect to food and drugs and other hazardous sub-
stances.
2
This interpretation of what the bill authorized was strongly disputed by
the Opposition and would appear to have been subsequently rejected by the
government itself. These policy differences were still unresolved when Bill
C-25 was sent to standing committee at which time additional concerns were
raised by industry and environmental groups.
Industry groups were principally concerned that better protection should
be afforded for confidential information, such as trade secrets, that cannot
otherwise be protected by patent;ss that unwarranted delay in production
SI Hon. Jeanne Sauv6, Min of the Env. on Bill C-25, Can. H. of C. Deb. March
24, 1975, at 4421-22. At the commencement of the standing committee hearings on the
Bill, Madame Sauv6 underscored this concern:
We investigated a blanket requirement that the government be kept informed
of all intentions of industry. There was also the choice of a registration scheme,
like the one written into the Pest Control Products Act. A registration system
would carry with it a duty for the government to respond with a carefully con-
sidered assessment of each notification from industry. A very large number of
highly trained experts would have to be found and added to the government to
handle these assessments ... it is almost impossible to do this within a reason-
able time frame... .We should be able to identify some really toxic chemicals
with the means at our disposal, but we should not require information on all
new chemicals."
Can. H. of C. Standing Comm. on Fisheries and Forestry, Proceedings, No. 16, (April 11,
1975) at 8. See also at 24 and 25, comments of Dr. J.E. Brydon, Director, Environmental
Contaminants Control Branch, Environment Canada on the same point.
3 1 Comments of Madame Sauv6, id. at 8 and 9.
32The Hon. Jack Davis, Min. of the Env., Can. H. of C. Deb. Apr. 24, 1974, at
1728-30.
33 Wilbur L. Canniff, Technical Director, Cdn. Chemical Producers Assn. and Dr.
B.B. Hillary, Manager, Corp. Services, Dow Chemical of Cda. Ltd., Can. H. of C.
Standing Comm. on Fisheries and Forestry, Proceedings, No. 18 (Apr. 17, 1975) at 5
and 6.
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start-up could be caused if prior substance or product registration were re-
quired,34 particularly since industry already did pre-market testing; 5 and,
that criminal sanctions in the bill should provide industry with a due diligence
defence when dangerous substances were released into the environment.36
Environmental groups were mainly concerned that the bill did not re-
quire industry to perform tests or report to government before manufacturing
new substances.3 7 Its provisions failed to encourage public participation, such
as allowing public initiation of review board proceedings or greater access
to information.3 8 It did not require that the government be notified when
industry learned that an existing substance might be dangerous to health or
to the environment.39 Finally, it was feared that since no time limit was
placed on consultation with the provinces and other federal departments,
few, if any, substances would be designated for control.
40
Issues of contention that eventually saw some compromise in the final
version of the bill included the acceptance by government of a modified
mandatory industry reporting requirement, 41 a time limitation on provincial
and federal agency consultation, 42 greater government authority to require,
3 4 Id. at 10, testimony of Mr. Canniff. However, industry did support the Bill as
legislation that could provide a distant early warning system of possible ecological
hazards. See correspondence from K.H. Rapsey, Exec. Dir., Cdn. Man. Assn. to the
Hon. Albert Bechard, Chairman, Can. H. of C. Standing Comm. on Fisheries and
Forestry (Jan. 20, 1975).
35 Id. at 17, testimony of Dr. Hillary.
36 K.H. Rapsey, Exec. Dir., and Graham Hughes, Leg. Dir., Cdn. Man. Assn., Can.
H. of C. Standing Comm. on Fisheries and Forestry, Proceedings, No. 19 (Apr. 24,
1975) at 21. See also "CMA director highly critical of environment bill," The Ottawa
Citizen, April 26, 1975 at 39, col. 1.
37 Heather Mitchell, Counsel, and J.F. Castrilli, Research Dir., Cdn. Env. L. Assn.,
Can. H. of C. Standing Comm. on Fisheries and Forestry, Proceedings, No. 24 (May 8,
1975).
88 Id.
39 John Bee, Researcher, Pollution Probe, Can. H. of C. Standing Comm. on
Fisheries and Forestry, Proceedings, No. 38 (June 17, 1975).
40 Supra note 37. See also "Federal Environmental Contaminants Legislation Given
First Reading", (1974) 3 Cdn. Env. Law News 64 at 67 where it is noted that: 'The
consultative process required with the provinces before any substances are designated
to make this Act effective is ieminiscent of the consultative constraints contained in the
Canada Water Act. It is perhaps relevant to note that the Canada Water Act, although
enacted in 1970, has been used only once to make any particular contaminant illegal."
41 Environmental Contaminants Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72, s. 4(6). The amendment
required that the manufacturer or importer of any chemical compound in excess of 500
kilograms, manufactured or imported for the first time, must report to the Minister
within three months of manufacturing or importing of the compound, the name and
quantity of the compound and any information in his possession regarding its danger
to health or environment. See generally Can. H. of C. Standing Committee on Fisheries
and Forestry, Proceedings Nos. 36 and 41 (June 10 and June 26, 1975 respectively).
42S. 5(2). The amendment required the Ministers to offer to consult but if the
offer was not acted upon within 30 days, consultation would be deemed to have
occurred. See generally Can. H. of C. Standing Comm. on Fisheries and Forestry, Pro-
ceedings, No. 42 (June 27, 1975).
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upon notification, industry information respecting quantities of substances
deemed to be of concern, 43 and the modification of criminal sanctions.44
An Opposition amendment that would have required industry to report
on dangers with existing chemicals of which it became aware was rejected by
the Government, 45 as was one that would have permitted any concerned
member of the public to file a notice of objection to a proposed order or
regulation and have a board of review empaneled to hear the matter.40 Other
43 S. 3(1). See generally Can. H. of C. Standing Comm. on Fisheries and Forestry,
Proceedings, No. 39 (June 19, 1975).
44S. 8(5). The maximum fine for violation of the section was raised from $10,000
to $100,000 but the possibility of imprisonment for up to six months, upon summary
conviction, was removed. See generally Can. H. of C. Standing Comm. on Fisheries and
Forestry, Proceedings, No. 42 (June 27, 1975).
45 Stu Leggatt (New Westminster) moved an amendment that read: "Any person
or corporation engaged in any commercial, manufacturing or processing activity dealing
with chemical substances already in existence, where such person or corporation has
reason to believe that such substance constitutes a danger to human health or the
environment, shall notify the Minister of the probable effects of such manufacturing or
processing and shall not distribute or emit such substance until approval is granted
by the Minister." Can. H. of C. Standing Committee on Fisheries and Forestry, Pro-
ceedings, No. 40 (June 25, 1975) at 25. Amendment negatived No. 41 (June 26, 1975)
at 16. A similar amendment respecting new chemicals was also negatived the same day.
Mr. Leggatt, in describing the advantages of an industry requirement to report
existing and new chemicals of concern noted in part that: "If a chemical company has
a report in its files from one of its own chemists that says, we have reason to suspect
this substance may be carcinogenic, then the onus should transfer to the company to
report that to [the Minister]." No. 36 (June 10, 1975) at 13. According to Mr. Leggatt,
such a provision would: make industry very careful in terms of its scientific assessments;
fill gaps in government information while preventing a potentially harmful substance
from being released to the environment; and reduce the administrative burden on
government by not having to register everything but placing the onus on industry to
report primarily existing substances it has reason to believe are of concern. No. 36 at
13 and 14 and No. 40 at 25-29.
While agreeing in principle with the proposal, government officials characterized
it as arguably unworkable because it: placed great reliance on industry to decide when to
report; raised the spectre of the new provision's circumvention by companies that simply
took care not to have such information in their possession, and; amounted to a de facto
registration system because it required that such substances not be emitted until govern-
ment approval. J.E. Brydon, Dir., Environmental Contaminants Control Branch, Env.
Cda., No. 40 at 27.
40 Robert Wenman (Fraser Valley West) moved the amendment arguing that the
government provision in the Bill would likely be construed by the courts to only allow
an "interested person", in the sense of one having a proprietary or financial interest that
would be effected by a proposed regulation, to file a notice of objection and have a
board of review established. Environment Canada's Legal Advisor, C.S. Alexander,
substantially agreed with this assessment of the government provision in the Bill and its
likely judicial interpretation. He added that the reason for limiting the phrase in this
manner was to permit the Minister discretion to refuse to set up a board where "some-
body who really knew nothing about the subject... would file a notice of objection .... "
Madame Sauv6 argued that the amendment was unnecessary because regardless of how
the courts might interpret the word "interest" she would include in this category
"ordinary citizens who have a clear interest in the substances entering their environ-
ments" as well as public interest groups. Id., No. 42 (June 27, 1975) at 19-25.
Interestingly, when the Bill was debated in Parliament at second reading in 1974
(when it was Bill C-3) the Hon. Jack Davis, then federal environment minister, stated
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comparatively minor amendments were incorporated at second and third
readings and the bill passed in December 1975. The Act came into force
April 1, 1976.
2. The Environmental Contaminants Act
The purpose of the Act is "to protect human health and the environment
from substances that contaminate the environment." 47 Under the Act the
Environment and National Health and Welfare Ministers are given the author-
ity to ban or restrict the import, manufacture, processing, sale, commercial
use or release of a substance (or class of substances) that they are satisfied
does or will constitute "a significant danger.., to human health or the envi-
ronment. 48 In keeping with the supplementary or residual role of the Act
the Ministers, before acting, must also be satisfied that the problem will not
be eliminated by use of other federal or provincial laws after undertaking
consultation, or making offers to consult, with the provinces and other fed-
eral departments.4 9 The Ministers' authority does not explicitly include the
authority to address such matters as the disposal of substances that are to be
scheduled for control under the Act.
The Act has several key provisions to complement the Ministers' basic re-
gulatory authority. The Ministers may publish notices in order to gather infor-
mation on and to require testing of certain substances from industry.50 There
is a provision requiring mandatory reporting by any person within three
months of the first time manufacture or import of a chemical compound in
excess of 500 kilograms. 51 Further, the Ministers may require record-keeping
and inspections. 52 These provisions and related matters are reviewed below.
a) Significant Danger
Any action by the Ministers to recommend regulation of a substance
(or class of substances) must be based on a finding that they are "satisfied"
that the substance "does or will constitute a significant danger... to human
that the review board provision "was included at the request of industry. It will give
any company or individual affected by this legislation an opportunity to state his or her
case. Producers, importers, etc. will therefore have an avenue of appeal open to them.
These industry-oriented boards of review will have powers and responsibilities similar
to those already enjoyed by the board of review under our... Hazardous Products
Act." Supra note 32, Davis at 1730.
47 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72.
48 This authority is actually exercised by the federal cabinet on the advice of the
two Ministers. It is based on the ability to place substances by order in a schedule
under the Act and to restrict them by regulations which must first be published in draft
form in the Canada Gazette 60 days prior to promulgation. Objections to the draft regu-
lation or order may be lodged during this period by "any person having an interest
therein" at which time an Environmental Contaminants Board of Review must be
empaneled to hear the objections and related matters and make recommendations to
the two Ministers. See generally ss. 5, 6, 7, 8 and 18.
49S. 5(2).
50 See generally ss. 3, 4, and 18.
51 S. 4(6).
52 SS. 10 and 18.
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health or the environment."53 As a result of this and related sections, com-
mentators argue that the burden of proof is generally on the Ministers, 4
notwithstanding other sections of the Act, such as the mandatory first time
reporting requirement r5 or notice of quantities requirement, 5 which could be
used to shift at least a significant evidentiary burden onto industry with
respect to particular substances.57 Moreover, because the Ministers' statutory
standard of proof is so vague (they must be "satisfied"), it is arguable that
in fact the Ministers set the standard they will themselves have to meet. As
Franson and Lucas note:
It does not indicate what factors the Minister[s] [are] to consider, nor does it
indicate how [they are] to weigh the various factors. It is not clear what method
of testing should be used to determine 'danger to human health or the environ-
ment'. Should humans be tested? Should various components of the physical or
biological environment be monitored? How should testing be carried out? What
levels of particular contaminant substances should be regarded as significant?
Considerable latitude is left for exercise of discretion.... Within the general
terms of the statutory standard or test, regulation and enforcement may range from
vigorous to feeble and accommodating. It all depends on internally generated
policies.58
The Act contains no definition of "significant danger." In practice, scientific
and technical uncertainty creates a problem in determining whether a par-
ticular substance poses, or may pose, a significant danger to health or to the
environment. In addition, competing socio-economic concerns may serve to
lessen the degree of control that might be imposed. 9 Currently, through the
development of several lists of priority and candidate chemicals,00 the Minis-
53S.5.
54 Franson and Lucas, "Part I-Legal Control of Hazardous Products in Canada"
in Sc. Council of Cda. Canadian Law and the Control of Exposure to Hazards. Back-
ground Study No. 39 (Ottawa: Supply & Services, Oct. 1977) at 67. Other examples of
the burden substantially being on the Ministers can be found in s. 3 where the Ministers
must "suspect" a danger to human health or the environment before they can collect
data or conduct investigations on a substance. See also s. 4 where the Ministers must
have "reason to believe?' that a substance will constitute a significant danger to human
health or the environment before industry can be required to furnish specified informa-
tion or conduct tests on a substance.
65 S. 4(6).
56 S. 3(1).
57 Supra note 54.
58 Id.
59 See generally Leah, "Hazard Assessment for Purposes of Federal Legislation in
Canada: The Fisheries Act, The Clean Air Act and The Environmental Contaminants
Act," in International Joint Commission, Great Lakes Water Quality Board Workshop
on Hazard Assessment, (Windsor, Ontario: I.J.C., Dec. 1977) at 9 and 22.
6
0 Since 1978, the Ministers have published three priority chemicals lists in the
Canada Gazette covering approximately 20 substances or classes of substances. These have
been divided into 3 categories of concern based upon the level of information available
regarding environmental and human health effects. Category I chemicals are those
which the government is satisfied pose a "significant danger" and for which regulations
are being developed. Category I chemicals are those which the government has reason
to believe pose a "significant danger" and which are being further investigated to
determine the nature and extent of the problem and what should be done. Category III
chemicals are those which the government believes may pose a "significant danger"
or for which more information, including toxicology and amounts used, is required. To
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ters concentrate on obtaining and assessing hazard risk information on se-
lected substances as a prerequisite to possible implementation of controls. 61
Once regulation development is deemed to be warranted, a 1977 federal
government directive requires that a socio-economic impact analysis of the
proposed regulation be prepared so that the costs and benefits and related
matters associated with the regulation may be considered.6
It is foreseeable that scientific uncertainty and problems of proof may
lead to successful industry challenges that a "significant danger" does not
exist. To date, regulations have been promulgated to ban or restrict the use
of five substances about which substantial scientific and public opinion
existed as to the dangers presented.63 However, federal advisors note that
date regulations banning three of the substances (Mirex, PBBs and PCTs) and restricting
the use of two others (PCBs and chlorofluorocarbons) have been promulgated. Six
other substances on the priority list have been dropped because the government viewed
them as being more properly controlled under other federal or provincial laws (e.g.
arsenic, asbestos, benzene, lead, nitrogen and sulphide oxides). Substances that are
primarily in Categories II and III include cadmium, chlorophenols, chlorobenzenes,
HCBD, mercury, phthalic acid esters and related substances.
In 1979, a list of candidate chemicals was created in order to obtain data and
evaluate potential environmental problems. Some of these eight substances or classes of
substances may eventually be placed on the priority chemicals list or dropped from
further investigation. They include aromatic amines and the chlorinated naphthalenes,
paraffins and styrenes. See generally Environmental Protection Service, Env. Oda.,
Canada Gazette Announcements-Environmental Contaminants Act (Ottawa: Env.
Cda., Dec. 1980).
01 The types of criteria or information used in assessments of hazard risk include:
carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, teratogenicity, toxicity, volatility, solubility, routes of entry
into the environment, dispersion and distribution throughout the environment, nature of
transformation products, impurities, persistence, accumulation in tissues and amounts
imported, manufactured or processed. See Canada Gazette. Part I. Departments of the
Environment and National Health and Welfare-Environmental Contaminants Act
Priority Chemicals-1979 (Dec. 1, 1979) at 7366. See also Leah, supra note 59 at 20-
22; and Toft, "Health Hazard Assessment in the Bureau of Chemical Hazards" in
Workshop on Hazard Assessment, id. at 131-139.
2 Treasury Board and Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, "Regulatory Re-
view System Announced," News Release (Ottawa: Gov't of Cda., Dec. 14, 1977). This
directive, which came into force in August 1978, requires that all new major federal
regulations in the areas of health, safety and fairness must undergo this analysis not
only in relation to direct costs and benefits, but also in relation to such considerations
as effects on costs and prices, distribution of income (who pays and who benefits),
international competitiveness and related concerns.
63 See, e.g., Schedule to the Act, amendment, S.O.R./77-733 and Chlorobiphenyl
(PCB) Regulations No. 1, CRC, Vol. 5, c. 564 at 3843; S.O.R./78-153; 80-461 as
am. During testimony before the PCB Board of Review in 1979, Dr. J.E. Brydon,
Director of Environment Canada's Contaminants Control Branch, set out the back-
ground of scientific and international opinion with respect to PCBs which helped spur
government action: "In 1973 ... the Council of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) made a major decision that all member countries
should limit the use of PCBs to enclosed uses and should develop control mechanisms
to eliminate the release of PCBs into the environment. The 'OECD decision,' establish-
ing co-ordinated environmental regulatory action among OECD countries, laid stress
on the ultimate need to entirely eliminate the dispersal of PCBs." Testimony of Dr. Jim
Brydon before PCB Board of Review (Ottawa: Gov't. of Cda., Dec. 10, 1979, Transcript
Vol. 1) at 10.
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these initial priority substances were some of the more visible contaminants
in the Canadian environment. They query whether the Act will be able to
cope with other less well-known substances or combinations of substances.
04
Moreover, federal officials themselves acknowledge that they are now investi-
gating many substances "whose hazardous nature is not so obvious."0 5 Under
our legal system, the greater the scientific uncertainty and problems of proof,
the greater is the likelihood of a successful court challenge to a government
decision by an industry with a substantial proprietary or pecuniary interest
in the substance or activity to be regulated. 6 As commentators have noted:
A subsequent federal/provincial Task Force recommended phasing out, by regula-
tion, all uses of those PCBs that were highly persistent in the environment. See Back-
ground to the Regulation of PCR in Canada. Report of the Task Force on PCB to the
Joint Department of Environment and National Health and Welfare Committee on
Environmental Contaminants (Ottawa: Gov't. of Cda., Apr. 1976). Dr. Brydon, in his
1979 testimony to the Board of Review, indicated that in fact the federal government
intends to phase out all uses of PCBs. Id.
All uses of three other substances (Mirex, PBBs and PCTs) which in recent years had
been produced in small quantities in Canada, have been prohibited by regulations under
the Act. Certain uses of other substances (chlorofluorocarbons) have been restricted by
regulation. In most cases such prohibitions or restrictions were proceeded by reports
which documented the quantities of the substances in Canada, determined the levels
of the substances in different ecosystems, determined the routes by which the substances
were entering the environment and recommended appropriate controls to be prescribed
by regulations under the Act. See, for example, Mirex in Canada. Report of the Task
Force on Mirex to the Joint Department of Environment and National Health and
Welfare Committee on Environmental Contaminants (Ottawa: Gov't. of Cda., Apr.
1977); Jamieson, Environmental Protection Service, Env. Cda., Polychlorinated Ter-
phenyls in the Environment. A report prepared for the Joint Department of Environ-
ment and National Health and Welfare Committee on Environmental Contaminants
(Ottawa: Gov't. of Cda., Sept. 1977).
It would appear that in certain cases, notorious pollution incidents in other juris-
dictions involving substances, such as PBBs, that had relatively little production volume
or use in Canada, may have made it feasible for the Ministers to restrict or prohibit
their use in this country. For example, in 1973 cattle feed inadvertently contaminated
with PBBs in Michigan and distributed across the state, subsequently resulted in gov-
ernment decisions to destroy at least 9,000 dairy and beef cattle, swine, goats and sheep;
700,000 chickens; and 3,000,000 eggs. PBBs had been shown to cause such problems
as cleft palates, liver tumours and brain outside the skull in tests by Michigan medical
researchers on mice offspring. Farmers testifying at state legislative committee hearings
reported a high incidence of abortions, stillbirths, deformed calves and mortality in
new-born cattle. Human health problems such as liver ailments, severe fatigue, deform-
ities, loss of hair and eyesight were also linked to PBB contamination. See PBB (poly-
brominated biphenyls) Pollution Problem in Michigan: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Water Resources of the Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Alma, Michigan, Nov. 19, 1979).
6 4 Hall and Chant, supra note 2, at 13 and 14. Indeed, Professors Hall and Chant
argue that the Act is inadequate to meet the realities of chemical contamination because its
procedures "are better adapted to coping with single chemical-single effect relationships
than with the often subtle and indirect effects of chemical complexes, often acting in
minute quantities over long periods of exposure." Id. at 19.
65 Leah, supra note 59, at 9.
46 See, e.g., Re Canada Metal Company Limited and MacFarlane (1973), 1 O.R.
(2d) 577 (H.C.), 41 D.L.R. (3d) 161. A stop order issued to a secondary lead smelter
in the Toronto area, was quashed by the court after a finding that the Ontario Environ-
ment Ministry, Air Management Branch Director had acted "arbitrarily and not judi-
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Hazardous substance issues can often be characterized as situations in which
there is some evidence of a risk of damage, but the likelihood of the risk cul-
minating in damage cannot be demonstrated with objective certainty. It is largely
or entirely speculative.
6 7
The possibility of a court challenge by industry may serve, therefore, to limit
the number of substances the Ministers deem a "significant danger" deserving
of regulation, or may serve to lessen the level of regulation imposed on a
particular substance or class of substances.
Increased administrative requirements respecting cost-benefit or risk-
benefit analysis as a basis for regulatory decision-making, 8 may also restrict
the Ministers' ability or willingness to make a finding of "significant danger"
for certain substances or to regulate them to a particular level. Federal offi-
cials themselves admit that "[w]hile the absolute hazard posed by a substance
will remain constant, the degree of acceptable hazard will likely fluctuate as
a result of... cost-benefit analysis."
Overall, some positive initiatives on better-known toxics have been un-
dertaken to date. The above factors, however, in conjunction with others
discussed below, could have a substantial limiting effect on the Act's system-
atic control of lesser-known toxic chemicals that could, eventually, present
equally great environmental impacts.
70
cially" by adopting a subjective and not an objective test of the danger to health alleged
to be caused by the company's operation. The provision of the Environmental Protection
Act (R.S.O. 1981, c. 141) under which the Director acted, authorized him to issue stop
orders where he is of the opinion "upon reasonable and probable grounds" that a con-
taminant source is discharging into the environment a contaminant that constitutes "an
immediate danger to human life, the health of any persons, or to property.... " The
Director acted after data was obtained showing high levels of lead in the blood of
several area residents. The Court found the Ministry's affidavit evidence was inadequate
and that there was no necessary cause and effect relationship between the company's
lead emissions and the elevated blood lead levels in area residents as opposed to other
possible sources or explanations. The court also noted that the evidence of the com-
pany's lead expert "pointed up the greater danger of jumping to a conclusion without
proper study." Id. at 591 (O.R.), 175 (D.L.R.).
Manufacturing chemists have expressed reservations about the scientific basis of
environmental legislation generally. For example, the Chemical Institute of Canada
recently stated that: "Any meaningful examination of environmental hazards must be
based on cause and effect. Current knowledge of dose-response relationships is limited
and inadequate. Epidemiological data is also limited. We may know the lethal dose of a
contaminant; we may even know the dose at which morbidity is observed; we know little
of the dosages and synergisms which produce chronic or sub-acute effects. This is the
weakness in the basis for most environmental legislation today and the cause for much
of the controversy between apparent experts." See Chemical Institute of Canada. Board
of Environmental Affairs. Comments on the Science Council Studies "Policies and
Poisons" (Ottawa: Chem. Inst. of Cda., Apr. 1976).
S0 7 Franson and Lucas, supra note 54, at 55 and 56.
08 For a discussion of the federal socio-economic impact analysis requirements
(SEIA) and notions of cost-benefit analysis generally, see infra notes 200-220 and
accompanying text.
69 Leah, supra note 59, at 9.
70 In 1978, for example, the International Joint Commission's Great Lakes Research
(now Science) Advisory Board expressed its "concern on the possible limitations of
current Canadian Federal legislation to control and to prevent future manifestation
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b) Information-Gathering: Government Notices and Testing Requirements
Four interrelated notice provisions under the Act authorize the Ministers
to obtain information from industry regarding selected commercial substances
and substances being released into the environment. The Ministers may place
notices in the Canada Gazette to "ascertain" from persons engaged in com-
mercial, manufacturing or processing activity involving selected substances,
the 'quantities of these substances being released into the environment;" to
obtain the names of those engaged in the above mentioned activities who are
using substances the Ministers are particularly concerned about; 72 to send
written notices directly to companies requiring them to furnish information;78
and to conduct tests7 4 specified in the notice.
Generally, these provisions can be used by the Ministers if they have
insufficient information to examine adequately whether a substance or class
of substances presents a "significant danger."7 5 Environment Canada regional
offices also can undertake more extensive surveys in conjunction with the
Act's notice-gathering provisions where known substances of concern, such
as PCBs, present potentially greater environmental risks because of the types
and extent of uses involved.
7 6
of man-made chemicals within Canada and the Great Lakes ecosystem." The concern
was expressed, in part, as a result of the fact that since 1975, regulations for only a few
chemicals such as PCBs, mercury, Mirex, PBBs and PCTs had been passed or considered
under federal legislation. See International Joint Commission, Great Lakes Research
Advisory Board. Annual Report (Windsor, Ont.: I.J.C., July 1978) at 10.
7
1 Environmental Contaminants Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72, s. 3(1). Section 3(2)
requires any person who has engaged or will engage in import, manufacture or process-
ing of the substance 12 months prior or subsequent to the notice, to provide the govern-
ment with data respecting such quantities upon the notice's publication.
72S. 4(1) (a). In order to use any of the notice provisions of s. 4, the Ministers
must have "reason to believe' that a substance is entering or will enter the environ-
ment in quantities or concentrations or under conditions that they believe constitutes
or will constitute a "significant danger to human health or the environment."
73 S. 4(l) (b).
74S. 4(1)(c). Such notice may only be sent to those engaged in importation or
manufacture of the substance or any product containing the substance.
75 For example, to December 1980, s. 3(1) has been used to ascertain the quan-
tities of four substances or classes of substances in use in Canada. Canada Gazette
Announcements, supra note 73. The substances or classes of substances and the quan-
tities of use above which companies were required to report during the specified periods
included: mercury (10 kilograms); chlorobenzenes (500 kilograms); aromatic amines and
halogenated hydrocarbons (1 kilogram). By January 1982 polyectrolytes and bro-
minated fire retardants may also be the subject of s. 3(1) notices. [Interview with T.D.
Leah, Contaminants Control Branch, Env. Cda., (March 4, 1981, Ottawa)], s. 4(l)(a)
has been used. to obtain the names of those persons using four other substances or
classes of substances [Id. These included: Mirex, PCBs, PBBs and PCTs. In each
case use of more than 1 kilogram of the substance in a calendar year necessitated
reporting to government]; and s. 4(1)(b) has been used to obtain information from
companies respecting production, import, export, sales distribution, end-use patterns
and related matters for eight substances or classes of substances. lId. These included:
PCBs; chlorofluorocarbons; chlorophenols; chlorobenzenes; aromatic amines; and halo-
genated methanes, ethanes and ethylenes].
76 A 1977 questionnaire, eventually sent to over 1,000 companies, was designed to
gather information from companies using PCBs directly, such as in plasticizers and
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While the Act has provided some valuable information, it apears defi-
cient, on its face and as it has been applied, in several key respects. First,
without sufficient information to demonstrate concern for a chemical (neces-
sary to satisfy the "reason to believe" requirement), the Ministers cannot
invoke provisions such as sections 4(1) (b) or (c) to demand additional
data or to require testing. As a result, preliminary assessments are often
based on insufficient data.77 This presents particular problems with respect to
chemicals that are reported to the government by industry for the first time
pursuant to section 4(6), discussed below. Second, section 4(1) (c) requires
testing only by manufacturers and importers, and not by those using or pro-
cessing the substance commercially. Commentators argue that all those who
use, process, manufacture, or import the substance should be required to test
or to share in testing a substance to ensure its safety and to reduce the cost
burdens of testing.78 Third, the Ministers have never invoked section 4(1) (c).
This is partly explained by the fact that there is no departmental policy or
statutory guidance as to who, among several importers or manufacturers of an
existing chemical, should be required by the Ministers to conduct tests. An-
adhesives; indirectly such as in transformers, capacitors or other mechanical devices;
and from firms engaged in the disposal or transportation of PCB wastes. The informa-
tion sought included: the use, type and quantity of PCB at each location; past servicing
and maintenance carried out on PCB containing equipment; disposal practices used for
PCB containing wastes and equipment; and an indication as to whether plans had been
made within each plant to phase-out PCB use. The survey helped contribute to findings
which showed that as of January 1979 the bulk of the approximately 17.5 million
kilograms of PCBs in use, or in storage for use or disposal in Canada are located in
Ontario and Quebec (app. 70%). See generally Environmental Protection Service, Ont.
Region, Env. Cda., PCB Inventory Report (Toronto: Env. Cda., Jan. 1979).
77 Memorandum from R. Demayo, Hazard Assessment Division, to J.R. Monteith,
Acting Director, Contaminants Control Branch, Env. Cda. (March 4, 1981, Ottawa).
78 Heather Mitchell, Research Fellow, International Council of Environmental Law,
Federal Control of Toxic Substances in Canada (unpublished paper presented to the
International Institute for Environment and Society, March 14, 1978, Berlin, Federal
Republic of Germany).
In other jurisdictions, such as the United States, pursuant to the Toxic Substances
Control Act of 1976 (15 U.S.C. §2601) (TSCA) once a test rule for a chemical sub-
stance is promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, it applies to all
manufacturers, importers and processors. To avoid duplicate testing of a substance and
needless expense by many firms, TSCA allows U.S. EPA to exempt from testing, a
manufacturer or processor of a chemical that is "equivalent" to one for which testing
is already required. The company then shares the cost with those doing the testing
(§4(c), 15 U.S.C. §2603(b), (c)). While the U.S. EPA is seeking voluntary industry
arrangements for cost allocation or third party responsibility for testing, TSCA requires
that if no agreement can be reached among the parties, U.S. EPA must determine the
proper amount of reimbursement, considering all relevant factors, including relative
competitive positions of the parties. These provisions were included to also ensure that
small businesses are not assessed an undue percentage of testing costs.
Some concerns that have been raised with this approach include: how and when
"equivalent" is to be defined; how a company's "market share" should be determined
so that test costs can be fairly allocated and reimbursement disputes settled; and how
confidential information can be protected in communications concerning what company
shall test chemicals and how test costs should be allocated. See generally U.S. Council
on Environmental Quality, Eleventh Annual Report (Washington, D.C.: C.E.Q., Dec.
1980) at 239.
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other reason behind the non-use of section 4(1) (c) is that the departments
lack the methodology to determine whether chemicals are entering the environ-
ment in quantities, concentrations or under conditions that constitute an en-
vironmental or human health danger. As a result, no regulations pursuant
to section 18(h) respecting tests required under section 4(1) (c) have been
promulgated. 79 Finally, industry concern about the potential expense asso-
ciated with testing existing chemicals has arguably influenced government
decisions not to require testing. 0
Testing was regarded as a key issue by the 1972 Cross-Mission Task
Force and during House of Commons consideration of the bill. It is also
considered a cornerstone of environmental legislation in other jurisdictions.8'
The failure to develop and apply systematic testing requirements is a major
gap in the Act and its implementation in Canada.8
79 Interview with Dr. J.E. Brydon, Director, Toxic Chemicals Management Centre
and Dr. M.F. Millson, Chief Toxicologist, Contaminants Control Branch, Env. Cda.
(March 4, 1981, Ottawa).
In the U.S., where most test rules under TSCA are also expected to be developed
for one or a group of existing chemical substances, the U.S. CEQ reports that U.S. EPA
efforts to develop policies for issuing test rules have been circumscribed by disagreement
which has "centered on how chemicals are selected for testing, how detailed an evalua-
tion must precede issuance of a test rule, and what kinds of tests should be conducted
by whom." CEQ Report, supra note 78, at 235-36.
80 For example, at 1980 hazardous waste hearings in Alberta, the Canadian Chemi-
cal Producers Association described the costs and possible range of tests needed for
testing existing chemicals as a "horrendous" problem. See testimony of William A. Neff,
Technical Dir., Cdn. Chem. Producers Assn., Environment Council of Alberta, Public
Hearings on the Management of Hazardous Wastes in Alberta, Transcript, Vol. 15 (Red
Deer, Alta.: June 5, 1980) at 153-54.
81 Steven D. Jellinek, Assistant Administrator for toxic substances with the U.S.
EPA, testified before a U.S. Senate subcommittee in May 1979 as to the importance of
testing under TSCA, saying: "The chemical testing program is one of two major pro-
visions of TSCA-the other being the pre-manufacture review program for new chemi-
cals-that are largely unique to the law and provided much of the impetus for its
enactment." United States Senate. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and Space of the Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 4, 1979) at 3.
The West German Federal Chemicals Law, enacted in July 1980 (came into force,
January 1982) has been described as breaking new ground, from the standpoint of
European toxic substances regulation, primarily in the area of controls on existing
chemicals. The federal government has been authorized to identify particular existing
substances for which there are real indications of hazard and to demand that these be
subjected to any tests that are deemed appropriate. See Jasanoff, "German Law to
Control Toxic Substances," Toxic Substances Control Newsletter, Nov.-Dec. 1980 at 1.
82 This failure is also a problem in other jurisdictions. For example, a U.S. General
Accounting Office review of U.S. EPA's testing program recently concluded that the
agency has been slow to assess the risks of existing chemicals (such assessment being
a key pre-requisite to use of TSCA's testing requirements). It also found that no test
standards describing how specific tests should be performed or test rules requiring
manufacturers or processors to test a chemical have been issued. The review also found
the agency dilatory in responding to an advisory committee's recommendations that
selected priority chemicals should be tested. See United States General Accounting
Office. EPA Is Slow To Carry Out Its Responsibility To Control Harmful Chemicals.
Report to the Congress By The Comptroller General of the United States. CED-81-1.
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 1980).
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c) Mandatory Industry Reporting of First-Time Manufacture or Import
Section 4(6) of the Act makes it mandatory for industry to report infor-
mation without first being requested by the Ministers. This section requires
that where, during a calendar year, a person manufactures or imports a
chemical compound in excess of 500 kilograms for the first time, he must,
within three months of reaching that amount, notify the Minister of the name
and quantity of the compound and of any information he possesses regarding
any danger it poses to human health or to the environment.
This reporting requirement was one of the main compromise provisions
that resulted from concerns expressed during the 1974-75 House of Com-
mons and public debates arising from the fact that the bill contained no
early warning system of possible problem substances to the environment.
Thus, in drafting section 4(6), it was the government's intent to identify
major new uses of chemicals in order to be in a position to know what
chemicals are being introduced into commerce for the first time or what new
uses of existing chemicals are being planned.83 Indeed, between April 1, 1976
and December 30, 1980, approximately 1,273 substances were reported to
the Minister pursuant to this section.
84
In practice, however, section 4(6) has been of little aid in helping the
federal government determine which substances are, in fact, new to Canadian
commerce. This is so partly because no inventory of existing chemicals in
Canda is required under the Act. s5 Federal officials have noted further that:
All we know definitely is that a chemical compound reported under section 4(6)
is new to the reporting company. We rely on information in the trade journals
and on intelligence obtained from... an officer of the reporting company to
indicate whether a given compound is indeed new in Canadian commerce, or
whether there is a major new use projected for it, or whether there is to be a
significant increase in its consumption in the future.... One of our stumbling
blocks in the identification of new chemicals is the absence of a comprehensive
inventory of existing chemicals in use in Canada. We have no immediate plans
to develop one for several reasons. At the moment we plan to make use of the
equivalent U.S. inventory in identifying new chemical compounds in Canada. We
83 Dr. J.E. Brydon, Director, Contaminants Control Branch, Env. Cda. Notes for a
Talk to the Chemical Industry (March 25, 1976, Ottawa). Dr. Brydon also observed that
generally there are three categories of problems that an early warning system must
address: First, new chemicals because we have no experience with their properties;
second, existing chemicals used for new purposes which may lead to major new releases
to the environment in amounts which it cannot accommodate; and third, existing
chemicals about which we suddenly obtain new knowledge with respect to long-term
adverse effects, such as carcinogenesis. See Address to the Canadian Chemical Pro-
ducers Association, Notes on the Environmental Contaminants Act (Apr. 8, 1976,
Ottawa).
84 Demayo, supra note 77. However, not all these substances would be considered
"chemical compounds". For example, between April 1976 and September 1978, 839
substances were reported, but only 356 could be described as chemical compounds,
according to federal officials. During this 1976-78 period approximately 69 of these
compounds required more detailed follow-up, through the notice and related informa-
tion-gathering mechanisms discussed above. See Brydon, supra note 6.
85 Interview with Ruth Demayo, Hazard Assessment Division, Contaminants Con-
trol Branch, Env. Cda. (March 4, 1981, Ottawa).
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believe that is a reasonable approach, given the close relationship of the chemical
industry and the manufacturing industry in the U.S. and Canada.80
Section 4(6) and related information-gathering limitations under the
Act have also been criticized by International Great Lakes research bodies:
It is... feasible that the two Canadian Departments with responsibilities under
the Environmental Contaminants Act are not aware of many compounds manu-
factured, processed or imported within Canada, while two other Departments
with no obligations to the Act do have such information, namely Statistics Canada
(production and usage) and Revenue Canada - Customs and Excise (importa-
tion). However, the continually updated data of the latter two Departments is by
Canadian law, confidential and inaccessible to any other Federal Departments.
Without such information, it is difficult for the [Research Advisory] Board to
comprehend how the Departments with responsibility for the Contaminants Act
can confirm which compounds are being produced or imported for a first time,
and henceforth, determine whether importers or manufacturers are complying
with section 4(6) of the Act. The Board feels that it is most essential for juris-
dictions with responsibilities for toxic substance control to have a continually
updated inventory which identifies substances in use, manufactured or imported
within a country. The Canada Environmental Contaminants Act does not assure
such information even on a confidential basis to the Canadian Departments
responsible for enforcement of the Act.
87
A federal environmental contaminants board of review also found that sec-
tion 4(6) was drafted too narrowly to require the reporting of elemental
chemicals which may be potentially hazardous to health and to the environ-
ment. It recommended that amendments be considered to correct this
deficiency.88
Quite apart from not necessarily knowing which chemicals are new to
Canadian commerce, the federal government has not been receiving adequate
information from industry about chemicals reported under the section 4(6)
requirement. Federal officials indicate that even with the issuance of 1978
reporting guidelines which list the type of data that should accompany, even
voluntarily, a section 4(6) notification," Environment Canada has been
receiving very little toxicity information from industry and almost nothing on
environmental effects. The Department often requests further information
on notified chemicals, if for no other purpose than to determine formally, in
writing, which data are not available.90
While the government's experience has been that companies are cooper-
86 Brydon, supra note 6.
87 Findings and conclusions of the IJC-Great Lakes Research Advisory Board, supra
note 70 at 9-10.
88 Environmental Contaminants Board of Review, Report on PCBs (Ottawa: Gov't
of Canada, March 1980). This Board was established as a result of objections to pro-
posed PCB regulations issued pursuant to the Act in 1978.
89 See Canada Gazette, Part I (Oct. 14, 1978) at 6217-6219. The Reporting Guide-
lines request such information be filed as: chemical identification; specification (i.e.
composition, packaging and name and address of foreign supplier); properties (e.g.
melting point, degradability, solubility); toxicity data; amounts and uses. The guidelines
also address confidentiality matters. Because under section 4(6) only the chemical name,
quantity and availability of information on danger can be required, all other information
requested in the guidelines would, be submitted voluntarily.
90 Supra note 85.
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ative in responding to such requests, frequently the data does not exist or is
not available to Canadian companies (for example, when the chemical is an
import). This problem can only be solved by a testing requirement. But, as
noted above, without sufficient information to demonstrate concern for a
notified chemical, other sections of the Act such as 4(1) (b) and (c) cannot
be used to require additional data or testing. In essence, "section 4(1) (b)
does not seem to provide a suitable tool for obtaining information about new
chemicals and section 4(6) does not demand sufficient data in the original
notification." 9'
Because of the deficiencies in section 4(6) and also because of the
perceived need to achieve harmony in the international control of chemi-
cals,92 Environment Canada has determined that substantive amendments
to the Act in the area of data collection and testing are necessary.93 They
recommend the incorporation of provisions, by statute or regulation, to
establish a list of existing chemicals so that a new chemical can be defined
by its absence from the list; to require that all new chemicals imported,
manufactured or used in Canada be subject to a sixty day pre-market notifi-
cation and moratorium; to specify a minimum pre-market set of data to
accompany the notice, with opportunity to extend the marketing moratorium
a further sixty days while hazard assessment is undertaken; to prohibit mar-
keting of the chemical; to allow specified uses; to defer permission to market
the chemical pending results of further testing or to require testing after the
chemical is marketed; to issue special orders (for example, orders relating
to labelling, packaging, handling and disposal) to ensure safety in its use;
to issue general orders respecting control of manufacture, use, export, han-
dling and disposal of reported chemicals; to require maintenance of records
of amounts used, transported, sold, or disposed of; and to require reporting
of such records to the government.94
With respect to the special problems of testing new chemicals, Environ-
ment Minister John Roberts has supported the "value of a system which
91 Supra note 77. The problem of inadequate data and testing, particularly for new
chemicals, has also plagued toxic substance control programs in other countries. During
1980 testimony before a Congressional subcommittee, for example, Steven D. Jellinek,
assistant administrator for toxic substances with U.S. EPA, stated that: "Since the July
1, 1979, inception of the TSCA section 5 premanufacture notification program, EPA
has received 105 notices from companies intending to manufacture new chemicals in
the United States. The notices we have received to date have been characterized by a
very significant lack of health effects testing data. . . .There is no doubt that this general
lack of adequate risk related information runs contrary to congressional intent in
passing section 5 of TSCA and that it also contradicts industry's own oft-expressed view
of how it conducts testing of new chemicals." Toxic Substances Control Act Amend-
ments of 1980. Hearings on H.R. 7003 before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protec-
tion and Finance of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 1980) at 281.
92 International developments will be discussed infra.
93 Memorandum from Dr. I.E. Brydon, Dir., Toxic Chemicals Management Centre
to George Cornwall, Acting Dir., Planning, Policy and Assessment Directorate. Env.
Cda. (Oct. 14, 1980, Ottawa).
94 Id.
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would give us good data on the implications of these chemicals before they
enter the commercial world." 95 Whether this authority to test would be sys-
tematically employed remains to be seen; however, given the relatively small
number of new chemicals produced or imported into Canada each year,"0 it
would appear that systematic use of such provisions is feasible. Industry has
been a cautious supporter of a prospectively greater federal capacity under
the Act to require selective pre-market testing of chemicals, with the pre-
condition that industry should be involved in assessing the tests to be used
in determining the degree of hazard 7
Should the Environment Canada proposals be implemented, they would
mark a substantial improvement in the government's ability to control new
chemicals. As with the current provision of the Act on this point, however,
there is a danger that any testing will come too late in the process to be
effective, because notice is required only at the pre-marketing stage of a
chemical's development. Statutes like the Toxic Substances Control Act,
while they have also had their difficulties in being implemented, 08 require
pre-manufacture notice. To the extent that testing can be required at this
earlier stage, sounder decision-making is likely to result because large sums
of industry development money will not have been irretrievably committed.90
d) Protection of Confidential Industry Information.
The Act provides for confidentiality of information gathered under its
authority that "relates to a formula or process by which anything is manu-
95Hon. John Roberts, Min. of the Env. Speech Notes for an address to a Joint
Meeting of the Canadian and American Bar Associations (March 19, 1981, Banff,
Alta.). See also "Guidelines co-ordinate toxic testing," The Globe and Mail (Toronto),
March 19, 1981 at 8, col. 5.
96 Robinson and Brydon, supra note 6.
97Canadian Manufacturers Association, Position Statements on Environmental
Quality Control (unpublished, Dec. 1, 1980, Toronto) at 11.
981n late 1980 the U.S. GAO reported that U.S. EPA had not implemented the
premanufacture notice requirements of TSCA in a timely manner. It noted that while
EPA was developing review procedures it was not actively working on establishing
criteria upon which to base decisions. Moreover, it noted that experience to date indi-
cated that EPA was not receiving adequate toxicity or exposure data from industry,
thus hampering government reviews. Supra note 82. These problems could adversely
influence development of Canada's control programmes as well.
9 Mitchell, supra note 78. Under section 5 of TSCA, any person who intends to
manufacture or process a new chemical, or an existing chemical for a significant new
use, must give the U:S. EPA 90 days' notice before manufacturing or processing the
chemical. Notices submitted must include the name of the chemical, its chemical identity
and molecular structure, proposed categories of use, an estimate of the amount to be
manufactured, the by-products resulting from the manufacture, processing and disposal
of the chemical, and any test data related to the health and environmental effects in
the manufacturer's possession. The manufacturer must also do new tests, and submit
the resulting data if, the testing of the chemical or members of its chemical class is
required by a rule promulgated by the U.S. EPA, or if, the U.S. EPA has included
the chemical on a published list of new chemicals or classes of new chemicals which
present or may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment
if they are introduced into commerce. Other mechanisms under the section are avail-
able to U.S. EPA to delay manufacturing where necessary.
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factured or processed, whether patented or not, or to other trade secrets or
that is sales or production information.""' Such information which is speci-
fied in writing by the company as confidential cannot be disclosed by the
Ministers, "except as may be necessary," for the Act's purposes.
While this non-disclosure provision is meant to protect a legitimate in-
dustry concern regarding release of confidential data to competitors, it may
impinge on another important societal interest: the need to have access to
environmental health and safety studies on toxic chemicals. The tension in-
herent in the provision is essentially resolved in favour of industry, as there
are no affirmative duties in the Act that require the Ministers to release
information to other agencies or the public. Indeed, during House considera-
tion of the environmental contaminants bill, industry groups, while ex-
pressing some reservations about the section, were generally satisfied with the
provision.' 0' Environmental groups, on the other hand, argued that the sec-
tion did not give the public the right to know what the identity of a substance
was, let alone what its environmental health and safety effects might be. 02
Federal officials have been cognizant of these competing interests in
administration of the Act. They note that, in addition to protecting trade
secrets and related data, they are attempting to develop a system that would
permit the sharing of confidential information by a number of government
agencies as well as meet the increasing public demand for detailed knowledge
about chemicals which are in, or are likely to be in, the environment.
03
Presently, however, there are constraints, or certainly delays, in the
timely release of information obtained under the Act. For example, because
of problems of confidentiality, the names of notified substances under section
4(6) have yet to be made public. Federal officials indicate that, in most
cases, an industrial chemical name or trademark name is not confidential;
however, its association with section 4(6) may disclose to competitors a
trade secret such as the "hidden" ingredient of a catalyst, a paint formulation
100 Environmental Contaminants Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72, s. 4(4).
1o Supra note 33, at 9.
1o2 Supra note 37.
103 Brydon, supra note 6. Similar initiatives have been recommended in other juris-
dictions. For example, eighteen federal agencies in the U.S. recommended in mid-1980
that legislation should be prepared to facilitate sharing of confidential data between
health and environmental agencies and to permit sharing data with contractors and
subcontractors with appropriate security safeguards. The group also recommended that
statutes allowing public disclosure of health, safety and efficacy data should remain
unchanged, but legislation should be prepared enabling agencies to give the public access
to confidential data "on a good cause-public interest basis so that there cart be public
participation in decision-making and independent evaluation of the data." Such legisla-
tion would define the standard for disclosure and include security precautions, sanctions
against unauthorized disclosure and notice to the data submitter. See Toxic Chemicals
and Public Protection. A Report to the President by the Toxic Substances Strategy
Committee (Wash., D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printers Office, May 1980). TSCA explicitly
exempts health and safety studies and data from the prohibitions not to disclose trade
secrets found elsewhere in the U.S. law. §14(b), 15 U.S.C. §2613(b)(A).
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or a dye. As a result, a list of 374 unique chemical compound names in-
cluded in section 4(6) notifications between April 1976 and December 1978
were released for the first time in 1981. Other lists for subsequent years
will follow.'
Such delays can effectively reduce the possible role of public scrutiny
of the section 4(6) program by allowing potentially harmful substances
to enter Canadian markets and the environment long before the public is
aware of a problem. This could also occur if, unlike in Japan's Chemical
Substances Control Law, the public is not permitted to know the chemical
structure of new chemicals.105 Industry has been known to claim as confi-
dential the chemical identity of new chemicals, although such identification
has been described as perhaps the single most impoi-tant piece of information
for judging the possible health and environmental effects of a substance. 100
Canadian industry has argued that if data has been developed by a com-
pany it is the company's intellectual property. Such data should then be
protected because principles of confidentiality ought not to be overridden by
the broad wording characteristic of the last part of section 4(4), which per-
mits disclosure "for the purposes of the Act."'' 07 In particular, industry has
pressed for government acceptance, supported by legislation, if necessary,
of a number of principles, including the limitation of government requests for
information to those which are necessary to protect human health and the
environment; the maintenance by government of an adequate security system
for confidential data; the designation by industry of what is, and what is
not, confidential; the prohibition of agencies sharing such data, unless
104 Supra note 77.
105 Under Japanese law, the chemical structure of all new chemicals must be pub-
lished. Law No. 117 of 1973, Concerning the Examination, Screening and Regulation of
Manufacture (etc.) of Chemical Substances. See also Ministry of International Trade
and Industry, The Chemical Substances Control Law in Japan (Tokyo: Min. Int'l Trade
and Ind., 1977).
106 Of the first 183 pre-manufacture notices for new chemicals filed by industry
with U.S. EPA under TSCA to July 16, 1980, 70% of the notices (123) claimed
chemical identity as confidential business information. Supra note 82. For U.S. EPA's
conclusions respecting the importance of knowing chemical identity for judging a sub-
stance's possible environmental health effects, see 44 Fed. Reg. 2242 (1979). "Proposed
Regulations for the Submission and Review of Premanufacture Notices under TSCA,
s. 5 and support documents." U.S. environmental groups argue that in the absence of
knowing chemical identity, one cannot independently determine structure-activity rela-
tionships; assess the appropriateness of the tests and test methods used; replicate the test
or conduct additional testing. They also argue that a generic description of the chemical
would not be an adequate substitute. See Jacqueline M. Warren, staff attorney, Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Authorization and Oversight of the Toxic Substances Control Act.
Hearings on H.R. 2606 before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of
the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Wash., D.C.:
March 8, 1979). Industry has argued that an informed evaluation of the test data for
new chemicals can be based as effectively on a chemical's generic class as on its specific
identity. Testimony of Curtis W. Smith, Manufacturing Chemists, Association. Id. at 40-
41.
107 CMA, supra note 97. See also Canadian Chemical Producers, Association, Posi-
tion Paper on Confidentiality (Aug. 1980, Ottawa).
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authorized by law or with company consent; no disclosure of confidential
data, except where necessary, and only with company approval, including
a company opportunity to prepare the initial draft of any release; and the
imposition of liability on government for damages resulting from wrongful
disclosure.108
The federal government agrees that legitimate confidential data should
not be released but takes issue with the industry view that there should be no
interagency sharing of such information:
Industry holds the view that it, not government, should determine what in-
formation should be treated as confidential and that governments should not be
allowed to transfer such information to other governments for whatever purpose.
It is further contended that if other governments wish that information they
should approach industry directly for it. A policy based on this view of confi-
dentiality runs the risk of placing industrial or corporate interest ahead of the
public interest through adoption of overly broad confidential categories. It could
also make more difficult federal-provincial and international cooperation in the
management of toxic chemicals and could result in costly duplication of in-
formation-gathering activities.109
From the public's perspective, the principal difficulty with the Act is that it
does not require disclosure of health and safety studies to the public. In prin-
ciple, Environment Canada officials agree with the concept of aggregating
the confidential data collected by notices under the Act and of presenting for
release to the public the non-confidential sections of a report or summaries." 0
In practice, because of frequent industry assertions that such data are con-
fidential, or inextricably linked to confidential information,"' it is likely that
only statutory amendments will guarantee public access to health and safety
data.
e) Advisory Committeks and Boards of Review: The Roles of the Public
and Industry in the Regulation-Making Process
Two mechanisms under the Act may permit both the general public and
industry to influence the development of regulations: the provisions for
establishment of advisory committees and boards of review.
The Ministers are authorized to appoint advisory committees to review
and assess data collected under other sections of the Act; to advise the Min-
isters on possible substance control measures; to receive representations from
"interested parties or concerned members of the public"; and to publish
reports and recommendations. 1 2 The Act also requires prior publication in
108 Id.
1o Supra note 4, at 9.
1"o Supra note 79.
11 Of the first 183 TSCA premanufacture notices for new chemicals industry filed
with U.S. EPA to July 16, 1980, 19% claimed health and/or safety data as confidential.
This percentage was regarded as understated because not all the notices contained health
and safety information. Supra note 82. U.S. GAO report.
112 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72, ss. 3(4) and (5).
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draft form of contaminants regulations in the Canada Gazette, sixty days
before promulgation. An opportunity for objection and a hearing before an
Environmental Contaminants Board of Review is also afforded "any person
having an interest." Once such a Board of Review is empanelled, "other in-
terested or knowledgeable persons" may also appear before it to present evi-
dence and make representations."13
The distinctions, as well as interrelationships, between the two types of
bodies are summarized in a recent report of the first Board of Review:
The function of an advisory committee is very different from that of a board of
review. The former is concerned with the collection and assessment of data as
well as, possibly, the shape of control measures, all leading to the formulation of
regulations and hence should make its contribution before government officials
have developed any commitments to particular control strategies or even the
necessity for them in relation to a particular substance. The latter-a board of
review-is concerned with the review of the control policy which the Govern-
ment has specifically proposed as being appropriate. The former may include
government officials who will be involved in advising the Minister. The latter
must be independent and be seen to be independent. 114 [emphasis in original]
There have been positive and negative experiences with both processes to
date. The principal concerns expressed during Parliament's consideration of
the environmental contaminants bill in 1975 with respect to advisory com-
mittees were that they might be neither sufficiently representative of various
professional perspectives or interests, nor sufficiently visible in their activities
to attract submissions from the public." 5 A further concern is that the Act
contains no mandatory duty on the Ministers to establish advisory commit-
tees." 6 Since April 1976, only one advisory committee has been established-
respecting mutagenesis-under the direction of Health and Welfare Can-
ada. 17 Before April 1981 this committee, which was established in 1978,
had not sought public input."a 8 In 1980, the PCB Board of Review drew
113 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72, ss. 5 and 6. The Board's inquiry must address not only
the proposed regulation and any objections to it but also the nature and extent of any
danger posed by the substance to be regulated. In addition, it must also address such
matters as the substance's presence in the environment and any possible human health
or environmental effects; the extent of its dispersal and persistence in the environment;
its ability to bioaccumulate and cause biological change; and control methods. Is. 6(5)].
114 Environmental Contaminants Board of Review, Outside Review and Public
Participation (Ottawa: Environmental Contaminants Board of Review, July 1980) at 71.
This was the second report of the board established as a result of objections to proposed
PCB regulations published in the Canada Gazette, Part I in December 1978.
115See generally Can. H. of C. Standing Comm. on Fisheries and Forestry,
Proceedings, No. 40 (June 25, 1975).
Is Science Council of Canada, supra note 5 at 47.
"17 Supra note 79. According to Environment Canada officials, a second committee
on dioxins may be proposed. The Mutagenesis Committee's terms of reference include
reviewing data relating to the mutagenencity of chemicals; and advising on the evalua-
tion of mutagenencity tests and the significance of such tests in terms of human health
or environmental hazard.
118 See Info Letter IL 599 DNH & W/DOE, Advisory Committee on Mutugenesis
(Apr. 15, 1981); Criteria for Selection of Chemical Substances for Mutagenity Testing,
Min. NH & W/Min. of Envir. (March 11, 1982).
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attention to the lack of public knowledge about the mutagenesis committee,
despite its then two-year existence and its completion of several reports. 119
In 1980 the PCB Board of Review recommended that the Ministers
consider the use of section 3(4) whenever a new regulation is being con-
templated to control a toxic chemical. The Board further recommended that,
pursuant to section 18(j), a regulation be drafted respecting the procedure
to be followed by advisory committees to facilitate their more systematic
use. 120
Yet another concern is that the Board of Review process has been used
sparingly when objections to draft regulations are made. This is exemplified
by events surrounding a 1977 proposed regulation in the Canada Gazette
respecting the control of PCBs.1 2 1 The purpose of the regulation was to
prevent the use of PCBs in any new goods other than electrical capacitors
and transformers.
However, Enviroiament Canada, in effect, acknowledged that the regula-
tion simply recognized the status quo because industry had already eliminated
most non-electrical uses of the substance.' The National Indian Brother-
hood (NIB) filed a notice of objection to the proposed regulation arguing
that it did not go far enough towards eliminating the PCB problem.123 The
NIB also argued that if this regulation was only the first of several, there
ought to be a firm timetable for the promulgation of the subsequent regula-
tions since a piecemeal approach could lead to unwarranted delays. No such
timetable existed in the proposed regulation. 24 Environment Canada did not
acknowledge in the Canada Gazette that a notice of objection had been
"0 Supra note 114, at 69. In August 1979, the Mutagenesis Committee recom-
mended that "mutagenecity data should be included as a part of the toxicological evalua-
tion that may lead to regulatory decisions." Memorandum from the Advisory
Committee on Mutagenesis to the Ministers of National Health and Welfare and
Environment (August 2, 1979). The committee has also investigated the mutagenecity
of pulp mill effluents and epoxy resins and developed position papers on criteria for
selecting chemical substances for mutagenecity testing. These will eventually lead to
federal guidelines.
120 While the use of other mechanisms, such as the 1976 PCB Task Force, was
said by federal officials to be the equivalent of the section 3(4) advisory committee,
the Board of Review disagreed. It observed that using the section 3(4) process would
encourage public involvement that could later reduce both the number of objections
to regulations and the length and scope of Board hearings. Supra note 114, at 70 and
72.
121 Canada Gazette, Pt. 1, Vol. 111 (February 26, 1977) at 977.
122 Env. Cda. "Proposed Initial Regulation on PCB Published," News Release
(Ottawa: Env. Cda., Apr. 1977).
123 Notice of Objection filed by Richard Phaneuf, NIB, Ottawa, to the Hon. Romeo
LeBlanc, Min. of Fisheries and Environment (April 12, 1977, Ottawa).
124 The NIB cited the example of Clean Air Act emission standards for mercury,
which were first expected in 1972 but which were not promulgated until 1978. [Corres-
pondence from Noel V. Starblanket, Pres., NIB to the Hon. Romeo LeBlanc, Min. of
Fisheries and Environment (July 18, 1977, Ottawa)].
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filed;1' nor did it empanel a Board of Review to hear the matter as required
by section 6(1) when a "person having an interest" files an objection. The
rationale given by the Minister was that the Department did not regard the
NIB notice as an objection and that the Department should not be obliged
to establish a Board of Review everytime someone argues, on "general
grounds," that a proposed regulation does not go far enough or goes too
far.126
In contrast, in 1979, when two companies filed notices of objection 27
to a proposed government amendment to the first PCB regulation, 128 the
Ministers did establish a Board of Review to hear the "first challenge to the
Environmental Contaminants Act."' 29 The amended regulation's purpose was
to prohibit the use of PCBs as new filling or as make-up fluid in the servicing
of electrical transformers. Interestingly, at least one corporate objector was
reported as saying it did not object to the amendment itself, but was simply
concerned because "we have lots of transformers filled with PCB and we just
want to use up what we have on hand."' 30 Moreover, a government spokes-
man noted that as a result of earlier deliberations held to determine if PCBs
were needed as make-up fluid in electrical equipment, it had been concluded
that "PCB was not necessary and that we should have included this amend-
ment in the original regulations."'u3 [emphasis- added]
The differences in the government's treatment of the two cases are cause
for concern. In the case of the NIB objection, the government refused to hold
a hearing for a group who clearly indicated that it was objecting to the
adequacy of a proposed regulation. In the case of the companies' objections,
the government, in first instance, decided to hold a hearing despite some
indication that at least one of the objectors was not really objecting to the
adequacy of the proposed regulation. Ironically, the Board of Review em-
panelled to hear the companies' objections eventually recommended amend-
125 Canada Gazette, Pt. II, Vol. 111 (September 28, 1977) at 4228 states that "no
notice of objection was filed with the Minister." Subsequently, the Department amended
the Canada Gazette notice to read "... the only notice received pursuant to subsection
5(3) of the Environmental Contaminants Act was a notice from the National Indian
Brotherhood purporting to be an objection but not objecting to what was being proposed
but urging that further action be taken." See Canada Gazette, Part II, Vol. 112 (March
8, 1978) at 700.
126 Correspondence from the Hon. Len Marchand, Min. of State, Env. Cda. to
Noel V. Starblanket, NIB (October 25, 1977, Ottawa).
127 Notices of Objection filed by Iron Ore Company of Canada, Labrador City,
Nfld. (January 31, 1979) and Eurocan Pulp and Paper Company of Kitimat, B.C.
(January 24, 1979) with the Hon. Len Marchand, Min. of State, Env. Cda., Ottawa.
128 Canada Gazette, Part I, Vol. 112 (Dec. 2, 1978) at 7117.
129 Env. Cda. and National Health and Welfare. "First Challenge to Environmental
Contaminants Act to be Investigated by Board of Review," Joint News Release (Oct. 9,
1979, Ottawa). Canada Gazette, Part I, Vol. 113 (Oct. 6, 1979) at 6286.
130 "Objections made by two companies to PCB restrictions," The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), Oct. 10, 1979, at 50 col. 2.
131 Id. These findings were based on a 1978 consultant-government workshop on
the subject.
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ments to the Act to allow "any interested or knowledgeable person" to file
a notice of objection. The proposals, if adopted, would remove the argument
that objections are limited to persons having pecuniary or proprietary in-
terests. 1m
Perhaps the traditional regulation-development process the federal gov-
ernment employs has contributed to a reluctance or inability to use advisory
committees and boards of review to achieve greater public involvement and
influence in decision-making. A prominent part of federal regulation-develop-
ment has been industry consultation, 133 both through questionnaires and fed-
eral-provincial task forces. 34 Such consultation has generally been observed
to be a major vehicle for inducing industry support for, and compliance with,
regulations' 35 as well as familiarizing government with the technical details
of the industry to be regulated. For example, in 1978, a two-day seminar in-
volving forty-two industry and thirteen government participants had a major
influence on the subsequent government regulation that prohibited the use of
PCBs as new filling or as make-up fluid in transformers. It also had a major
influence in the establishment of the federal policy to phase-out the approxi-
mately twenty million gallons of PCBs in transformers by attrition.136 The
PCB Board of Review later questioned the wisdom of the attrition policy,
arguing that such an approach "is not one that promises a reasonably early
resolution of the PCB problem in Canada." The Board proposed an annual
fixed percentage retirement of such equipment, which it argued would reduce
the time-scale from forty to one hundred years down to twenty years; achieve
greater public credibility at acceptable financial cost to industry; and be a
spur to resolution of other key aspects of the problem, such as the manufac-
ture of PCB replacement fluids and development of disposal facilities.137
The government has not, to date, accepted this approach as a basis for future
regulation of PCBs in transformers and capacitors, partly because of the lack
of disposal facilities, but also because of the earlier agreement reached with
industry that one of the safest places for PCBs in the interim is in well-
supervised transformers. 38
"32 Supra note 114. When considering the 1975 Environmental Contaminants Bill,
Members of Parliament had feared limitations on who might be able to file notices
of objection. Supra note 46.
133 Environment Canada's "Policy [is] to develop regulations through consultation
with the industry concerned." See Environmental Protection Service, Env. Cda., Pre-
liminary Study of Soclo-Economic Impact of the Proposed Regulation of ChIorofluoro-
methanes under the Environmental Contaminants Act (Ottawa: Env. Cda., Apr. 1979).
134 Raymond M. Robinson, Assistant Deputy Minister, Environmental Protection
Service, Env. Cda. Text of an address given at the Canadian Environmental Law Re-
search Foundation Regulation Conference (January 22, 1980, Toronto).
135 See, e.g., P. Nemetz, J. Sturdy, D. Urens, P. Vertinsky, J. Vertinsky and A.
Vining, Regulation of Toxic Chemicals in the Environment (unpublished study, Toronto,
May 1978) Working Paper, No. 20, (Regulation Reference) (Ottawa: Economic Council
of Canada, 1981).
136 See Dillon Consultant PCB in Transformers.
1
3 7 Supra note 88.
1
3 8 Supra note 136. See generally the testimony of federal officials during the 1979
PCB Board of Review hearing, supra note 63. To facilitate the maintenance of trans-
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While increased public participation in a board of review or related
procedure could upset traditional industry-government consensus and lead to
arguments for more stringent regulation, industry concern can also be ex-
pected regarding release of information arising from such a process. In the
past, industry has argued that government, in its information-gathering activ-
ities leading to regulation-development, has not always exhibited an under-
standing of the need to protect commercially sensitive information, or even of
the range of information that industry regards as confidential. 5 9 Thus, de-
spite government intentions to open up the regulation-development process
to more participants, 140 there may be serious limitations on how meaningful
the exercise will be if substantial restrictions are placed on information
access.
There is also the prospect, as the PCB Board of Review noted, that
neither advisory committees nor boards of review are, by themselves, ade-
quate or timely public consultation mechanisms:
The difficulty which is perceived with the present board of review process under
this Act, as a completely satisfactory mechanism for consultation through public
hearings, relates to... the question of timing. By appearing at a very late stage
in regulation-making, it may deprive government of the full potential benefit of
formers the federal government has developed guidelines. See Environmental Protection
Service, Env. Cda., Handbook on PCBs in Electrical Equipment (March 1981, Ottawa).
That transformer safety and supervision can be ensured has not necessarily been
an accepted tenet in other jurisdictions. Interestingly, 1979-80 U.S. Congressional hear-
ings reported numerous incidents involving leaks and spills from transformers and
related equipment. The consensus that emerged was that many transformers could not
be considered "totally enclosed uses" despite proposed U.S. EPA regulations permitting
such continued use on that basis. U.S. EPA studies themselves estimated that approxi-
mately 78,000 pounds of PCBs "will be released into the U.S. environment each year
from utility transformers and capacitors." United States House of Representatives.
PCBs: Dangers Associated With Their Storage and Use. Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., at 552.
A U.S. Court of Appeals decision subsequently set aside the proposed U.S. rules,
holding that they fell "far short of the mark" in carrying out the U.S. Congress' specific
mandate in TSCA to protect the public from the chemical. See Phillip Shabecoff,
"Court of Appeals Acts to Restrict Toxic Chemical; Federal EPA Ordered to Tighten
Regulations on PCB Use," The New York Times (Nov. 1, 1980) at 12, col. 1. See also
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency (1980), 10 ELR
20972 (D.C. Cir.).
129 The chemical industry has given the following as examples of commercially
sensitive information: formulations and process know-how; catalysts; process efficiencies;
production and sales volumes; customer lists; some specific uses, and; exact chemical
nomenclature. See William A. Neff, Technical Director, Canadian Chemical Producers'
Association, "Early Industrial Input An Essential Element In Rule-Making." An address
presented to the 63rd Chemical Conference and Exhibition, The Chemical Institute of
Canada, Environment Division (June 1980, Ottawa).
140 Environment Canada argues that there is a need to encourage greater public
involvement at an earlier stage in the process. As a result it is currently attempting to
establish a departmental policy on public participation that would include opportunities
for interest groups to participate throughout the development of regulations. Supra note
134. See also Environment Canada, Draft Policy for Public Consultation and Informa-
tion Availability (Ottawa: Env. Cda., June 1980).
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public consultation and may generate frustration in seeking to influence decisions
to which a firm commitment had already been made.
The advisory committee system can assist but it is not an ideal vehicle for early
public consultation. As discussed previously, it is not required by law to be estab-
lished. Even when established, the committee may be restricted in its deliberations
and consultations by the scope of the mandate given to it by the Ministers.
Moreover, the advisory committee may be too early a stage since there will not
yet be in existence a public document which might form the basis for submissions
and debate .... 141 (emphasis in original]
The Board concluded that it would be preferable to provide for a public
hearing or similar process that would occur at a much earlier stage in regu-
lation-making. Consultative and educative benefits would result, including
greater public support for decisions taken, while retaining a residual oppor-
tunity to use the existing board of review process when necessary. 142 The
Board also supported the views of the Economic Council of Canada which
emphasized the need for funding those individuals or groups otherwise un-
able to participate in regulation-making activity.
143
It is too early to determine whether the Board's early hearing proposals
will meet with federal approval in any new contaminants legislation or policy.
Certainly, approaches supported by federal regulators respecting advance
notice, prior consultation and improved information access with respect to
regulation development 44 are, in principle, a step in the right direction. It is




4 1 Supra note 114, at 98 and 99.
142 Id. at 102 and 103. The question of timing and the role of the public was also
taken up by the chairman of the PCB Board of Review, Maxwell Cohen, at subsequent
Parliamentary hearings: "In our report on PCBs ... we saw that there are two stages
[to outside review and public participation]. Stage one is before the minister and his civil
servant advisors have made up their minds: hold public hearings when they say, we are
going into the PCB area, let us decide how far we want to go and let us throw this out
to the public for comment and hold public hearings.... In the case of PCBs, what they
did in the preliminary sense... was to have a seminar. The seminar was organized by
industry, by a consultant firm. It was a good seminar on PCBs, but it was organized
for the needs of the department by an outside consultant and it did not have the flavour,
therefore, of an impartial review board at which the total public invitation was there
to act as kind of both a conscience and an input of great variety.... A preliminary
hearing process has another great virtue, if you do it at the stage before the minister's
mind has been made up and he has a draft order, he gets material information points
of view which are likely to lead him to an improved order and .... your second hearing
process may not really be as trying and as difficult and as slow going.... So, you have
the two-stage process. If you have a good stage one process then your stage-two process
need not be too complicated and too lengthy, but it still serves a valuable purpose in
going into depth on how the public sees the minister's proposed order." Can. H. of C.
Special Comm. on Regulatory Reform, Proceedings, No. 25 (Nov. 14, 1980) at 14-15.
143 Supra note 114, at 93-94. A special Parliamentary Committee also recently
supported the concept of public interest group funding. Infra note 217, at 30-33.
1
44 Supra note 134, Robinson.
145 It has been indicated that generally Environment Canada's policy review of how
to better involve the public in the regulation-making process does not anticipate any
changes in federal environmental statutes. Correspondence to author from George M.
Cornwall, Acting Director, Planning, Policy and Analysis Branch, Environmental Pro-
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f) Inspections, Record-Keeping and Enforcement
Integral to the Ministers' basic responsibilities under the Act is the
capacity to inspect, to require record-keeping and to undertake enforcement.
The powers of inspection under the Act grant authority to designated inspec-
tors to enter and search premises respecting use and records of scheduled
substances; to enlist the assistance of owners or those in charge of such
premises in obtaining information; and to seize and detain scheduled sub-
stances where they believe, on reasonable grounds, that a contravention of
the Act has occurred. 146 Regulations can also be promulgated requiring the
maintenance of records by persons involved in the import, manufacture or
processing of scheduled substances.
147
Major offences under the Act include: the wilful release or permitting
of release of scheduled substances during commercial, manufacturing or
processing activity beyond an authorized quantity or concentration or con-
trary to prescribed conditions; the import, manufacture, processing, offer for
sale or knowing use of scheduled substances for prescribed commercial,
manufacturing or processing uses; and the import, manufacture or knowing
offer for sale of a product that contains a scheduled substance beyond
authorized conditions. 48
The authority of inspectors has been described as one consistent with
the general prohibitory, as opposed to managerial, nature of the Act. Accord-
ingly, inspections are limited to situations where the inspector has "reason
to believe" the Act is being contravened. Because of a lack of statutory au-
thority, inspectors will be frequently constrained in directing that more
preventive and planning action be taken.
149
Presently, despite suggestions for reform,149a provincial governments are
not agents under the Act. Although federal officials argue that adequate in-
spection is accorded to some chemicals that are also provincially regulated, 1 0
such as PCBs,15' still, for less geographically concentrated substances, a
change designating provincial governments as agents would provide for more
comprehensive inspections.
tection Service, Env. Cda. (Dec. 3, 1979, Ottawa). Environment Canada views the non-
statutory approach as being advantageous in that it allows the department to implement
the process in a shorter time frame and provides more flexibility so that changes can be
made when necessary to ensure a more effective process. Correspondence to author from
Raymond M. Robinson, Assistant Deputy Minister, Environmental Protection Service,
Env. Cda. (Sept. 15, 1980, Ottawa). While such flexibility can be an advantage, the
argument does not respond to the concern that an in-house process cannot be enforced
by the public should future, less enlightened governments, for whatever reasons, wish
to make the procedures less effective or no longer support the policy at all.
14 6 See generally S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72, ss. 9, 10 and 11.
147 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72, s. 18(i).
148 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72, s. 8.
149 Supra note 88, at 32.
149a Id. at 29 and 30.
15o Interview with J.R. Monteith, Acting Director, Contaminants Control Branch,
Env. Cda. (March 4, 1981, Ottawa).
151 Approximately 70% of the PCBs in the country are in Ontario and Quebec.
Supra note 76.
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Statutory constraints on record-keeping may also impede inspections
and the narrowness of the major offence categories may encourage non-
compliance with other important provisions of the Act. In the former regard,
federal officials note that they cannot require the maintenance of records by
persons engaged in commercial activity relating to a scheduled substance
that may later need to be reviewed by inspectors.152 Moreover, the record-
keeping requirement is limited to scheduled substances and does not include
other toxic chemicals. 15 With respect to offences, commentators have noted,
for example, that a failure to test, or a delay in conducting tests, required
by notice is only subject to a minimal fine. Nor is there apparent statutory
authority to seek suspension of activities in the interim. 154 The PCB Board
of Review, in recommending a re-examination of the offence sections of the
Act, noted that:
For offences under Sections of the Act other than Section 8, Section 17 states that
the offender shall be punishable on summary conviction which carries a com-
paratively low maximum fine or six months imprisonment. It would appear that
a polluter could choose summary conviction as a penalty for barring entry to an
inspector who has reason to believe that an offence under Section 8 is being
committed and in this way avoid the higher penalty provided under Section V 55
Environment Canada argues that it has experienced greater enforcement
difficulties with federal crown corporations, such as the National Harbours
Board and the Canadian Grain Commission, than with industry. In several
instances, continued use of PCB filled electromagnets for grain movement
by the crown corporations was allowed after regulations came into force
prohibiting this use. While no charges were laid by the department, the crown
corporations complied with the regulations only after being ordered by the
department to replace the PCB equipment. 156 To date, no prosecutions have
been launched. There is therefore no information on what defences will be
raised by defendants or accepted by the courts.
g) The Special Jurisdictional Problems of Storage, Disposal and Related
Matters
The proper management of toxic chemicals includes control of manu-
facture through to disposal or re-use. While the regulatory authority available
to the Ministers under the Act is significant, it does not specifically include
the control of storage or the disposal of scheduled substances. The PCB
Board of Review, in examining this problem, attributed the omissions to
152 Supra note 150.
153 Under TSCA, U.S. EPA is authorized to require manufacturers and processors
to submit reports and maintain records respecting their commercially produced chemical
substances and mixtures, to maintain records respecting adverse health or environmental
effects of such substances and mixtures, and to provide available health and safety data
on them. §8, 15 U.S.C. §2607.
154 Supra note 78, Mitchell.
155 Supra note 88, at 35.
156 Supra note 150. Electromagnets have been known to fail and leak PCBs over
grain conveyors. Such incidents took place at wheat pool elevators in Prince Rupert in
1974 and in Vancouver in 1978, respectively. Such electromagnet use in related food
and animal feed industries is now specifically prohibited by section 3(b) of the
amended PCB regulation which came into force on July 1, 1980.
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"political realities" and "accepted constitutional notions however debatable"
of the division of federal and provincial powers under The British North
America Act.157 Federal officials indicate that there has been a reluctance
to use the Act as a waste management tool since no explicit statutory refer-
ence to disposal is made and also because the Act is viewed as being re-
stricted to prohibitions consistent with the criminal law power.'58
Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of whether disposal may
be addressed at the federal level, it is arguable that contaminants legislation
is not only within criminal law power, but also falls under the power "to
make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada."' 159 The
courts have held this general power capable of supporting federal legislation
where the subject matter has attained "national dimensions"'16 0 or become
a matter of "national concern."' 161 The national scope of the toxic chemicals
problem in Canada should permit it to fall under the general power, thus
providing a broader basis for action. Interestingly, background documents
to the Cross-Mission Task Force Report suggest that the federal government
recognized the need to address disposal requirements,' ' although the Bill
never included this category within its ambit.
157 Supra note 88, at 17.
158 Supra note 150. The PCB Board of Review itself observed that: "The Environ-
mental Contaminants Act may be regarded as legislation designed essentially to prohibit
various forms of individual or corporate behavior. The language of the Act... is very
largely prohibitory rather than managerial." Id.
159 See, e.g., Cross Mission Report, supra note 19 and accompanying text. Profes-
sors Franson and Lucas note that the "general power" includes several theoretical bases
for federal jurisdiction-a residual power, an emergency power and a power to deal
with questions of national dimensions or of national interest. "Of these," they argue,
"the last probably offers the most important basis of federal jurisdiction over hazardous
substances, but it is not yet clear how broad this basis is. It has been the subject of
controversy, and was restrictively interpreted at first but has been relied on more fre-
quently in recent years." Supra note 54, at 17 and cases cited therein.
In the related area of dangerous goods movement, the Hon. Jean-Luc Pepin, federal
transport minister, testified before a Parliamentary Committee in 1980 that the heads
of power under which the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, S.C. 1980, c. 36,
is founded include peace, order and good government and the criminal law power so
as to cover both manufacturers and carriers. Reliance on the head of power relating
to undertakings of an interprovincial nature would only permit the federal government
to impose responsibilities on carriers in matters relating to public safety that require
that manufacturers be controlled as well. See Can. H. of C. Standing Comm. on
Transport Respecting Bill C-18, Proceedings, No. 1 (May 29, 1980) at 1A-3.
160°Attorney-General of Ontario v. Attorney-General of Canada, [1896] A.C. 348,
5 Cart. B.N.A. 295.
161 Johannesan v. West St. Paul, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 609, 69
C.R.T.C. 105 (federal power over aviation); Munro v. National Capital Commission,
[1966] S.C.R. 663, 57 O.L.R. (2d) 753 (national capital commission); Reference re
Offshore Mineral Rights, [1967] S.C.R. 792, 62 W.W.R. 21, 65 D.L.R. (2d) 353 min-
erals off the shore of British Columbia); and The Queen v. Hauser, [1979] 1 S.C.R.
984, [1979] 5 W.W.R. 1, 46 C.C.C. (2d) 481 (control of narcotics).
162 A 1971 descriptive paper appended to the Cross Mission Report respecting an-
ticipated environmental contaminants legislation, noted that authority was needed "re-
stricting the release of any substance causing or likely to cause environmental damage,
through appropriate restrictions on import, manufacture, distribution, sale, use, disposal,
or any other means of release." Supra note 11, at D5, Cross Mission Report, Appendix D.
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Hearings before the PCB Board of Review in 1979 revealed the prob-
lems and uncertainties associated with the bifurcation of scheduled substance
control between federal manufacturing control and general provincial dis-
posal control responsibilities1es The Board's Report observed that:
While all governments seem to have concluded that manufacture, use, transpor-
tation, imports and exports ... are within federal jurisdiction... with storage and
disposal within provincial jurisdiction, the Board is not satisfied that this is the
end of the story. For the effect of such a division is to leave the question of
storage and disposal, its monitoring and policing, to local governments (provincial,
regional and municipal) and there may be great variations between provinces,
regions, cities and towns in their approach to the difficult issues involved.' 64
Because of these concerns, and despite the existence of federal waste guide-
lines -and general federal-provincial accords, 165 the Board recommended re-
placing such guidelines, where possible, with federal regulations agreed to
by the provinces. "The effect of this recommendation," concluded the Board,
"would result in a national system of rules but delegating to the provinces
the administration and implementation of those regulations dealing with
storage and the disposal of PCB wastes."' 16
3. Other Federal Laws
The Environmental Contaminants Act 67 is the principal statute that
permits the federal government to undertake relatively comprehensive control
of toxic substances. 168 Other laws, however, while not directly relating to
toxics, allow federal control of a particular media (for example, water or
air). The Fisheries Act authorizes the development of national effluent limit
regulations to control industry discharge into water of contaminants that are
deleterious to fish. 169 This Act also contains general prohibition 170 and selec-
1
6 3 For example, the following is an exchange between the PCB Board of Review
Chairman, Maxwell Cohen and Raymond M. Robinson, Assistant Deputy Minister,
Environmental Protection Service, Environment Canada on this issue:
Chairman: But there is no question.., when it comes to the manufacture of new
PCB fluid, that that is clearly a federal control?
Mr, Robinson: That is very definitely our view and it's upon that that the Environ-
mental Contaminants Act is based.
Chairman: And when it comes to the waste product, you have both provincial
[control] plus grey areas?
Mr. Robinson: I think that's a fair comment.
Supra note 63, at 76-77.
164 Supra note 88, at 17.
165 Federal waste management guidelines and accords with the provinces will be
discussed infra.
1o6 Supra note 88, at 17.
167 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72.
168 Madame Sauv6, federal Enviornment Minister during the Act's 1975 passage
through Parliament, indicated during Standing Committee hearings that the Act "is our
main approach to a problem that is being tackled in many of the world's industrial
nations at this time. That problem is the contamination of the environment by chemical
substances." Supra note 30, at 6.
169 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, ss. 33 and 34.
170 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, s. 33(2).
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tive new works control sections' 7' which authorize prosecution and mitigation
measures, respectively, for deposits into the water of substances deleterious
to fish, even if a regulation is not in place. Inspections are authorized 72 as
is the development of mandatory spill reporting regulations that are con-
sistent with provincial requirements. 173 The Clean Air Act authorizes infor-
mation-gathering 74 and development of standards to control emissions to air.
The Act regulates particular industries that might release contaminants either
dangerous to human health or in violation of an international agreement. 17
This Act goes further than the Fisheries Act by requiring publication of draft
national air emission standards in the Canada Gazette sixty days before
promulgation. 170
The regulation-development processes which Environment Canada has
utilized under these Acts to establish both water effluent discharge regulations
and national air emission standards are quite similar to each other (although
the levels of control differ). 17 The first step, apart from identification of a
potential environmental problem, is the setting of priorities, given limited
resources, among the various industrial contaminants for which regulations
should be developed. Other factors which enter into the setting of priorities
include: the magnitude of the emissions from the industrial sector concerned;
the degree to which the industrial sector is spread out across the country;
the degree to which the emissions from the industrial sector are perceived to
be an environmental and health hazard, based on Canadian and foreign in-
formation reviews; and the technological and political feasibility of control.
Once the government determines that there is an initial basis for action,
the particular industry is asked through questionnaires for further informa-
tion on related industrial processes and emissions. Environment Canada also
seeks advice from other government departments (for example, the Depart-
ment of National Health and Welfare may be consulted on possible health
effects). If this information indicates the desirability of reducing the emis-
sions of a particular substance but the experts cannot determine the appro-
priate or "safe" release levels-a frequent problem-the government pro-
ceeds to evaluate the socio-economic and technical factors which would be
affected by the contaminant's control.
The traditional mechanism that both the air and water pollution control
directorates of Environment Canada have used is the establishment of a
federal-provincial-industry task force. The task force's responsibility is to
identify pollution controls for the particular industry, using the industry study
171 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, s. 33.1.
172 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, s. 33.2(3).
173 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, s. 33.2(4).
174 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 47, s. 3.
175 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 47, s. 7(1).
1718 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 47, s. 7 (2).
177 This description of the process generally follows that found in Robinson, supra
note 134.
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report as a basic source of information. As a result of its deliberations, the
task force recommends the appropriate technology for the particular con-
taminant's control and the emission limits that should be achieved by the use
of the particular technology chosen. Since August 1978, this process takes
place with the socio-economic impact analysis procedure discussed below.
Recent regulatory initiatives indicate that industry sector regulations or
standards under these Acts can result in an improvement in the control of
toxic substances, or at least in a reduction of absolute contamination:
a) Prior to 1978 mercury losses in liquid effluents from chlor-alkali plants
were about 67,000 kilograms per year. Regulations first promulgated
under the Fisheries Act in 1972 and revised in 1977, have contributed
to a reduction in these aquatic discharges to under 250 kilograms per
year. (Reduction in the number of plants operating in Canada that use
the mercury-cell process for chlorine production has also been a key
factor.) 178
b) Based on 1972 Environment Canada emission inventories, emissions of
arsenic from gold roasting operations were 1,934 tons per year. Regu-
lations proposed for the Clean Air Act are expected to limit these
emissions to about 25 tons per year, or 0.3 per cent of the amount of
arsenic associated with such operations. 179 Arsenic is a toxic substance
and a carcinogen.' 80
Unfortunately, few regulations under either Act have been made with respect
to toxic chemicals. Fisheries Act regulations have been promulgated, for ex-
ample, on mercury discharges from chlor-alkali plants' 8' and on various
metal discharges from mining operations.' 82 Clean Air Act regulations have
been proposed or promulgated for certain industries emitting lead,1s3 mer-
cury, 84 asbestos, 8 5 vinyl chloride,
80 and arsenic.' 87
The regulation-development process under these Acts, as under the
Environmental Contaminants Act, is one that has traditionally facilitated in-
178 Environmental Protection Service, Water Pollution Control Directorate, Env.
Cda., Status Report on Compliance with the Chlor-Alkali Mercury Regulations 1976-77
(Ottawa: Env. Cda., Oct. 1979).
179 Environment Canada. "Arsenic Emissions Regulations Announced," News Re-
lease (Ottawa: Env. Cda., Oct. 16, 1979).
180 Canada Gazette, Part I, "Summary of Socio-Economic Impact Analysis for the
Gold Roasting Plant Proposed National Arsenic Emission Standard Regulations" (Octo-
ber 13, 1979) at 6443-6444.
181 Chlor-Alkali Mercury Liquid Effluent Regulations. SOR/72-92.
182 Metal Mining Liquid Effluent Regulations. SOR/77-178.
183 See, e.g., Secondary Lead Smelter National Emission Standards Regulations.
SOR/76-464 as am.
184 Chlor-Alkali Mercury National Emission Standards Regulations. SOR/77-548.
185 Asbestos Mining and Milling National Emission Standards Regulations.
SOR/77-514 as am.
180 Vinyl Chloride National Emission Standards Regulations. SOR/79-299.
187 Draft Arsenic Gold Roasting Plant National Emission Standard Regulations,
supra note 180, at 6444-6449.
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dustry, but not general public, consultation. s8 Under the Clean Air Act pro-
cess, public comment on draft regulations has occurred,'8 resulting in the
federal government dealing more openly with concerns raised,190 and occa-
sionally revising draft regulations before they become law.191 Even industry
argues that a comment period of sixty days after a draft regulation has been
published is inadequate if there has been no prior consultation.
192
The government is trying to open up regulation-development under
these Acts to more participants at an earlier stage in the process. But industry
concerns for the confidentiality of information may have a substantial effect
on the eventual success of these efforts. Federal officials have said that to
some extent technical knowledge of industry may be sacrificed for greater
openness in consultation.19'
The federal commitment to opening up the regulation-making process
is an encouraging sign for public involvement in toxic substance control.
The failure to enshrine minimum procedures in law, however, may leave the
process open to charges of potential abuse. An example of the result of not
having a minimum procedure is the promulgation of regulations in April 1979
under the Fisheries Act for a major mining and milling project in British
Columbia without first publishing them in draft form in the Canada Gazette
for public comment.'1 4 Subsequent public concerns included the argument
that the mining project will have potentially damaging effects on marine life
188 Raymond M. Robinson, Assistant Deputy Minister, Environmental Protection
Service, Env. Cda., recently indicated this to a Parliamentary Committee noting that
".... our consultation historically has been with the regulated.... We have extremely
full consultation with industry both in terms of developing specific regulatory instru-
ments where we set up task forces with industrial personnel, our own personnel and
provincial personnel, and it is out of these task forces that the recommendations come
on which we base our regulatory instruments...." Can. H. of C. Special Comm. on
Regulatory Reform, Proceedings, No. 6 (Sept. 24, 1980) at 6.
189 See, e.g., proposed emission standards regulations published in Canada Gazette,
Part I, Vol. 109 (May 29, 1976) at 2588 (mercury); and Canada Gazette, Part I, Vol.
111 (June 11, 1977) at 3251 (vinyl chloride). Both notices filed with the draft regula-
tions advise of the Department's intention to regulate the particular substance; sum-
marize the known or presumed environmental and health effects; note the availability
of control technology to meet the proposed standard; and invite comment within the
sixty-day specified period.
190 See, e.g., departmental reviews of public comments received on proposed emis-
sion standards regulations published in Canada Gazette, Part I, Vol. 111 (March 19,
1977) at 1350-52 (mercury); and Canada Gazette, Part I, Vol. 112 (Aug. 26, 1978)
at 5193-98 (vinyl chloride).
191 In the case of mercury air emission standards for chlor-alkali plants, the De-
partment's review indicates that public comments it received persuaded it to specify a
total daily maximum emission of 1.68 kg. of mercury regardless of plant capacity in
addition to the daily emission rate of 5.3 grams of mercury for each 1000 kg. of
chlorine produced. Id. at 1351.
192 Chemical industry representatives note that: "A 60-day period is adequate and
sufficient if prior consultation has taken place during the development process. It is
mere window dressing if there has been no prior consultation." Supra note 139, Neff.
1
93 Supra note 188, at 6 and 7.
194 See SOR/79-345. Alice Arm Tailings Deposit Regulations.
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from release of heavy metals in the mine tailings.'0 5 In this instance, the
regulations were promulgated despite the 1978 Treasury Board requirement
of prior publication of all major regulations in the areas of health, safety and
fairness. A joint Senate-House of Commons Committee recently declared the
federal order-in-council authorizing the regulations as an "unusual and un-
expected use of power."'
196
Increasing recognition by the courts of potential damage to the environ-
ment from toxic chemicals appears to be resulting in the gradual imposition
of higher fines. A 1977 conviction for depositing mercury into waters in
excess of concentrations permitted under the Fisheries Act chlor-alkali regu-
lations resulted in a $64,000 fine, probably the highest pollution fine ever
imposed in Canada.
97
In certain jurisdictions, such as Ontario, where the Fisheries Act is
administered by the province, the provincial government's preference has
been to rely on its own laws rather than on the Act. This policy preference
has sometimes resulted in Fisheries Act enforcement being left to private
citizens. 198
4. Non-Statutory Programmes
Programmes without legal effect may, nonetheless, have an important in-
fluence on legislated requirements regarding toxic chemicals. Federal pro-
grammes respecting socio-economic analysis, development of drinking water
and waste management guidelines and accords with the provinces are of
particular interest.
a) The Socio-Economic Impact Analysis Requirements
In December 1977, the federal government announced that all new
federal regulations in the areas of health, safety and fairness that would have
a significant effect on the Canadian economy would be subject to socio-
economic impact analyses (SEIA) as part of the basis for decision-making.
The principal aim of the program is to "reduce undesirable economic side
effects" and "economic barriers or inflexibilities which may have been un-
necessarily adding to costs and prices." 99 Apart from emergencies, sum-
mary analyses are to be published in the Canada Gazette, along with draft
regulations. The public is given sixty days to comment on these proposed
regulations.200
195 See, e.g., Christie McLaren, "Mine allowed to dump in Pacific despite reports,"
The Globe and Mail (Toronto), March 17, 1981 at 11 col. 1.
196 Can. Sen. and H. of C. Standing Joint Comm. on Regulations and Other
Statutory Instruments, Proceedings (June 3, 1982) unreported.
197 Regina v. American Can of Canada Ltd. (Ont. Prov. Ct., April 4, 1977). See
also, "Highest Fine Ever Assessed for Environmental Pollution in Canada," C.E.L.A.
Newsletter. Vol. 2, No. 4 (1977) at 40.
198 See Regina v. Cyanamid Canada Inc. (1981), 11 C.E.L.R. 31. See also "Chemical
producer charged by biologist," The Globe and Mail (Toronto) March 3, 1981 at 5,
col. 1.
199 Supra note 62.
200 Supra note 62 and note 68.
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Socio-economic analysis, as contemplated by the federal government,
covers the use of several different methods or conceptual frameworks, in-
cluding cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness and risk-benefit analysis.201 Cost-benefit
analysis, which is preferred by the Treasury Board,202 compares all benefits
and costs arising from a regulation and weighs them in monetary or quanti-
tative terms. Cost-effectiveness analysis compares the costs of achieving certain
benefits from alternative regulatory actions in monetary terms, but describes
the benefits themselves in physical, not monetary, terms. Risk-benefit analysis
compares the risks to life, limb or property of an activity being considered
for regulation and balances them against the activity's general economic
benefit.203
Industry has been strongly supportive of the SEIA concept. 204 It has
argued, however, that the programme's implementation by environmental agen-
cies has revealed "deficiencies" including the "apparent reluctance to assess
benefits because of the difficulty in quantifying them. ' 205 The result has been
"increased reliance on cost-effectiveness comparisons of the various alterna-
tives rather than the cost-benefit assessment which was intended.
'200 Cost-
effectiveness, according to industry officials, assumes, rather than demonstrates,
a net benefit to society from regulation. Thus, the method confines itself to
estimates of how much contaminant reduction can be obtained from different
technologies and levels of expense. As a result, use of cost-effectiveness is
said by industry to run counter to "the stated government policy that all
future regulations shall have a net benefit to society. .. ,,207 Industry has
recommended that some attempt be made to assess benefits, even if only
qualitatively. It has further recommended that the SEIA be performed by
independent third parties rather than by the agency proposing the regula-
tion.208 Recent testimony by chemical industry officials before a Parliamen-
201 Treasury Board Canada, Administrative Policy Manual (Ottawa: Treas. Bd.
Cda., 1979) ch. 490. See also Treasury Board Canada, Benefit-Cost Analysis Guide
(Ottawa, 1977).
202 Id.
203 Id. For further elaboration on these methods or frameworks see, e.g., testimony
of Dr. Lester B. Lave, Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institution and Professor of Eco-
nomics, Carnegie-Mellon University in United States House of Representatives, Use of
Cost-Benefit Analysis by Regulatory Agencies: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations and the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of
the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Wash., D.C.,
July 30, 1979).
204 Supra note 139. See also Canadian Manufacturers' Association. Submissions to
the Government of Canada regarding the Socio-Economic Impact Assessment Process
(Nov. 1979, Toronto).
205 Neff, supra note 139.
206 Id.
207 Testimony of W.A. Neff, Assistant Technical Director, Canadian Chemical
Producers' Association, Can. H. of C. Special Comm. on Regulatory Reform, Proceedings,
No. 14 (Oct. 14, 1980) at 18.
208 Neff, supra note 139. See also testimony and brief of J.M. Belanger, President
and W.A. Neff, Assistant Technical Director, Canadian Chemical Producers' Association,
Can. H. of C. Special Comm. on Regulatory Reform, Proceedings, No. 14 (Oct. 14,
1980).
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tary committee respecting the SEIA performed by Environment Canada on
proposed Clean Air Act arsenic emission standards illustrates industry con-
cerns:
[Environment Canada] stated very honestly that they could not determine if there
were any benefits or not and, therefore, they would simply adopt a cost-effective
approach. There probably was some benefit there but they were unable to qualify
it; when you are looking at something like arsenic, I do not know. The point that
concerned us was that there was a policy requiring a cost-benefit study, and
simply to say, we cannot do it so we will adopt this other methodology does not
achieve the same end point. You will always be able to remove something if you
spend enough money; whether or not there is a benefit is an open question...
[We would like to think there is a societal benefit, not necessarily a benefit to our
company but to society as a whole.2 9
Industry officials later added that:
You may not be able at this point in time to quantify [benefits], but that would
be the ultimate goal ... in the meantime let us ensure that at least qualitatively
what we see or what we suspect will be the benefits [are] put down, and not
simply say, as they did in the case of arsenic, we are unable to determine the
benefits, therefore we will ignore them.21
SEIA documents prepared by Environment Canada on proposed regulation
of chlorofluoromethanes have also been criticized on similar grounds.
211
Federal officials, in describing the dilemma they faced with the develop-
ment of the SEIA document on arsenic, noted:
In the case of the arsenic problem, we were faced with a conclusion by the
Department of National Health and Welfare, a conclusion that is fairly widely
supported in world literature on the subject, that arsenic in very small quantities,
in so-called trace quantities, is a cancer-causing agent,2 12 and therefore we ought
to move to reduce the presence of arsenic in the environment .... As is so often
the case, in the area of identifying health threats for trace contaminants, there
was no threshold value given for the contaminant... a so-called safe level...
[NHW] were not able to draw a graph which would say that below this amount
of concentration of arsenic in the atmosphere, you were safe, that you would not
have any incidence of cancer in the population. .. 213
The arsenic problem had to be resolved other than by quantifying the benefits
209 Testimony of Neff, supra note 208 at 7.
210 Id. at 15.
211 Robert D. Anderson, "The Federal Regulation-Making Process and Regulatory
Reform, 1969-1979," in Stanbury, ed., Government Regulation: Scope, Growth, Process
(Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980) at 176-77.
212 See, e.g., Robert Hoover, National Cancer Institute, Bethseda, Maryland, Envi-
ronmental Cancer (paper presented before the New York Academy of Sciences Con-
ference on Public Control of Environmental Health Hazards, Vol. 329, 1979). Mr.
Hoover notes in part that "counties which contain nonferrous metal smelters experience
unusually high lung cancer rates for both males and females. These industries are known
to involve their work force in an excess risk of lung cancer due to the arsenic exposure,
and are also known to dump large amounts of arsenic into the general atmosphere around
these plants." See also Blot and Fraumeni, Arsenical air pollution and .ng cancer, (1975)
2 Lancet 142.
213 Supra note 188, at 8 and 9, Robinson.
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of controls. 214 Indeed, such inability to quantify benefits appears to be the
rule rather than the exception with respect to toxic substances. 215
The use of the non-statutory SEIA program raises several questions in
relation to toxic chemical legislative responsibilities. First, does the program
in fact require that regulations have a "net benefit to society"? If so, what
exactly does that mean and how is it to be determined? Second, how much
reliance can be placed on the cost-benefit analysis, in any of its conceptual
forms, for determining, or aiding in the determination of, such matters?
Third, what are the implications of such a non-statutory directive on statu-
tory mandates to protect human health and the environment from significant
dangers posed by toxic chemicals?
The SEIA policy does not require that regulations be adopted only if
their benefits exceed their costs. 216 Indeed, a recent Parliamentary Committee
on regulatory reform, while recommending that all proposed regulations be
subjected to an "impact assessment" performed by the "sponsoring depart-
ment or agency," gave no explicit support to the notion that regulations only
be adopted if their benefits exceed their costs. The committee noted that, "[a]
greater appreciation of the use of cost-effectiveness analysis rather than cost-
benefit analysis in situations in which a benefit cannot be assessed in dollar
terms needs to be developed. 217
Some evidence suggests that cost-benefit analyses and related concepts
are limited, if not primitive, instruments for decision-makers to place great, let
alone decisive, reliance upon. A recent United States congressional subcommit-
214 The end result of this problem was a federal decision to draft a SEIA document
which, rather than quantifying benefits of regulation, instead stated a rationale for con-
trolling arsenic (by saying it is a carcinogen at trace levels with no indication of a point
below which it ceases to be a threat). [Generally, methods do not now exist for deter-
mining a "safe" threshold level of exposure to carcinogens. Thus, it has been argued
that prudence requires that no safe threshold levels be assumed to exist. Toxic Chemicals
Report, supra note 103, at 133. See also Marvin A. Schneiderman, et al., Thresholds for
Environmental Cancer: Biologic and Statistical Considerations, (paper presented before
the New York Academy of Sciences Conference on Public Control of Environmental
Health Hazards, Vol. 329, 1979)]. The document also reviewed the industry's economic
situation, the applicable control technology and alternative control levels and costs.
(Supra note 188, at 9, Robinson).
215 Id. The following is an exchange between the Regulatory Reform Parliamentary
Committee Chairman, James Peterson and R.M. Robinson, Environment Canada on this
point:
Chairman: ... You have indicated to us that there is a ... problem in quantifying
certain benefits.
Mr. Robinson: That is right.
Chairman: And that is the main problem under the SEIA. We will probably never
be able to find some way to quantify a lot of these benefits in money
terms.
Mr. Robinson: Well, in our present knowledge, and given the uncertainties particularly
about toxic substances at threshold levels, the answer is basically correct.
That is right.
216 Supra note 211, at 172.
217 Can., Report of the Special Comm. on Regulatory Reform. 1st Sess., 32nd Parl.
(Dec. 1980, Ottawa) at 9-10.
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tee report, which followed testimony by key experts on the subject, outlined
several problems with institutionalizing reliance on these instruments in gov-
ernment regulation-making. 218 Even dissenting views on the subcommittee
did not support cost-benefit analysis as a tool or test to be used as a decisive
determinant when considering whether to promulgate a regulation. 219 Indus-
try in Canada has also recognized the limitations of the method.2 0
In sum, to rely primarily upon cost-benefit or related analyses and pro-
hibit the implementation of regulations whose "benefits do not exceed their
costs," would appear neither prudent nor consistent with the mandate in toxic
chemicals legislation originally authorized by Parliament. If such methods are
to be used, it should be with a recognition of their limitations and only
within the context of a full and open regulation-making process.
b) Drinking Water, Waste Management and Related Guidelines
The federal government has also developed guidelines for the purpose
of advising other government levels, the private sector and the general public
regarding appropriate measures and controls to be taken with respect to toxic
chemicals. Three types of guidelines in use relate to drinking water para-
meters, 221 management of wastes containing substances scheduled under the
218 These problems included:
i) because it is easier to quantify the costs of regulation than its benefits, there
has been a general tendency to overstate costs and understate benefits;
ii) while it is usually easier to estimate costs than benefits, particularly in dollar
terms, there are also many problems associated with cost quantification in-
cluding: agency dependence on industry data that over-estimates compliance
costs; failure to reduce cost estimates that might come from recognition of
economies of scale; and failure to reduce cost estimates that come from in-
dustry's ability to learn over time to comply more effectively with controls;
iii) the state of the art in quantifying benefits is primitive, as reflected in difficulties
in determining how many lives will be saved; how much pain and suffering
averted and risk of environmental harm reduced. There are also difficulties in
applying dollar values to items that lack a market value e.g. human life) or
of adjusting cost-benefit estimates over the time during which they accrue; and
iv) cost-benefit analysis is incapable of dealing with questions of equity, i.e. that
costs and benefits are often borne by different groups of people within society.
United States House of Representatives. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Wonder Tool or
Mirage? Report together with Minority Views by the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (Dec. 1980) at 25. Similar difficulties have been raised with risk-benefit analysis.
See United States Senate and House of Representatives. Risk-Benefit Analysis in the
Legislative Process. Sum'mary of a Congress-Science Joint Forum prepared by the Con-
gressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (March 1980).
219 Id., at 40, report.
22 o Supra note 204, CMA submissions.
221 Health and Welfare Canada, Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality
(Ottawa: H & W Cda., 1978). The guidelines note that "the chemical characteristics of
drinking water are a matter of growing concern because of the increasing number of
organic pollutants, metals and organometallic substances that are being introduced into
the environment." Thus, "limits are specified for those organic and inorganic substances
that could present a health hazard if present in drinking water at excessive concentrations."
Parameters for sixteen inorganic and three organic substances are provided. A further
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Environmental Contaminants Act,222 and effluent controls which should be
employed for existing industrial activities not covered by federal regulation. 220
The guidelines are not legally enforceable unless promulgated as such
by the appropriate federal or provincial agency.22 4 In the case, for example,
of the drinking water guidelines, no provincial or federal agency has adopted
thei or variants of them as regulations in Canada. The advice provided by
the guidelines may prove useful in adopting controls to an activity or project
under local circumstances.
Concern and uncertainty about the degree to which actual practices of
the private sector and other government levels are meeting the goals of fed-
eral PCB waste management guidelines, recently prompted the PCB Board
of Review to recommend that, where practicable, the guidelines should be
adopted as federal regulations and that they should be administered by the
provinces.225
c) Accords with the Provinces
Another mechanism that has evolved without statutory base, or recog-
nition by the courts is the development of accords with seven provinces on
general environmental protection matters. The objectives of such accords are
to improve co-ordination of federal-provincial environmental control activi-
ties and provide a framework for coping with particular problems by specific
agreement. The accord with Ontario, for example, addresses such matters
as the development of ambient environmental criteria; control requirements
and guidelines for industry; consultation mechanisms on environmental ef-
fects of projects; pollution control implementation and enforcement; moni-
toring and surveillance; special agreements for accelerated action; contingency
plans; research and technical training and cost sharing. 226
The accords have not been used to develop specific toxic chemicals sub-
agreements. Control of PCB wastes through development of sub-agreements,
however, was raised by the PCB Board of Review during its hearings as a
background document lists ten additional substances or classes of substances that were
reviewed but for which maximum acceptable and objective concentrations were not
considered necessary. These include Mirex, PCBs and phthalic acid esters. See Health
and Welfare Canada. Supporting Documentation-Guidelines for Canadian Drinking
Water Quality (Ottawa: H & W Cda., 1978). Surveys are also conducted in conjunction
with drinking water guideline development. Toft, Supra note 61.
222 Environmental Protection Service, Env. Cda., Guideline for the Management of
Waste Materials Containing Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs). (Ottawa: Env. Cda.,
1978); and Environmental Protection Service, Env. Cda., Guideline on Central Collection
and Storage Facilities for Waste Materials Containing Polychlorinated Riphenyls (PCBs)
(Ottawa: Env. Cda., Nov. 1978).
223 Environmental Protection Service, Env. Cda., Guidelines for Liquid Effluents from
Existing Metal Mines (Ottawa: Env. Cda., Apr. 1977).
224 See, e.g., supra note 221, at 15, Guidelines.
225 Supra note 88, at 16 and 17. See also PCB Board of Review hearings, supra
note 63 at, e.g., 77 and 78.
226 Canada-Ontario Accord for the Protection and Enhancement of Environmental
Quality (Toronto and Ottawa: Gov't. of Cda., Oct. 1975).
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possible mechanism for ensuring better waste management control of sched-
uled substances where federal jurisdiction is uncertain.
2 27
The accords indicate that the federal government will undertake en-
forcement where the provinces cannot or will not do so, with respect to
matters of federal jurisdiction administered by the provinces. 228 The tendency
in Ontario, with few exceptions, has been for the province not to prosecute
alleged violations of federal laws.229 Instead, Ontario relies on provincial
laws to achieve abatement. In some cases, however, provincial control pro-
grams may have the effect of prolonging violations of federal law. The result
has sometimes been that private citizens are left to enforce federal laws when
neither level of government prosecutes.
23 0
B. The Role of the Provincial Governments
Because of the provincial constitutional responsibility for property and
civil rights, matters of a local or private nature and other heads of power,
the provinces' control of toxic chemicals can be substantial. The next part
of the paper presents an overview of both provincial statutory and non-
statutory activities in this area.
1. Application of General Pollution Control Programmes to the Problems
of Toxic Chemicals
With the exceptions of Alberta,2
3
1 and, to a certain extent, Quebec,
23 2
provincial governments do not have legislation specifically directed to toxic
chemicals.233 Generally, provincial environmental legislation cannot be used
to prohibit the use of any substance, but only to regulate its discharge into
227 Supra note 63, at 60-68.
228 Supra note 226, s. 14(c).
229 The one exception since 1970 known to the author is the American Can prose-
cution, supra note 197.
23o Supra note 198.
231 See The Hazardous Chemicals Act S.A. 1980, c. H-3. This Act does not contain
a provision for pre-market testing, though approximately 13 substances or classes of
substances have been added by Ministerial order to a Schedule under the Act. However,
to date no orders have been issued under the Act to require that information from
manufacturers of the scheduled chemicals be submitted to the provincial government.
Correspondence to author from KJ. Simpson, Head, Waste Management Branch,
Alberta Environment (March 23, 1981, Edmonton).
232 In Quebec, regulations may be promulgated so as to regulate and prohibit the
intra-provincial use of any contaminant and the presence of any contaminants in any
product so distributed or used in Quebec. See Environment Quality Act R.S.Q. 1977,
c. Q-2, s. 31.
233 See, e.g., correspondence to author from: the Hon. Stephen Rogers, British
Columbia Minister of the Environment (March 26, 1981, Victoria, B.C.); H.S. Malie-
paard, Director, Policy, Planning and Research Branch, Saskatchewan Environment
(March 9, 1981, Regina, Sask.); the Hon. Gary A. Filmon, Manitoba Minister of Con-
sumer and Corporate Affairs and Environment (March 12, 1981, Winnipeg, Man.);
Leo B. FitzPatrick, Solicitor, Legal Services Branch, Ontario Environment Ministry
(Apr. 9, 1981, Toronto, Ont.); Madeleine C. Robitaille, Quebec Environment Ministry
(March 31, 1981, Quebec City, Que.); and the Hon. Eric J. Kipping, New Brunswick
Minister of the Environment (March 31, 1981, Fredericton, N.B.).
1982]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
the ambient environment. Thus, while it is theoretically possible to prescribe
zero discharge for certain substances, provincial legislation does not provide
for pre-manufacture or pre-market toxicity testing or routine inventory re-
porting of designated chemicals.2 4 The result has been the application of
general emission control programmes to the toxic chemicals problem.
a) Control of Air and Water Discharges of Toxic Chemicals
The thrust of provincial pollution control legislation for industrial dis-
charges to air and water is to prohibit general contamination of the environ-
ment.235 In practice, provincial laws, through site-specific permits, licences,
approvals or administrative orders, allow discharges based on the capacity
of local environments to assimilate such discharges. These mechanisms are
sometimes used in conjunction with general ambient environmental stand-
ards. Normally, under provincial law, a chemical does not have to be
declared "hazardous" or a "significant danger" in order to be subject to
regulation or other control.m6
Provincial agencies argue that reliance on site-specific approval or re-
lated mechanisms can provide the flexibility needed for adaptation to unfore-
seen problems, such as toxic chemicals. Use of these mechanisms can enable
control of releases of more exotic chemicals that might not originally have
been regulated by quantity and quality limitations in a permit. This can be
important with substances, such as PCBs, that have been found to have
multiple pathways of entry into the air and the water.237 Yet, given the large
number of discharge sources of a substance and the potential difficulties and
delays in amending each specific permit or order, it is reasonable to argue
that the issuance of province-wide or even basin-wide air or water emission
standards would be an easier, swifter and more effective approach. The scien-
tific uncertainty about what levels to set, as well as differences in economic
and technical feasibility among companies, are possible reasons why the
provinces, generally, have not preferred this route for control of substances
such as PCBs.
238
23 4 See, e.g., Robert Caton, Air Resources Branch, Ontario Environment Ministry,
"Hazard Assessment by the Ontario Ministry of the Environment" in IJC Workshop
on Hazard Assessment, supra note 59, at 146.
238 See, e.g., The Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, s. 14.
23
6 Supra note 234, at 145.
2 3 7 A 1976 federal task force on PCBs reported that "PCBs are being liberated into
water, air and soil from sewage treatment plants, solid waste disposal sites and incinera-
tors." Supra note 63 at ix. A 1976 report on PCBs in the Great Lakes concluded that
PCBs were detected in the waste waters of all thirty-three municipal sewage treatment
plants sampled with an estimated total load to receiving waters from the thirty-three plants
of 246 kg/yr. The report also noted high PCB concentrations in sewage sludge. Environ-
ment Canada and the Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Polychlorinated Biphenyls
(PCBs) in Municipal Wastewaters, Research Report No. 49, Research Program for the
Abatement of Municipal Pollution under Provisions of the Canada-Ontario Agreement
on Great Lakes Water Quality, 1976.
238 See, e.g., The Ontario Water Resources Act R.S.O. 1980, c. 361. This statute
does not contain environmental standards for specific substances, though it does contain
a general prohibition on impairment or pollution of the aquatic environment. (s. 16)
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Even where provincial agencies do promulgate province-wide standards,
they may not always be adequate.239 Nonetheless, a number of provinces,
including Ontario, have begun to take more systematic initiatives to deal with
toxic chemicals in air and water. Ontario's hazardous contaminants program
is concerned primarily with industrial discharges of specific chemical com-
pounds. The program facilitates decisions about which substances to control
To provide guidance to the public and private sector, the province has established water
quality guidelines that provide goals, policies and where possible specific objectives as
to what the province regards as acceptable water quality. In addition to outlining objec-
tives for a number of toxic substances, the province's policy is to require case-by-case
examination of any proposal to release any hazardous substances for which provincial
water quality objectives have not been established. See Ontario Ministry of the Environ-
ment, Water Management: Goals, Policies, Objectives and Implementation Procedures
(Toronto: Gov't. of Ont., Nov. 1978). See also Ontario Ministry of the Environment,
Hazardous Contaminants Office, Assessment of Toxic Substances Legislation in the
Province of Ontario (Toronto: Gov't. of Ont., 1980). No water quality standards have
been promulgated for specific substances under this Act.
See also the following exchange between R.D. Kennedy, M.P.P. and E.W. Turner,
Waste Management Branch, Ontario Ministry of the Environment during 1978 legisla-
tive standing committee hearings:
Mr. Kennedy: . .. The Ministry, of course, has standards set as to the emission of vari-
ous elements as a result of industrial activity and so on. Do you have
standards set for emissions of PCBs?
Mr. Turner: The simple answer to that is no, there is not a formal standard as such.
The philosophy, of course, is for zero emission wherever possible. I
should perhaps just indicate that the Ministry has standards in some areas
only covering emissions, primarily in the air emission field. It doesn't
cover all materials or wastes by any means. In the liquid field, particu-
larly with respect to liquid industrial wastes, we do not have any stand-
ards per so.
Legislative Assembly of Ontario Standing Comm. on Resources Development, Proceed-
ings, Vol. R-37 (Oct. 19, 1978) at R-1540-2. Quebec has set limits to the emission of
halogenous substances in the atmosphere from liquid waste incinerators. See Q. Reg
75-496. Regulation respecting liquid waste management made under the EQA.
239 This appears to be the case, for example, with Ontario's air-borne lead criterion
regulation, which, since 1973, has been 2.0 micrograms per cubic metre measured by a
geometric mean over a thirty day period. This method of measurement is inadequate
because the use of a geometric mean as the unit of measurement for the lead stand-
ard de-emphasizes high pollution concentrations or readings, whereas an arithmetic
mean is more directly related to dosage and biological effects. (In fact, in 1976 the
then Ontario Environmental Hearing Board recommended that use of the geometric
mean be discontinued in favour of an arithmetic mean for protection of health.)
A further inadequacy is observed when, in 1978, the U.S. ambient air lead standard
was set by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at 1.5 micrograms per
cubic metre using a maximum arithmetic mean averaged over a calendar quarter.
California has had a similar standard since the early 1970's. By this yardstick Ontario's
air-borne lead criterion regulation and guidelines are twice as lenient. (ie. Ontario's geo-
metric mean of 2.0 micrograms per cubic centimetre is convertible into an arithmetic
mean of 3.0, which is twice as much as the U.S. EPA standard of 1.5). This should
be cause for concern because the California regulations indicate that the most relevant
health effects associated with air-borne lead levels above the 1.5 standard include in-
creased body burden and impairment of blood formation and nerve conduction.
For a fuller description with references regarding this matter see Castrilli and Lax,
"Environmental Regulation-Making in Canada: Towards a More Open Process," in
Swaigen, Environmental Rights in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981).
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and in what manner, through development of a priority chemicals list and
industrial source inventory. 240 River basin surveys of industrial effluents will
also normally identify problems created by certain substances (such as organ-
ic chemicals) and involve fish toxicity and related testing in anticipation of
implementing abatement measures.
241
b) Control of Toxic Chemicals Pollution from Landfill Sites
Toxic chemicals, such as PCBs, can also enter the environment through
improper disposal or management of liquids, solids, garbage, sewage sludge,
waste oils, scrap and other waste materials. 24 A frequent source of local
toxic chemicals contamination is a landfill site that has been poorly located,
designed, operated and closed.243 Without raising the issue of hazardous
waste management generally,244 this section of the paper will focus on the
toxic chemicals problem in relation to landfills.
Control mechanisms for addressing the problem of toxic chemicals in
landfill sites vary under provincial laws. Measures are usually undertaken
pursuant to a statute's general pollution control authority as opposed to
specific toxic chemical control provisions. In some provinces, administrative
guidelines that are specific to toxic chemicals management at landfills have
been developed. 245 Such guidelines have no legal effect, except to the extent
they are incorporated into a specific permit, licence, approval or related
statutory mechanism.
Because provincial statutory provisions for disposal control do not dis-
tinguish between measures to be taken for toxic chemicals and more conven-
240See, e.g., Caton, supra note 234. See also address by T.W. Cross, Ontario
Ministry of the Environment, "Ontario Government's Hazardous Substances Program,"
given at the 24th Ontario Industrial Waste Conference (June 1977, Toronto) Ont. Min.
of the Env., Air Resources Branch, Hazardous Substances Program, Hazardous Sub-
stances List and Handbook (Toronto: Gov't. of Ont., Dec. 1976); and Ont. Min. of
the Env., Air Resources Branch, Hazardous Contaminants Program, Environmental
Aspects of Selected Chlorinated Hydrocarbons in Ontario: A Comprehensive Back-
ground Report (Toronto: Gov't. of Ont., Nov. 1978). Asbestos, PCBs and Vinyl Chlo-
ride are three substances that were investigated under the program shortly after its
inception.
241 Michael Keating, "84 chemicals discovered in St. Clair River near Sarnia,"
The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Apr. 2, 1981 at 4 col. 1.
242 Supra note 63, PCB Task Force. See also Ont. Min. of the Env., Pollution
Prevention and Waste Management Guidelines for Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCB)
(Toronto: Gov't. of Ont., Nov. 1978).
243 A recent federal government report on Maritimes pollution noted that few land-
fill sites are adequate to contain the substances dumped into them. For example, PCBs
from a municipal dump in Amherst, Nova Scotia have been found in a nearby river.
See "East Coast Industries dump unsafe wastes," The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Apr.
28, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
244 For a review of the hazardous waste problem generally see supra note 3.
245 Supra note 242. See also Ont. Min. of the Env., Guidelines for Environmental
Protection Measures at Chemical Storage Facilities (Toronto: Gov't. of Ont., Oct. 1978);
and Nova Scotia Department of the Environment, Guidelines for the Selection of
Chemical Waste Landfills (Draft) (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Gov't. of N.S., 1981).
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tional pollutants, special precautions, if any, for toxics would appear in
individual landfill permits.246 The imposition and enforcement of such meas-
ures for old or existing landfills is uneven across the country. For example,
Alberta and Saskatchewan officials note that broad authority exists, usually
under provincial public health laws, to control toxic chemicals deposition in
existing landfills. This authority, however, is rarely exercised in practice.24 7
Manitoba has no statutory requirements at all in this regard.248
Ontario requires that a public hearing be held before approval may be
given to deposit hazardous wastes at a site.249 The province has had problems,
however, with unauthorized sites receiving chemical wastes.250 And Quebec
has various sections of its solid wastes regulations which prohibit the dump-
ing of both toxic and non-toxic wastes in landfill sites.251
Provincial legislation is not usually specific in relation to the establish-
ment and operation of new landfill sites that are to receive toxic chemicals.
Permits, however, can specifically require plans and specifications for con-
tainment, pre-treatment, design, operation and de-commissioning as well as
place restrictions on the location of such sites. Unfortunately, establishing
systematic control without specific legislative or regulatory authority may be
an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task in many instances.
Controlling problems from closed sites may be especially difficult with-
out explicit statutory authority.252 Ontario has considered enacting legislation
to provide for a perpetual care fund for clean-up of existing and inactive or
abandoned sites. According to a 1979 interim report on the subject, a fund
of this nature could be financed through an industry surcharge based on
type, toxicity or weight volume of waste disposed.253 No final report, how-
ever, has been released nor has any legislation been proposed to date.
Apart from Quebec, almost no provincial legislation or regulations spe-
246 Supra note 233, Rogers.
247 Supra note 231 and 233, Simpson and Maliepaard.
24
8 Supra note 233, Filmon.
249 The Environmental Protection Act R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, Part V.
250 The province recently released a report which indicated that seven certified
waste disposal sites were not specifically designated for liquid industrial wastes but were
receiving them anyway. Two additional sites, which were not certified at all under
Ontario law, were also accepting liquid industrial wastes. See Hon. Harry Parrott, Min.
of the Env., Details on Waste Site Identification Program (Toronto: Gov't. of Ont.,
June 1979). See also Appendix "A" to that report: List of Waste Disposal Sites Accept-
ing Liquid Industrial Wastes (Toronto: Gov't. of Ont., May 1979).
251 See regulation respecting solid waste management made under the EQA. Q. Reg.
78-687, ss. 54, 68, 82, 84, 86 and 99.
2Z2 See, e.g., The Director, Ministry of the Environment v. Mississauga (1980) 9
C.E.L.R. 24 (Ont. Cty. Ct.). The court held that despite the existence of high levels of
methane gas escaping from a closed waste disposal site, the Ontario Ministry of the
Environment cannot issue control orders under the Environmental Protection Act im-
posing new obligations on either current or former owners of a site, once the use of
the site has ceased.
2W Ont. Min. of the Env., Perpetual Care for Waste Management Facilities. Interim
Report (Toronto: Gov't. of Ont., Aug. 1979).
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cifically require toxic chemicals proposed for landfilling to be either charac-
terized as to their content or segregated for disposal from non-toxic or
hazardous materials.254 Such information is frequently important for prompt
remedial action if a problem arises. Ontario's Waybill Regulation 25 may be
a step toward providing such a system. The purpose of the waybill is to
require the generators and haulers of liquid industrial wastes, as well as the
operators of disposal facilities, to provide information to the province re-
specting the nature and quantity of such wastes. While the program has been
of value, it has several inadequacies. The waybill appears not to apply to
industrial or hazardous wastes that are stored or disposed of on a generator's
premises.2, 1 Nor does it appear to apply to solids or to recycled wastes, such
as waste oils used for rural road dust control.257 Indeed, a 1980 consultant's
study for the Ontario Government reported that even the waste hauling in-
dustry, itself, was certain that substantial quantities of liquid industrial wastes
were not being reported; that certain types of waste exemptions were likely
to encourage unscrupulous operators to mix some industrial wastes with
sewage and disguise the entire mixture as sewage; and that there was a
general lack of enforcement of the waybill regulations. 2 8
The dumping of toxic chemicals in existing landfills has contributed to
public concerns about the adequacy of provincial planning and enforce-
ment.25 9 It has also increased public and municipal scepticism about the
sufficiency of recent provincial proposals to address toxic chemicals of na-
tional concern, such as PCBs, through such measures as interim storage20 0 and
25 4 Supra note 231 and 233. Several provinces note that this could be done by
permit system. Correspondence to author from C.D. Carter, office of the deputy minis-
ter, Nova Scotia Department of the Environment, Halifax, Nova Scotia (March 26,
1981).
255See Transfers of Liquid Industrial Waste. 0. Reg. 926/76. This regulation,
promulgated under The Environmental Protection Act, 1971, came into force April 1,
1977.
256 0. Reg. 926/76, s. 1 (vi). See also James F. MacLaren Ltd. Consulting Engi-
neers, Planners and Scientists. Development of Treatment and/or Disposal Sites for
Liquid Industrial Wastes and Hazardous Wastes. An Interim Summary Report to the
Ontario Ministry of the Environment (Toronto: James P. MacLaren Ltd., Aug. 1979)
at 2-3.
257 0. Reg. 926/76, s. l(vii). "Waste that is wholly used or recycled" is not meant
to be included under the waybill's ambit. See also supra note 3, at 155-156.
258 See James F. MacLaren Ltd. Consulting Engineers, Planners and Scientists,
Need For Waste Management Facilities And Available Technologies. Annex One. Tech-
nical Report to the Ontario Ministry of the Environment on the Siting of Facilities and
the Management of Liquid Industrial and Hazardous Wastes in Ontario (Toronto: James
F. MacLaren Ltd., Nov. 1980).
259 In Ontario, for example, for ten years the Ministry of the Environment did not
advise either the township or residents of Harwich that cyanide, PCBs, formaldehyde
or other toxic substances, were being dumped in the local landfill. See Rudy Platiel,
"Township's mistrust is ministry's reward for years of poison," The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), May 23, 1980 at 4 col. 1.
260 Hon. Harry Parrott, Min. of the Env. A Statement to the Ontario Legislature on
Proposed Interim Storage Site for PCB Wastes (Dec. 4, 1979, Toronto). See also Doris
Hilts, "Misled over PCB storage, West Lincoln councillors say," The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), Oct. 18, 1978, at 8 col. 4.
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cement kiln incineration.261 Resistance to such proposals has been charac-
terized by provincial officials as exhibiting part of the "not in my backyard
syndrome," although such proposals have frequently been rejected on techni-
cal-not emotional-grounds.
262
Most provincial programs are still in their infancy in attempting to meet
the PCB disposal problem, even as federal controls on manufacture and use
increase the stock of PCB wastes requiring disposal. The PCB Board of
Review expressed the following concern:
The difficulties that governments and industry are having with the storage and
disposal question may be resolved, in the Board's view, only if and when the
public can be satisfied that a specific storage and disposal site is selected for its
special features, providing minimum risks to nearby populations and maximum
protection from transportation, storage or disposal accidents.6
201 Robert Sheppard, "Kiln is seen as answer for PCBs," The Globe and Mail,
(Toronto), May 26, 1978, at 4 col. 1. See also Attorney-General of Ontario v. Mississauga
(1980) 9 C.E.L.R. 87 (Ont. D.C.),where municipal by-laws which regulated nuisances and
prohibited PCB test burns except under controlled conditions were upheld against pro-
vincial challenge that such by-laws were in conflict with provincial law. However, this
was reversed on appeal, see A.G. Ont. v. Mississauga (1981), 10 C.E.L.R. 91 (Ont.
C.A.). See also Re Canadian Environmental Law Association et al and Pitura (1980)
9 C.E.L.R. 41 (Ont. D.C.), where an application challenging the legality of a commis-
sion established under The Public Inquiries Act to investigate the safety of PCB burns
in a cement kiln in Mississauga was dismissed in part on grounds that the project was
not a Crown undertaking necessitating the use of The Environmental Assessment Act
for consideration of alternative sites and methods of PCB control. AII'd on other
grounds, (1981) 10 C.E.L.R. 80. Leave to appeal to the S.C.C. is being sought by the
Can. Env. Law Assn.
262 In 1978, both the Environmental Assessment Board and the Director of En-
vironmental Approvals for the Ministry of the Environment rejected primarily on techni-
cal grounds, an industry proposal to establish a liquid industrial waste treatment and
landfill site complex at Nanticoke. The grounds included: inadequate hydrogeological
investigations by the company; unsatisfactory provisions for leachate handling; unsatis-
factory provisions for monitoring and site management; a finding that the wrong dis-
charge point was chosen; unsatisfactory provision for contingencies; unacceptable further
deterioration of groundwater quality, and; lack of demonstration that effluent quality
would be acceptable. See Ontario Environmental Assessment Board. Report on the
Public Hearings on the Nanticoke Waste Management Limited Waste Disposal Site for
Liquid Industrial Waste Treatment and Landfill Facilities (Toronto: O.E.A.B., Apr.
1978). See also Decision of the Director of Environmental Approvals, Ont. Min. of the
Env., Re Nanticoke Waste Management Limited (1978) 7 C.E.L.R. 129. In October
1980, a panel of the E.A.B. that heard the evidence recommended rejection of a regional
government proposal to convert a conventional treatment plant to one for the treatment
of liquid industrial wastes in Ajax, Ontario. The grounds for the recommended rejection
included: unsatisfactory planning, site selection and design; vulnerability of the site to
flooding; unsatisfactory provision for inorganic sludge disposal; possible elimination of
future waste reclamation opportunities due to the treatment process proposed, and; the
absence of on-site soil and ground-water studies. See Ontario Environmental Assessment
Board, Report on the Public Hearing Concerning an Application By the Regional Munic-
ipality of Durham for Approval of a Proposed Liquid Industrial Waste Treatment
Facility-Town of Ajax (Toronto: O.E.A.B., Oct. 1980). Portions of the draft report
were varied by the full E.A.B. (i.e. including those who did not hear the evidence by
resolution. The result was a recommended approval. See T.M. Murphy, Board Secretary,
"Certification that portions of the draft report were varied by the full E.A.B. by resolu-
tion," (Nov. 20, 1980, Toronto).
2
3 Supra note 88, at 14.
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According to the Board, the inability to devise such a program would inevi-
tably delay further PCB restrictions under federal law.264
c) Spills and Emergencies: Regulatory Controls and Victim Compensation
PCB spills in Ontario265 and Saskatchewan 26 6 in recent years have high-
lighted the need for improved provincial authority to respond to releases of
toxic chemicals and to compensate victims. Existing requirements for the
reporting and clean-up of spills, while of value, have not addressed the issue
of victim compensation. Guidelines267 and plans2 6 8 have emphasized the need
for the co-ordination of emergency response actions by agencies.
One of the more comprehensive pieces of legislation enacted in this area
is Part IX of Ontario's Environmental Protection Act.26 9 The Act makes
the owners and handlers of pollutants responsible for cleaning up spills, re-
storing the environment to its previous condition and reimbursing the victims
of spills for property or health damage and financial losses. The Act further
authorizes the establishment of an environmental compensation corporation
to provide victims with funds not otherwise recoverable through the courts.
As of May 1982, this law had not been proclaimed in force nor had regula-
tions creating the corporation been released. 270 A new Act in Saskatchewan
grants similar powers, although no provision is made for the creation of a
compensation corporation. 271 Numerous toxic substances, including sched-
264 Id.
265 A 1973 train-truck collision in the Sudbury area spilled 1500 gallons of battery
transformer fluid containing PCBs. The chemical eventually leached into groundwater
and threatened the Dowling, Ontario area's well-water supply. A complete clean-up was
delayed for years while the Ontario government and the Canadian Pacific Railway nego-
tiated responsibility before the government issued a clean-up order. A 1977 Environ-
mental Appeal Board decision ordered both the government and the railway to share
the costs of PCB removal. See Re Canadian Pacific Ltd. and the Ministry of the En.
vironment (1977), 6 C.E.L.N. 173 (Ontario Environmental Appeal Board). On appeal,
the Sudbury District Court held that the MOE had no jurisdiction to issue a waste clean-
up order under the Act because the PCBs were not a waste under s. 42 and had not
been deposited by the railway. Nor was there authority under the Act for the Ministry
to be directed to share in the clean-up costs. Authority under other sections of the Act
could be used to direct the railway to clean-up and repair damage. Re Canadian Pacific
Ltd. and Director of Ministry of the Environment (1978), 19 O.R. (2d) 498.
2 6 6 In Saskatchewan, PCB contaminated soil, arising from a 1976 industrial spill,
has threatened the city of Regina's water supply. The National Research Council in 1980
recommended that up to 20,000 cubic metres of the soil be immediately excavated. At
least a $1 million clean-up cost is estimated. See National Research Council, Associate
Committee on Scientific Criteria for Environmental Quality, A Case Study of a Spill of
Industrial Chemicals-Polychlorinated Biphenyls and Chlorinated Benzenes (Ottawa:
NRC, 1980).
267 Ont. Min. of the Env., Guidelines for Response to Environmental and Environ-
mental Health Emergencies (Toronto: Gov't. of Ont., Nov. 1978).
268 Ontario Contingency Plan for Spills of Oil and Other Hazardous Materials.
1975. Toronto, Ontario.
269 Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141. Part IX.
270 "Compensation Fund for Victims of Pollution One Year Overdue," (Editorial)
C.E.L.A. Newsletter, No. 6, Feb. 1981 at 1.
271 The Department of the Environment Amendment Act, S.S. 1980-81, c. 50.
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uled substances under the Environmental Contaminants Act, come within
the control ambit of the regulations proposed under this Act.272
Nova Scotia, Quebec, Manitoba, Alberta and British Columbia also have
legislation establishing procedures for emergencies and for the recovery of
government incurred clean-up costs. These jurisdictions, however, are silent
on the matter of victim compensation.
273
Where provincial legislation addresses the issue of victim compensation,
the question of general industry contribution to the scheme has been left
unresolved. 274 Industry argues that "liability and any other requirement for
companies to provide compensation should be based on fault."275 It supports
the establishment of a chemical pollution victims fund from general revenues,
but at the same time it argues that social programmes may have already
created too great a burden on government revenues.
2 76
Compensation funds proposed in other jurisdictions have been said to
fulfill two important societal goals in internalizing social costs of pollution
and providing assistance to the individual injured by toxic substances.27 7 The
latter function cannot be met by traditional tort law, in many instances,
because in order to recover damages, proof of causation must be established.
This is frequently an insurmountable obstacle in relation to toxic substances.
278
The imposition of collective liability on a group of firms whose products or
substances tend to cause a given harm has been proposed as an alternative.
Funds could be generated, for example, by assessing risk levels, quantities
and opportunities for exposure of particular substances and then levying a
corresponding pollution tax.279 Thus, the fund would be built up by those
industries and consumers who profit from products and services that are
associated with hazardous substances.280 Unfortunately, provincial law, gen-
erally, has yet to address this issue.
272The Environmental Spill Control Regulation (Draft) (Feb. 1981, Regina).
2 7 3 Supra notes 231, 233 and 254. In Quebec, for example, see Environment Quality
Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. Q-2, ss. 21 (compulsory spill reporting), 114 (power to require a
clean-up), and 115 (authority to obtain clean-up costs).
274 In Ontario, for example, the compensation corporation was to receive funds
initially from general government revenues to cover any losses victims could not recover
through the courts. Environment Minister Harry Parrott also promised at the time of
the Spills Bill's passage that he would review and determine what contributions to the
fund should come directly from industry rather than the taxpayer. Supra note 270.
275 Correspondence to author from Gordon Lloyd, Manager, Technical Department,
Canadian Manufacturers' Association (March 2, 1981, Toronto).
276 Id.
277 Trauberman, "Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances Pollution: An Analy-
sis of Existing Federal Statutes," (1981), 5 Harv. Env. L. Rev. 1 at 28.
278 Toxic chemicals and various common law restraints are discussed infra.
2 79 See United States House of Representatives. Toxic Substances Control Act
Amendments. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of
the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95 Cong. 2nd Sess. (March 7, Apr. 26
and July 25, 1978).
2 80 See The Environmental Emergency Response Act. Hearings on S. 1480 before
the Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess. (Sept. 11 and 12, 1980).
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d) Information Access, Regulation-Making and the Role of the Public
Pollution control legislation is normally silent on information access and
public involvement in regulation-making. These matters are governed by dis-
cretionary agency procedures which vary from province to province.28' The
policy employed under Nova Scotia's Freedom of Information Act,28 2 is to
treat information from permits regarding toxic chemicals waste discharges as
proprietary, and therefore, confidential. 28 Saskatchewan grants no access by
statute, but the province argues that only in very special cases does confi-
dentiality prevent the province from releasing chemicals information. 28 4
Alberta has a provision in its Hazardous Chemicals Act similar to that in the
federal Environmental Contaminants Act respecting non-disclosure of con-
fidential information. 85 In contrast, the province of Quebec, under its general
pollution control law, must provide every person with a copy of any infor-
mation concerning the quantity, quality or concentration of contaminants
emitted, issued, discharged or deposited by a contamination source. 280
Quebec law may also be contrasted with that of the other provinces
regarding public comment on draft regulations. All draft regulations must be
published by the Minister of Environment in the Quebec Official Gazette
with notice that, at the expiry of sixty days following such publication, they
will be presented for adoption by the provincial Cabinet. The Minister is also
required to consider every written objection made to him before the expiry
of the sixty day period.287 Legislative Committee hearings have also been
held on some draft regulations in Quebec before being promulgated. Other
provinces such as Saskatchewan, Manitoba and New Brunswick have, as a
matter of policy, circulated some draft regulations for public comment.
British Columbia, which does not adopt its industry-specific pollution control
objectives as province-wide legal standards, has nonetheless frequently held
public hearings on them. The adequacy of these varying, if not sporadic,
provincial mechanisms for involving the public in this key decision-making
activity, has been detailed elsewhere. 28
8
Many of the issues raised during the discussion on federal procedures
regarding information access and regulation-making in respect of public in-
volvement are equally applicable at the provincial level.
281 For a review of access to information in Canada generally see Rankin, "Infor-
mation and the Environment: The struggle for Access," in Swaigen, supra note 239.
For a review of regulation-making procedures in Canada see Castrilli and Lax, id.
282 C.S.N.S. 1979, c. F-21.
283 Supra note 254, Carter.
284 Supra note 233, Maliepaard.
285 The Hazardous Chemicals Act, S.A. 1980, c. H-3, s. 4(5).
280 Environment Quality Act, S.Q. 1978, c. 64, s. 118(d), (e). Under the Act's
new environmental impact assessment procedures, the Minister may withdraw from a
public consultation any information or data concerning industrial processes. See s. 31 (h).
287 Environmental Quality Act, RLS.Q. 1977, c. Q-2, s. 124.
288 Supra note 239.
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2. Emerging Initiatives
There are a number of emerging regulatory and policy initiatives at the
provincial level respecting toxic chemicals that deserve brief mention.
First, in 1979 the Canadian Council of Resource and Environment
Ministers established a federal-provincial task force to review existing toxic
substance controls and to advise on any actions needed to fill legislative gaps
or to avoid duplicative measures. Areas under review include manufacture,
importation, transportation, storage, handling, use, effluents, emissions, waste
disposal and secondary effects of toxic substances. The adequacy of emer-
gency response and information or data systems is also to be examined. The
task force reported to the Ministers in late 1981.28
Second, initiatives by provincial labour ministries regarding the develop-
ment of inventories of existing chemicals may influence provincial and fed-
eral environment agencies to adopt similar mechanisms. For example, under the
Occupational Health and Safety Act, the Ontario Ministry of Labour must be
notified of any new biological or chemical agents that are to be manufactured,
distributed or supplied.290 New chemical agents are those not included in the
Chemical Substances Inventory published under the United States, Toxic
Substances Control Act of 1976.290a The inventory has been adopted as an
Ontario regulation.m2 '
Under Quebec occupational health law, no one is permitted to manufac-
ture contaminants or hazardous substances, other than those prescribed in a
list under development, unless prior notice is given to the Commission on
Occupational Safety. Inspectors may also have analyses and tests done, at the
expense of the manufacturer, to evaluate the risks posed by any substance.
29 2
Third, as a means of supplementing federal restrictions on toxic chemi-
cals, several provinces, including Alberta,293 Manitoba,294 Saskatchewan 295
289 Canadian Council of Resources and Environment Ministers. Report on Toxic
Substances (Toronto: C.C.R.E.M., 1981).
290 R.S.O. 1980, c. 321, s. 21.
291 Inventory of Agents or Combinations of Agents for the Purpose of Section 21
of the Act. 0. Reg. 693/80.
292 An Act Respecting Occupational Health and Security, S.Q. 1979, c. 63, ss. 64,
65 (these two sections were proclaimed in force on Jan. 1, 1981. Que. Gazette Vol. 113,
No. 2 at 49).
293 The Hazardous Chemicals Act, S.A. 1980, c. H-3, s. 4. The Schedule under the
Act lists approximately thirteen classes of substances including PCBs, chlorofluorocar-
bons, cadmium, chlorophenols, chlorobenzenes, mercury, phthalic acid esters, lead,
arsenic and asbestos.
294 The Clean Environment Act, S.M. 1972, c. 130, s. 5 and Man. Reg. 15/81,
Respecting the Designation of Certain Substances as Hazardous Materials. The 5 sub-
stances listed are ammonium nitrate, hydrochloric acid, nitric acid, PCBs and sulfuric
acid.
'2 95 Supra note 272. The draft regulations list over 100 substances under nine pollutant
categories, including substances scheduled under the Environmental Contaminants Act.
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and, prospectively, Quebec 6 have adopted schedules of certain toxic chemi-
cals for which special controls may be applied. These controls address such
matters as storage, handling and transportation. The schedules frequently
include restricted substances listed on the federal Environmental Contami-
nants Act schedule.
Fourth, the increasing awareness of the need for more research in toxi-
cology and for the monitoring of toxic chemicals has led Ontario to propose
the establishment of an Ontario Centre for Toxicology. The Centre will focus
on the potential health hazards from the manufacture, use and disposal of
chemical products as well as emphasize training, research and assessment
activities."
7
Lastly, concern about toxic chemicals has prompted both legislative
committees298 and other groups29 9 to urge that provincial testing be under-
taken for new chemicals before their manufacture and use in a province.
C. The Role of Municipal Governments
Provincial enabling legislation has historically granted municipalities the
capacity to enact by-laws addressing such matters as waste disposal, control
of nuisances, industrial use of sewers and other related matters. 800 Provincial
legislation has also historically delegated responsibility for many public
health and nuisance control initiatives to boards of health at the local level.801
Provincial planning legislation has similarly granted to municipalities sub-
stantial responsibility for official land use planning and zoning by-law devel-
opment. 02 These, and related authorities, can, in varying degrees, have
application to the problems posed by toxic chemicals.
Two current areas of activity at the municipal level are of interest.
There is increased municipal interest in knowing what substances the urban
public and work force are exposed to and in enacting by-laws substantially
restricting activities such as PCB burning and related undertakings within
their borders.
2 96 Supra note 233, Robitaille. A redrafting of the province's liquid waste regulation
is underway which will contain a definition of dangerous wastes including a list of wastes
coming from specific and non-specific sources; as well as a list of toxic chemical sub-
stances which may become dangerous wastes when discharged into the environment.
The new regulation will also require from producers on an annual basis, a list of dan-
gerous wastes that they produce.
297 Leg. of Ont. Deb.: Speech from the Throne, Apr. 21, 1981 at 8.
298 A standing committee of the Ontario Legislature recommended in 1978 that:
"Pre-testing of all substances before they are introduced into the workplace and into
the environment is strongly urged to prevent hazards before they threaten the com-
munity." Leg. of Ont. Interim Report on Liquid Industrial Waste of the Standing Comm.
on Resources Development (Toronto: Queen's Printer, Dec. 1978).
299 See Testimony of Dan Rogers, Legal Reform Section of Student Legal Services,
Univ. of Alta. Env. Council of Alta., Public Hearings on the Management of Hazardous
Wastes in Alberta Vol. 12 (May 27, 1980, Edmtn.).
300 The Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 302.
301 The Public Health Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 409.
302 The Planning Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 379.
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Interest in "right to know" legislation by cities, such as Toronto, has
been spurred by the "widespread production, use and disposal" particularly
of "new synthetic organic chemicals. °3 0 3 Information regarding the "presence
and health effects" of such substances is frequently lacking.30 4 In this regard,
the City of Philadelphia recently became the first local government in North
America to enact ordinances requiring public disclosure by industry of toxic
substances emitted into the atmosphere, used, manufactured, or stored. 03
Amendments to the city's air management code require companies to report
to the city Health Department any toxic substances emitted from their
plants.30 6 Amendments to the city's fire code require companies to identify
toxic materials they use or store on their premises.30 7 This information is
retained on file by the city for public scrutiny. Presently, approximately 150
chemical substances are subject to the air management code requirements
and 450 substances are subject to the fire code requirements.
30 8 City of
Toronto health officials have expressed interest in similar authority as part
of their programme.
30 9
Municipal by-laws, restricting industrial chemical disposal or PCB burn-
ing within local boundaries, have been enacted because of the potential
nuisance or health effects posed by such projects. Distrust of the records of
both provincial governments and industry has also been argued to be a reason
for these municipal actions.310 These by-laws have frequently been viewed
by provincial governments as conflicting with their attempts to control safe
disposal or destruction of toxic substances and wastes. Moreover, these by-
laws have recently been overturned by the courts.8 11
In commenting on the influence municipal concerns could have on na-
tional policy, such as with respect to PCBs, the PCB Board of Review ob-
303The production of chemicals or solids through the polymerization of com-
pounds possessing a carbon chain or ring. Synthetic chemicals pose special problems as
environmental contaminants because although they may contain low toxicity levels they
may also be persistent and biologically active. Two examples are DDTs and PCBs.
304 City of Toronto, Dept. of Public Health, Health Advocacy Unit. Brief Con-
cerning Bill C-43: The Proposed Access to Information Act. Submitted to the House
of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs. April 1981.
305 "Law Regulating Chemicals Wins In Philadelphia: Companies Must Disclose
Stored Toxic Substances," The New York Times, Jan. 23, 1981, at A14, col. 5.
306 City of Philadelphia. Air Management Code. Ch. 3. Jan. 14, 1981. Bill No. 270.
307 City of Philadelphia. Fire Code. Ch. 5, Jan. 14, 1981. Bill No. 475.
308 City of Philadelphia. Council Resolution Concerning Right-To-Know Legisla-
tion. Jan. 22, 1981.
800 "City may screen toxic chemical use," The Toronto Star, January 25, 1981, at
A18, col. 1.
310 Grace Patterson, Counsel, Canadian Environmental Law Association. "The
Municipal Act: An Environmental Protection Device." Paper delivered at the Canadian
Bar Association (Ontario Branch) seminar on Environmental Law for the General
Practitioner (Dec. 11, 1980).
311 See, e.g., Attorney-General of Ontario v. Mississauga, supra note 261, which
upheld the by-laws. However, this was reversed on appeal, see 10 A.G. Ont. v. Mississauga
(1981), 10 C.E.L.R. 91 (Ont. C.A.).
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served that "local concern over environmental contamination by PCBs may
be having the result of delaying the development of facilities for their dis-
posal and elimination."3 12 It acknowledged, however, that the public has not
been convinced that "the combination of transportation hazards, storage risks
and disposal uncertainties do not constitute a major environmental threat to
any' community that is presented with a proposal for a storage facility or
waste disposal unit within its boundaries.8 313 The Board voiced its opinion
on the need for sound proposals and viewed public and municipal confidence
in the soundness of federal and provincial government proposals as integral
to resolving the waste storage and disposal problem.
3 14
D. The Role of the Courts in Control of Toxic Chemicals: Common Law
Restraints
Use of the common law areas of nuisance (private and public), riparian
rights, trespass, negligence and strict liability can provide a valuable supple-
ment to government regulatory actions in controlling toxic chemicals con-
tamination. Exercise of these common law rights can result in the court
granting relief in the form of damages or an injunction to the injured party.
It has been observed that the common law provides one of the principal
methods of redress for injury to health or property.31, It can also be used to
compel firms to internalize costs they currently inflict on the rest of society116
There are serious limitations, however, in the undertaking of common
law actions. This is exemplified with respect to public nuisance actions. This
area of tort law has been traditionally regarded as the one most capable of
responding to interferences with interests or rights common to all.8 17 The
courts have usually held that individuals affected by a public nuisance may
not sue unless they can show that there has been interference with their
private rights, or that a statute has given them a special protection or benefit
which has been interfered with, or unless they can show that they have
suffered some particularly direct damage over and above that incurred by
the public at large.3 18 Thus, normally only the Attorney-General or someone
acting in his name or with his consent (a relator) may sue on the basis of
public nuisance.319 These limitations on who may sue have been severely
312 Supra note 88, at 15.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Estrin and Swaigen. Environment on Trial, Carswell and Swaigen, eds. (Revised
ed. Toronto: Can. Env. Law Research Fdn., 1978) at 400, 412.
318 McLaren, The Common Law Nuisance Actions and the Environmental Battle-
Well-Tempered Swords or Broken Reeds (1972), 10 Osgoode Hall L.J. 505 at 518.
17 Id. See also Estey, Public Nuisance and Standing to Sue (1972), 10 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 563 at 564-65.
318 See, e.g., Hickey v. Electric Reduction Co. of Canada (1972), 21 D.L.R. (3d)
368 (Nfld. S.C.); and Fillion v. New Brunswick International Paper Co., [1934] 3 D.L.R.
22 (N.B.C.A.).
319 Roman, "Locus Standi: A Cure in Search of a Disease?" in Swaigen, supra note
239. See also notes 316, 317 and cases cited therein.
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criticized and reforms have been proposed.a In fact, in Quebec, a modified
standing requirement has been adopted.3 21
Even if the average citizen can show personal injury to health or prop-
erty, trespass to his land, negligence or some other cause of action, thus
overcoming the public nuisance bar to his suit,322 there are still substantial
problems posed by traditional tort law in relation to recovery for toxic
chemicals-related injury. These include:
a) Chronic diseases with long-latency periods arising from exposure to
toxic chemicals usually make it difficult to obtain proof that the de-
fendant's release of a particular chemical was the proximate cause of
subsequent damage; u3
b) Compensation may also be difficult to obtain for increased risk of future
damage arising from toxic chemicals exposure because the courts may
frequently regard this as remote and speculative damage. The problem
of compensation for future harm may also be exacerbated by short
statute of limitations periods or difficulties in obtaining adequate evi-
dence linking cause and effect;
24
c) Proof that a specific chemical caused damage, identification of the re-
sponsible parties, and establishment of their failure to exercise appro-
priate care, require prohibitively expensive scientific and technical data
that may be difficult or impossible for the average citizen to obtain;3 25
d) Compensation for economic and psychic losses may frequently be diffi-
cult to obtain;
320
e) Potential defences available to a defendant including prescription (long-
term development of a right to pollute) and statutory authority (a
licence or approval to discharge or emit certain levels of a contaminant)
320 The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia recently recommended in
part that "... any member of the public should have the status to bring proceedings in
respect of an actual or apprehended violation of a public right, whether it be an infrac-
tion of a statute, a public body exceeding its power or a public nuisance. We do not
believe that the right to bring such proceedings should remain within the Attorney
General's exclusive jurisdiction." See Report on Civil Litigation in the Public Interest
(Vancouver: B.C. Law Reform Commn., 1980) at 72.
321 Environment Quality Act, S.Q. 1978, c. 64, s. 19a-g. These sections grant every
person a right to a healthy environment and to its protection; authorize a Superior
Court judge to grant injunctions prohibiting any activity or operations that interfere with
such right where filed by any natural person in Quebec living in the immediate vicinity
of the operations; limit to $500, plaintiff security for costs; but permit defendants to
continue to raise the defence of statutory authority.
3 22 Supra note 319, at 14.




326 Wright and Linden, The Law of Torts (Seventh ed., Toronto: Butterworths,
1980) ch. 10.
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may also be impediments to recovery from toxic chemical damage,
and;2 7
f) Compensation for massive damage to major natural resources is seldom
sought or recovered by individuals, let alone governments. 328
Because of these and related problems involved in using the common
law, several reforms have been proposed. It has been suggested that once a
plaintiff has proved that a defendant was manufacturing or using a substance
or discharging it or emitting it into the air or the water, and once he has
shown that someone's health or the environment was damaged, the burden
of proof should shift to the defendant to show that the harm did not result
from his activities.329 Reverse onus clauses, relaxation of causation require-
ments, as well as abolition of standing requirements, certain defences and
plaintiff court cost burdens, have been proposed in a number of private mem-
bers' bills in Alberta 330 and Ontario,3 31 although none have been enacted to
date.
3 32
Ill. INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS AND CONCERNS
International initiatives respecting control of toxic chemicals are an im-
portant supplement to the activities underway at the national, provincial and
local levels. Canada is involved in a number of these actions. Two interna-
tional approaches to the problems posed by toxic chemicals are briefly re-
viewed below. One involves bilateral cooperation to protect a major natural
327 Supra note 316, at 543-47.
328 In 1971, for example, the Ontario Government sued Dow Chemical Co. for $35
million for mercury contamination of Lake St. Clair. ($10 million to clean up the Lake
and $25 million for damage to fisheries). The suit followed the 1970 banning of com-
mercial fishing in the Lake as a result of the mercury contamination. In 1978 the
Ontario Attorney-General settled the case for less than $500,000 without it ever coming
to trial, or the company admitting liability as a precedent for future cases. Among the
costs associated with the lake's pollution which were not covered adequately, or at all,
by the settlement included: unemployment insurance and welfare payments to the fisher-
men; costs of clean-up and restoring the lake and riverbeds from mercury pollution; loss
of taxes that the commercial fishermen would have paid; loss of tourist revenue from
sport fishing; legal costs to the Government and Ontario taxpayers, and; damages to
fishermen for loss of income, destruction of their way of life and effects on their com-
munity. See "Province ends lawsuit against Dow," The Globe and Mail (Toronto),
June 9, 1978 at 4 col. 1, and "From writ to wrong," The Globe and Mail (Toronto),
(Editorial) June 13, 1978 at 6, col. 5.
3 Supra note 315, at 477-479.
330 The Environmental Bill of Rights, Bill 222, 1979 (19th Leg. Alta., 1st Sess.).
Introduced by Mr. Clark, Leader of the Opposition. Never received First Reading.
33' Environmental Rights Act, Bill 185, (31st Leg. Ont., 3rd Sess.). Introduced by
Mr. Smith, Leader of the Opposition. First Reading, November 20, 1979. Died Decem-
ber 13, 1979; and The Environmental Magna Carta Act, Bill 91, (31st Leg. Ont., 4th
Sess.). Introduced by Ms. Bryden, NDP Environment Critic. First Reading, June 3, 1980.
Died October 9, 1980.
332 Supra notes 330 and 331. See also "Broad Public Coalition Supports Citizens
Suit Bill, Though Measure is Defeated in Ontario Legislature" 4 CELA Newsletter 88
(1979); and "Environmntal Rights 'Snowed Again' in Ontario" (1980), 5 CELA
Newsletter 99.
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resource-the Great Lakes. The other involves multilateral attempts to
standardize procedures for toxic chemicals control in order to minimize
environmental health and economic damage.
A. Protection of Major Natural Resources from Toxic Chemical
Contamination
1. The Canada-United States Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
The Canada-United States Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of
1978,333 arising out of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 190933 4 and other agree-
ments and studies,3 5 is designed to prevent future, and to abate existing,
pollution of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem. This objective is to be achieved,
in part, through both countries adopting common water quality objectives and
developing and implementing joint, and domestically based, control program-
mes and measures. In this regard, certain overview and advisory functions are
also assigned to the International Joint Commission (IJC), a bilateral body
originally created under the 1909 Treaty.
The current agreement places particular emphasis on control of toxic3 36
and hazardous polluting substances.337 Both countries have adopted the poli-
cy that "the discharge of toxic substances in toxic amounts" is to be pro-
hibited and the "discharge of any or all persistent toxic substances" is to be
"virtually eliminated.1 338 The agreement authorizes adoption of broad goals
and minimum acceptable water quality levels that relate, in part, to toxic
chemicals.339 It also commits both countries to adopt programmes to abate and
prevent industrial pollution by a specified date and to include "requirements
for the substantial elimination of discharges into the Great Lakes System of
persistent toxic substances. 2340 Pre-treatment requirements and programmes
for industries discharging wastes to municipal treatment works are also
333 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Jan. 11, 1978, Can.-U.S., [30] UST 1383.
334 Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters
and Questions Arising Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, U.K.-U.S.,
12 Beavans 319, 36 Stat. 244.
335 See, e.g., Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Apr. 15, 1972, Can.-U.S., [23]
UST 301; and International Joint Commission, Canada and the United States, Report on
Pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the International Section of the St. Lawrence
River (Ottawa and Washington, D.C.: IJC, 1970).
336 Supra note 333. Article I (v) defines "toxic substance" to mean a substance
which can cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations,
physiological or reproductive malfunctions or physical deformities in any organism or its
offspring, or which can become poisonous after concentration in the food chain or in
combination with other substances.
237 Id., Article I (j) defines "hazardous pollution substance" to mean any element
or compound identified by Canada and the United States which, if discharged in any
quantity into or upon receiving waters or adjoining shorelines, would present an im-
minent and substantial danger to public health or welfare. "Public health or welfare"
is defined to include all factors affecting the health and welfare of humans including
but not limited to human health, and the conservation and protection of flora and fauna,
public and private property, shorelines and beaches.
3
3
8 Id., Article II (a).
339 Id., Articles HI and IV.
340 Id., Article VI.1 (b) (ii).
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authorized.34 ' An inventory of requirements for each municipal and industrial
discharger is required, a42 as are advisory programmes and measures for abating
the impacts of toxic substances from land use or non-point sources.343 Effec-
tive enforcement programmes and programmes for reducing pollution from
storm, sanitary and combined sewers344 must also be developed.345 Both gov-
ernments are further committed to controlling and maintaining a joint contin-
gency plan for the release of hazardous polluting substances from shipping
activities. 346 Programmes to control pollution from dredging3 47 and onshore-
offshore facilities are expected, 348 as well as programmes to identify and to
consult about airborne pollutants. 49
Annexes to the agreement focus on the programmes are required to be
developed. 350 In particular, the annex on persistent toxic substances35 ' outlines
the principles under which regulatory programmes are to be developed,35 2 what
programmes are to be established,3 5 the monitoring requirements,35 4 the estab-
lishment of an early warning system,35 5 action levels for human health pro-
tection3 56 and research needs. 357 The annex on hazardous polluting sub-
341 Id., Article VI.I (a)(iv) and (b)(vi).
342 1d., Article VI. 1 (c).
343 Id., Article VI.1 (e) (vii).
344 Id., Article VI.I (a) (v).
345 Id., Article VI. (a) (vi) and (b) (vii).
346 Id., Article VI.1 (f) and (i).
347 Id., Article VI.I (g).
348 Id., Article VI.1 (h).
349 Id., Article VI. 1 (1).
350 See, e.g., id. Annexes 4 (Discharges of Oil and Hazardous Polluting Substances),
7 (Dredging), 8 (Discharges from Onshore and Offshore Facilities) and 9 (Joint
Contingency Plan).
351 Id., Annex 12.
352 Id., s. 2. The general principles include virtual elimination of the input to the
Lakes of persistent toxic substances; adoption of a philosophy of zero discharge; and
rehabilitation to the extent reasonable and practical of those portions of the Lakes
adversely affected by such substances.
353 Id., s. 3. Programs include an inventory identifying raw materials, processes,
products, by-products, waste sources and emissions and quantitative data on the sub-
stances along with handling, use and disposition recommendations; co-ordination and
integration of air, water and solid waste programs in order to assess the total input to
the Lakes of toxic substances; and joint disposal programs.
354 Id., s. 4.
355 Id., s. 5. Such a system is expected to include development and use of structure-
activity correlations to predict environmental characteristics of chemicals; ability to
predict trends in the production, import and use of chemicals; review of new chemical
environmental testing results; toxicological research on chemicals and foreign research
reviews; biological tissue and sediment bank maintenance to permit review of trends
over time; monitoring; development of mathematical models to predict different chemi-
cal loading rate consequences; and data bank development and information storage
respecting known and suspected persistent toxic substances regarding their physical-
chemical properties, toxicology, use and quantities in commerce.
356 Id., s. 6.
357 Id., s. 7.
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stances lists both actual35s and potential3 59 substances and outlines the
procedures and criteria relating to the listing of these substances.3 60
IJC rules of procedure authorize public notice, comment and hearings
on major reports done by or for it, including reports on proposed water
quality objectives.361
Both the IJC and groups reporting to it have raised concerns regarding
toxic substances pollution in the Lakes, as has been noted above.362 A 1978
report to the TIC recommended the following: toxic substances should be
controlled at their source; proper management and disposal should be re-
quired; including identification, monitoring and control of toxic substances
at existing and closed waste disposal sites; cumulative and synergistic effects
of toxic substances on environmental health should be assessed in order to
improve water quality objectives; and where necessary and practicable, a zero
tolerance load should be designated. 36 The IJC itself reported to the Cana-
dian and U.S. governments in 1980 that approximately 2,800 chemicals,
including 2,200 organic compounds, are being produced or used in the Great
Lakes Basin. About 400 organic compounds have been identified in the Basin
Ecosystem. The IJC recommended that, "[t]he production, sale, transport or
use of persistent synthetic organic compounds with known highly toxic effects
whose use will result in their entry into the environment be prohibited. '864
More recently the IJC reported concerns about atmospheric deposition being
a major source of hazardous substances to the Lakes. It further advised of
the possible need to immediately regulate up to thirty-three chemicals found
in the Lakes previously identified as "being known to cause chronic adverse
effects in humans. '36
5
The IJC has also focused on specific areas of the Great Lakes Basin
that have been contaminated by toxic substances. Niagara River water quality
was recently the subject of a special report because it does not meet or is
close to exceeding a number of specific objectives contained in the agreement
including that for "unspecified organic compounds." 366 In addition, the IJC
358 Id., Annex 10, appendix 1. Approximately 250 substances listed.
359 Id., Appendix 2. Approximately 100 substances listed.
360 Id., Annex 11, ss. 1-4.
361 International Joint Commission, Rules of Procedure (Wash. D.C. & Ottawa:
I.J.C., 1912, as am. 1964). These rules were adopted in accordance with Article XII
of the Treaty. See, e.g., Part III of Rules, s. 29.
362 Supra note 5.
363 Id., PLUARG at 5-8.
364 International Joint Commission, Pollution in the Great Lakes Basin from Land
Use Activities: An I.J.C. Report on the governments of the United States and Canada
(Windsor, Ont.: I.J.C., Great Lakes Regional Office, 1980).
365 International Joint Commission, Interim Report under the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement (Wash. D.C. & Ottawa: I.J.C., Jan. 28, 1981) at 7.
366 International Joint Commission, Special Report on Pollution in the Niagara
River (Wash. D.C. & Ottawa: I.J.C., Jan. 20, 1981).
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has raised the issue of the adequacy of federal statutes307 and enforcement
programmes.
68
Ironically, the mechanisms and objectives authorized under the agree-
ment to control current and future damage from toxic substances may also
be inadequate in certain respects. To illustrate, a 1978 reference group report
to the IJC raised significant issues in respect of the water quality objectives
and trace elements. 369 The report noted that the additive, synergistic and
antagonistic effects of a mixture of heavy metals, such as might be found
near an industrial outfall, had not been considered in formulating the objec-
tives. It was critical, for example, that
... a mixture of all the trace elements listed in the [IJC's] revised Water Quality
Objectives proved highly toxic to algae at concentrations given in the objectives,
as well as at 50 and at 10 per cent of the proposed objective concentrations.3
70
The group advised that a better definition of Great Lakes pollution was re-
quired, one that recognized that while individual land use or non-point
sources of contaminants may not in themselves result in violations of water
quality objectives, "pollution" of the Great Lakes does result from these
sources in combination with other sources
a71
Currently, IJC reporting groups are working to meet the requirements of
certain aspects of the 1978 agreement such as the identification, description
and evaluation of federal, state and provincial toxic substance control pro-
grammes. 3
72
B. Standardization of Procedures and Protocols
Regulation of toxic chemicals has been described as a major interna-
tional challenge.373 But there are many obstacles to an effective international
response. These include the poor quality of existing test data; the lack of
internationally accepted testing protocols; differences in national require-
ments regarding the timing of new chemicals notification to government
agencies; industry and some governments' concern about the release of "con-
fidential" information due to fears of competitive market positions being
harmed; the lack of public participation requirements in many national chem-
367 Supra note 87, and accompanying text.
308 For example, in 1977 the I.J.C. argued that it was "concerned with the growing
evidence of the dangers of toxic chemicals in the lakes and with the failure to imple-
ment enforcement measures on many industrial and municipal sources of pollution."
International Joint Commission, Fifth Annual Report on Great Lakes Water Quality
(Windsor, Ont.: I.J.C., 1977).
3
69 PLUARG, Supra note 5, at 44-46.
370 Id. at 46.
371 Id. at 93-94.
372 See, e.g., International Joint Commission, Great Lakes Water Quality Board,
First Report of the Toxic Substances Committee (Windsor, Ont.: Nov. 1980).
373 Philip Alston, International Regulation of Toxic Chemicals (1978) 7 Ecology
L.Q. 397. John Roberts, federal Environment Minister, has stated that "... the solution
to dealing with the problem of chemicals in our society must involve international
cooperation on a major scale." Supra note 95.
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ical control laws; the establishment of unnecessary trade barriers due to
differing control requirements in each country; and the export or "dumping"
of hazardous chemicals from countries with stringent controls to those with
less stringent requirements. a74
The responses of several international groups, including the United Na-
tions' Environment Programme (UNEP), the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), to several of these issues are reviewed briefly below.
1. Testing
The OECD's chemical controls programme, established in 1978, is de-
signed to facilitate the acceptability of chemicals testing data among its 24
member countries (including Canada), as well as to coordinate controls at
the international level.3 75 Current emphasis is on developing testing pro-
cedures for new-not existing-chemicals. 376 In May 1980, OECD members
reached agreement on the basis for mutual acceptance of data,377 test guide-
lines,378 principles of good laboratory practice379 and a minimum pre-market
set of data.380 Canada is likely to adopt much of the OECD proposals in its
revisions to the Environmental Contaminants Act.
3 8 1
National preferences regarding initial testing requirements have been
said to depart extensively from one another. One commentator has noted
that:
Up to now, U.S. and European concepts concerning the extent of initial testing
are quite apart. The Americans prefer extensive (and costly) base testing of all
374 Alston, supra note 373. See also comments of Rehbinder, supra note 6.
375 OECD Chemical Controls Coordination 1979) 5 Environmental Policy and
Law 8. The initiative for OECD development of such a program is in part due to
the fact that trade in chemecals amongst OECD members accounts for approximately
two-thirds of world chemical production and annual sales in the 300 billion dollar
(U.S.) range. Thus, the failure to develop coordinated programs was seen as potentially
capable of adversely impacting human health and the environment, the chemical indus-
try and unnecessarily disrupting international chemical trade. See "OECD Programme
on Chemicals," UNEP: International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals Bulletin.
Vol. 3, No. 2. July 1980.
370 Supra note 95, comments of Roberts.
377 Supra note 375, UNEP: IRPTC Bulletin, OECD members decided that data
could be assured as internationally acceptable if specified guidelines for tests and standards
for laboratory practice were followed.
378 Id. The purpose of the 52 test guidelines is to establish identical testing methods
for specific chemical classes in each country. Thus each country could accept the others'
test results and avoid the duplicative effort associated with each country conducting its
own testing program. Supra note 95, comments of Roberts.
370 Id.
380 Id. The elements of the data package include: chemical identification; produc-
tion/use and disposal; recommended precautions and emergency measures; analytical
methods; physical/chemical properties; acute toxicity; repeated dose toxicity; and muta-
genicity, ecotoxicity, degradation and accumulation.
381 Supra note 93.
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new chemicals and envisage only one step of in-depth testing for selected chemi-
cals; the Europeans are considering multi-step sequence testing requirements...
where the initial testing obligation could be relatively lenient but the obligations
would gradually increase with production volume.
8 2
OECD industrial advisory groups do not support one method over another 8a8
They note that currently there are unresolved questions about the relevance
and the ability to reproduce some of the tests as well as gaps in the informa-
tion about how and when any given test should be applied. They also argue
that little or no work has been done on costs, economic impact and the
effects on small business. 384 They further emphasize that to minimize the
economic burden to industry, any testing requirements should be restricted
to those tests which are essential to assess the potential effects of a chemical
on human health and the environment. 38 5
European environmental groups have argued that toxic substances laws
should contain "a general obligation on manufacturers and importers to test
new and existing chemical substances" for their effects on humans and the
environment and that "an adequate screening programme for existing chemi-
cal substances" should be authorized. 380
The objectives of UNEP's International Register of Potentially Toxic
Chemicals (IRPTC) are: to facilitate access to existing data on the effects
of chemicals on humans and the environment; to identify important gaps in
existing knowledge and to draw attention to the need for further research;
to identify or help to identify potential hazards from chemicals; and provide
information on national, regional and global policies, regulatory measures,
standards and recommendations for the control of potentially toxic chemi-
cals. IRPTC's strategy for achieving these objectives includes the develop-
ment of working links with other information systems and the establishment
of an information network, the collaboration with institutions carrying out
evaluations of health and environmental effects of chemicals, and the dis-
semination of information. 387
a82Rehbinder, U.S.-German Conferences on Toxic Chemicals (1978), Environ-
mental Policy and Law 166. See also Dispute with U.S. on Toxic Substances (1979), 5
Environmental Policy and Law 92; and Commission of the European Communities:
Note Verbale; Comments of the European Community on the proposed rules of TSCA
Section 5 (1979), 5 Environmental Policy and Law 110-112.
383 OECD, Business and Industry Advisory Committee, BIAC Chemicals Sub-Group
Recommendations to O.E.C.D.'s Step Systems Group (Paris: OECD, Dec. 1979).
384 OECD, Business and Industry Advisory Committee, BIAC Comments for High
Level Meeting of O.E.C.D. Chemicals Group (Paris: OECD, Apr. 1980).
385 OECD, Business and Industry Advisory Committee, Views of the B.I.A.C.
Chemicals Sub-Group Regarding Some Principles of Controls Affecting National and
International Commerce in Chemicals (Paris: OECD, Oct. 1979).
3 8
6 Henselmans, "Toxic Substances Control in the European Community: Lack of
Prevention and Public Participation," UNEP: Industry and Environment Quarterly
Newsletter. Vol. 2, No. 4 Oct.-Dec. 1979, at 14.
387 Satkunananthan and Huismans, "International Register of Potentially Toxic
Chemicals," id., at 18.
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2. Information Confidentiality
The OECD has been investigating how member countries can exchange
health and safety data on chemicals and, at the same time, protect the com-
mercially sensitive or confidential information of the firms that had the testing
done.3
88
An OECD legal and scientific committee has proposed several principles
to govern the exchange of confidential information. The principles being
discussed include: the exchange of information between competent authori-
ties (governments) for the sole purpose of assessing the hazard to and the
protection required for humans and the environment; a requirement that
the requesting country produce evidence of need (for example, that the
chemical is on the market or being marketed and is being assessed); an agree-
ment that certain principles be followed to protect confidentiality and that
the requesting country ask only for information that it is authorized to collect
under its national legislation or during the normal course of its administra-
tion.389 The committee has also recommended a "non-confidential package"
that could be exchanged between countries. This package would include such
information as chemical trade names, general data on usage, safe-handling
precautions and emergency measures, disposal and transport methods, physi-
cal and chemical data (excluding that information which would reveal chem-
ical identity) and summaries of environmental health and safety studies. 390
The EEC has adopted a similar non-confidential list.3 91
The OECD business and industrial advisory committee(BIAC) supports
the above principles for protection and use of data, but it does not agree with
governments directly sharing confidential data. It also supports the "non-
confidential package" concept. The BIAC views industry involvement as
necessary in preparing the toxicological and eco-toxicological study sum-
maries. It further argues that governments should recognize two fundamental
principles as being important within the chemical industry. First, that infor-
mation submitted to government is the intellectual property of the industry
concerned, if industry resources were used in developing the information.
Second, that government is the trustee and not the owner of the confidential
information
392
There are, however, some potentially serious international environmen-
tal health implications in the OECD-BIAC position. This is exemplified in
3 s Supra note 375, UNEP; IRPTC Bulletin.
389 Telephone interview with Ruth Demayo, Hazard Assessment Division, Contami-
nants Control Branch, Env. Cda. (May 23, 1981).
390 "O.E.C.D. Proposes Exchange on Hazardous Chemicals Data," Canadian En-
vironmental Control Newsletter. No. 189. Feb. 3, 1981 at 1603. See also O.E.C.D.
Environment Committee, High Level Meeting of the Chemicals Group: Summary
Record. ENV/CHEM/HLM/80.M/1 (Paris: May 1980).
391 "European Economic Community," UNEP: 1.R.P.T.C. Bulletin. Vol. 3, No. 1.
Jan., 1980.
392 OECD, Business and Industry Advisory Committee, Views of the B.I.A.C.
Chemicals Sub-Group Regarding Some Aspects of Confidentiality (Paris: Oct. 1980).
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the proposal to release only health and safety study summaries. In 1969, for
example, studies were performed on the pesticide leptophos, by Industrial
Bio-Test Laboratories (IBT). The IBT report concluded that an examina-
tion of tissue from chickens fed leptophos "did not reveal any evidence of
demyelination [nerve damage] in any of the chickens tested." The body of
the report, however, included numerous descriptions of such neurotoxic
symptoms as "no control of legs," "very unsteady," "cannot remain stand-
ing" and "extreme staggering."39 3 A 1974 U.S. EPA review of the same
tissue slides found them "impossible to evaluate from the time they were
prepared."394 In 1975-76, workers at one chemical plant showed neurotoxic
and related health problems as a result of exposure to leptophos which was
being manufactured and packaged there. While leptophos was used only
experimentally in the U.S., and is no longer in production there, it was ex-
ported to as many as fifty countries, including Canada, between 1971 and
1976.39r
Notwithstanding concurrent international attempts to improve laboratory
testing practices, it is difficult to see how potential environmental health
damage can be entirely avoided in the future if test summaries are the prin-
cipal, if not only, type of information permitted to be released to the general
public, or to be shared with other governments.
In light of the OECD-BIAC views, and the pressure for internationally
similar mechanisms, it is unclear how Canada, a net importer of chemicals,
will address the question of confidentiality and health and safety study
summaries in any new federal toxic chemicals law. John Roberts, federal
Environment Minister, has recently stated that:
... it is vital that we maximize the availability of data in order to ensure the
public that there are no cover-ups going on here-nothing being hidden. I rec-
ognize that objective has to be balanced against the risk, when data are not
fully assessed, of causing uninformed or premature concern. We must also protect
legitimate proprietary rights. But my bias is very clear. If we are to err, we
should err on the side of making the information available.3 06
In an area as circumscribed by common law restrictions, if not ambiguities,
as this one, this policy statement, while laudable, cannot stand alone. It
clearly must have a statutory base for support. The federal government has
previously failed to release information about chemicals because of threats
393Report-Demyelination Study-Chickens, I.B.T., no. J7162, from Industrial
Bio-Test Laboratories, Inc., Northbrook, Illinois, to Velsicol Chemical Corporation
(July 29, 1969). Reported in United States Senate, The Environmental Protection Agen-
cy and the Regulation of Pesticides: Staff Report to the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Comm. on the Judiciary. 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Dec.
1976). See also Appendix to the Staff Report.
394 Memorandum from Howard Richardson (U.S. EPA pathologist) to "The
Record." Subject: Phosvel-Demyelination studies (Aug. 27, 1974), id., Senate Judiciary
Staff Report and Appendix.
395 Id., Staff Report at 42.
396 Supra note 95.
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of lawsuits from U.S. manufacturers claiming confidentiality for health and
safety tests.
3 97
3. Timing of Notification, Control Options and Public Participation
Three additional issues at the international level deserve brief mention:
the timing of industry notification to government regarding new chemicals;
control options, and; the role of the public.
The EEC, in September 1979, adopted what is known as the sixth
amendment to a 1967 EEC directive that dealt with standardization of mem-
ber states' laws regarding classification, packaging and labelling of dangerous
substances. The sixth amendment provides for a pre-market notification pro-
cedure regarding new chemical substances. The manufacturer or importer
of a substance must submit to the relevant government authority in the mem-
ber state, at least forty-five days prior to marketing, a technical file or pack-
age containing information adequate to evaluate foreseeable risks which the
substance may present to human health or to the environment. 398 Other
information, such as that described above, must be included. 99 Protection
for confidential information is provided for in the amendment,4 00 as well as
opportunities for government to require additional studies or tests if certain
conditions are met.40
1
Critics of the amendment argue that although government authorities
may ask for more information, they cannot stop marketing or restrict usage
if the notification is in accordance with the directive's requirements. Only
when a member state has detailed evidence that a substance constitutes a
hazard may it temporarily prohibit or restrict its use. Critics argue that the
burden of proof is substantially on the member state. As a result, the sixth
amendment has been described as being incapable of providing a preventive
control approach to new chemicals; 40 2 it is a "pure notification procedure."
40 3
The forty-five day waiting period between notification and marketing
has also been described as too short to make a risk assessment, on the basis
of which government agencies may consider any regulatory options.4° 4 More-
over, the pre-market notice requirement occurs at a much later stage in the
corporate decision-making process than the pre-manufacture notice require-
ment of statutes such as the Toxic Substances Control Act.40 5 In the TSCA,
397 Horgan, "Chemicals secret in Canada, not in U.S.," The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), March 18, 1981 at 5, col. 3.
398 Supra note 391.
309 Supra note 380.
400 Supra note 391.
401 Id.
402 Supra note 386.
4 03 Supra note 382, comments of Rehbinder.
404 Supra note 382. This was also a criticism of the recently enacted German
chemicals law; the first European statute to adopt the bulk of the EEC requirements.
Supra note 81, comments of Jasanoff.
405 Supra note 382. See also supra note 99, comments of Mitchell.
1982]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
there are also longer waiting periods and greater authority to restrict produc-
tion for lack of sufficient information on human health and environmental ef-
fects.4"' The EEC amendment is also silent on public participation in regu-
latory decision-making regarding new chemicals.
40 7
Improvements in EEC and related initiatives have been proposed. These
would require notification procedures for the manufacture, import or export
of new chemical substances; procedures for decision-making, including pub-
lic participation, prior to manufacture, import or export; and timely applica-
tion of control options.
408
IV. PROSPECTIVE GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES IN TOXIC
CHEMICAL CONTROL LAW AND POLICY IN CANADA
International programmes and concerns, as well as experience with exist-
ing federal, provincial and municipal law, are likely to influence the shape and
effectiveness of any new federal toxic chemicals management law in the
1980's. New legislation is, in fact, now under development. 40 9 The final
framework of such legislation is yet to be settled. It is likely, however, that
there will be a consolidation of federal air, water and contaminants program-
mes so as to address toxics in one law.410 Some elements of the expected re-
forms, arising out of international efforts to achieve compatible national
programmes, have been discussed above.411 Still others are hinted at in recent
406 Under §5, 15 USC §1604 of TSCA, after the 90-day pre-manufacture notifica-
tion period, the manufacturer may proceed to produce or process the chemicals involved
unless the U.S. EPA for "good cause!' extends the 90-day review period for another 90
days; or the U.S. EPA issues an order at least 45 days before the review period expires
to prohibit or limit the manufacture, processing, commercial distribution, use, or dis-
posal of the chemical pending acquisition of additional data where the U.S. EPA
determines that there is inadequate information to evaluate the health and environmental
effects of the new chemical.
4o7 Supra note 386.
408 Id.
409 Recent comments of federal officials before a Special Parliamentary Committee
on Regulatory Reform indicated that "there is underway the development of new en-
vironmental legislation.... The nature of the legislation-it deals with a number of
environmental matters, but the most important, perhaps, is the management of industrial
chemicals.... A great deal of the thrust of the legislation will be on obtaining informa-
tion about said chemicals, in the initial phases; and ultimately, as required and where
evidence demonstrates it is needed, some kind of government intervention in the market-
place related to said chemicals; some limitation or ban, product substitution, whatever
it may be." Supra note 188, at 24, comments of Robinson. See also Hon. John Roberts,
Minister of the Environment, "Notes for a speech in the House of Commons" (May 12,
1980, Ottawa); "Federal Policies For Toxic Contaminants Control," speech of G.M.
Cornwall, Director General, Policy Planning and Assessment Directorate, EPS, Env.
Cda. (June 1980, Ottawa). Both statements indicate that Environment Canada is devel-
oping a new federal environmental protection policy which will require new federal
legislation to protect human health and the environment from toxic chemicals and the
hazards they pose.
410 Supra note 6, comments of Gern.
411 Comments of Roberts regarding international testing guidelines for new chemicals;
and note 93 and accompanying text, comments of Bryden regarding pre-market notifi-
cation of new chemicals and related mechanisms. Supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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PCB Board of Review recommendations. 412 A number of possible amend-
ments have also been raised by federal officials in earlier reports.
413
Integral to the development of the legislative proposals has been the
federal enunciation of several broad principles. Few are currently enshrined
in federal law. Nor is it entirely clear how many will become part of the
eventual legislative package. The principles are important, however, to illus-
trate the direction in which federal thinking is heading. They include:
a) The placing of responsibility on producers and users of toxic chemicals
to ensure that human health and the environment are not damaged by
such substances regardless of whether regulations are in place;
b) The placing of responsibility on producers or importers, through tests
performed at their expense, to demonstrate the safety of their product
before commercial production;
c) The establishment, where possible, of a "safe level" for a chemical,
and the incorporation of this level in the regulations; where it is not
possible, controls will be employed at the level of best practicable
control technology, taking into account socio-economic concerns;
d) The application by the importer or producer of federally approved
systematic evaluations to new chemicals or new uses of existing chemi-
cals;
e) The providing of information on usage, release and effects of existing
chemicals by manufacturers and users upon request of the federal gov-
ernment, with duplicative testing to be avoided or minimized;
f) A reporting requirement to government of information regarding nor-
mal discharge or accidental release of toxic chemicals;
g) The minimization by manufacturers, importers or handlers of products
containing toxic chemicals of activities which damage environmental
and public health;
h) The making public of all toxic chemicals information except that which
is of a confidential proprietary nature the disclosure of which would
prejudice a legitimate commercial interest, though confidential infor-
mation should be shared between governments where necessary;
i) The encouraging of industry to seek alternative products and processes
to those which result in toxic chemical releases;
4 12 The Board recommended, for example, statutory authority to control exports, to
require labelling and to require the reporting of scheduled substance releases to the envi-
ronment. Other recommendations for statutory improvement addressed protection of en-
vironmentally sensitive areas from toxic chemicals; control of products containing sched-
uled substances; control of inventory, ownership transfer and abandonment of equipment
containing scheduled substances; mandatory reporting; inspection authority; penalties;
and who may file notices of objection to compel hearings on proposed regulations. Supra
notes 88 and 114.
413 The 1976 PCB Task Force noted, for example, that the Environmental Con-
tamninants Act did not permit the federal government to require labelling or control of
exports. Supra note 63.
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j) Because of the nature of the problems posed by toxic chemicals, fed-
eral leadership is required in co-operation with the provinces in such
areas as environmental measurement, cause-effect research, informa-
tion exchange, federal and provincial control and regulation, as well
as provincial implementation of selected federal controls; and
k). The requiring of exporters of toxic chemicals to notify the recipient
country and the federal government and to provide necessary informa-
tion.4 1 4
In 1980, Environment Canada established a Toxic Chemicals Management
Centre to co-ordinate control programmes and strategies. This is expected to
provide particular focus for federal initiatives.
415
The success of the Environment Canada actions is dependent upon the
development of common objectives and policies with other key federal de-
partments (for example, National Health and Welfare, Fisheries and Oceans
and Agriculture); the encouragement of provincial control initiatives in their
respective areas of jurisdiction, including co-operation on monitoring and
surveillance activities and delegation of selected federal controls; the promo-
tion of industry and general public involvement in regulation-development
and related activities, including socio-economic assessments; and the continu-
ation of international co-operation in such areas as testing protocols for new
chemicals. 41
6
Provincial statutory or administrative practice initiatives will likely con-
tinue to address, in varying degrees, such topics as the development of a
greater capacity to respond to emergencies, the need for better clean-up
requirements and the authorization of victim compensation; the compilation
of surveys and inventories of selected chemicals emitted or discharged by
industry; the need to upgrade landfill requirements; the compilation of river
basin surveys; the need for better storage, handling and transportation of
chemicals; the need to give special attention to chemicals of national concern,
such as PCBs; the need for greater specificity in permit or administrative
orders relating to chemicals; and, with some exceptions, the need for discre-
tionary public involvement in the areas of access to information, regulation-
making, permit issuance and administrative hearings.
Some municipalities will seek both better mechanisms for obtaining in-
formation on chemicals within their borders, and greater authority to protect
their populations from nuisances and potential health hazards.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL REFORMS
In addition to the government initiatives underway or contemplated, a
number of other actions appear warranted, given the dimensions of the toxic
chemicals problem. These can be divided into two general categories: activ-
414 Gerin, Supra notes 4 and 5.
415 Id.
416 Id.
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ities that government should have authority to undertake or require, with
respect to management or control of toxic chemicals, and; activities that the
general public should be able to become involved in or initiate as a matter
of law. The following recommendations may also apply to more than one
government level.
First, consideration should be given to requiring registration, or at least
pre-manufacture notice, before new industrial chemicals are introduced to
Canada. In conjunction with this, development of a Canadian inventory of
existing chemicals is necessary. There should be a statutory onus on industry
to show that any new substance it wishes to introduce into the marketplace
will not pose a significant danger to human health or the environment. Regis-
tration has long been required, for example, under federal pesticides law.41 7
Under federal food and drug law, tolerances must be set and extensive data
required before pesticides may be used in Canada that would leave a residue
on foods. 418 A registration requirement would not appear onerous in the
industrial chemical area because few new chemicals are produced in Canada
each year.419 While much larger numbers are imported for the first time each
year, if international testing guidelines are in place, most of the needed data
should already be available. If, for whatever reasons, registration is not re-
garded as an appropriate approach, pre-manufacture, as opposed to pre-
market, notification should be required. The reasons for pre-manufacture
notice have already been reviewed above.420 Either mechanism could serve
to make new toxic chemicals legislation more preventive in nature; to reduce
potentially large industry investment costs if a chemical's manufacture is
unwise; and to facilitate early public involvement in the process.
Second, consideration should be given to requiring a more systematic
programme for testing or screening existing chemicals of concern. The need as
417 Pest Control Products Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-10, s. 4.
418 Food and Drug Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27 as am. The health protection branch
of Health and Welfare Canada normally requires "extensive data" on at least the follow-
ing matters before authorizing a pesticide residue limit in food: specifications for the
chemical and its physical-chemical properties; evidence that the product is effective and
practical; the amount to be applied, frequency and time of application; satisfactory
methods of analysis for determining residues in foods; plant and animal metabolism
studies; data on the quantities and chemical nature of residues remaining on foods at
harvest, slaughter or point of sale, and; toxicity studies designed to evaluate the hazards of
residues to experimental animals including acute, subacute and chronic studies as well
as various types of special studies on reproduction, birth defects, neurotoxicity and
related matters. These requirements are regarded as consistent with the notion that the
applicant is responsible for proving the chemical nature, level and safety of any pesti-
cide residues in food. Correspondence to C.E.L.A. from Dr. Ian C. Munro, Director
General, Food Directorate, H.P.B., Health and Welfare Canada (Dec. 9, 1980, Ottawa).
419 Supra note 6, comments of Robinson and Brydon. Federal reports have also
noted the following: "Within Canada, only a small number of 'new' chemicals is devel-
oped each year. Much larger numbers are imported." They also note that "Particular
consideration will have to be given to testing new chemicals developed in Canada for
specialist use abroad and which, because of the small quantities entailed, might other-
wise go untested." Supra note 4, at 7.
42o Supra notes 99 and 405 and accompanying text.
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well as the possible mechanisms for accomplishing this while minimizing
costs and duplication have been discussed above.421 At the least, those chemi-
cals which were developed and used primarily in Canada and which are of
concern, should be addressed first. The development of a Centre of Toxicol-
ogy (such as in Ontario), may prove helpful as the smaller businesses that
have developed specialty chemicals may be able to have evaluations done
at the Centre. Payments could then be made through cost-sharing arrange-
ments with all other suppliers or users of the substance. This initial experi-
ence could serve as a basis for systematically refining and expanding existing
chemical reviews and cost sharing as appropriate. While industry has been
concerned about the cost of testing existing chemicals, in the past, particular-
ly in the United States, industry cost projections have been substantially higher
than those of government or independent evaluators. 422
Third, consideration should be given to requiring manufacturers, pro-
cessors and importers of chemicals to notify the government immediately if
one of their substances may cause or contribute to a danger to human health
421 Supra notes 17, 21, 22, 24, 78-83, 386 and accompanying tdxt.
422 During 1975 consideration of proposed toxic substances legislation in the U.S.,
for example, Dow Chemical Co., the Manufacturing Chemists Association (MCA) and
U.S. EPA each conducted cost analyses which attempted to project the costs of screen-
ing, testing, delays, bans, restrictions and related actions on the chemical industry arising
from such legislation. Dow estimated an overall annual cost to industry of $2 billion,
MCA projected a range from $358 million-$1.3 billion depending on the range of
testing needed and U.S. EPA projected a range of $78.5 million-$141.5 million per
year. Because of the discrepancies in these three sets of figures, the U.S. Senate re-
quested the U.S. GAO to review the appraisal variations. The GAO, while indicating
that any appraisal would be subject to uncertainty in this area, suggested a cost range
of $100 million-$200 million per year. The U.S. GAO also noted that none of the
studies had considered the health and environmental benefits of the Act. See Testimony
and Report of Harry Havens, Director, Office of Program Analysis, U.S. GAO, Hear-
ings on S. 776 before the Subcommittee on the Environment of the Committee on
Commerce. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 24, 1975).
A subsequent GAO submission to the Senate affirmed GAO's earlier views. It noted
that the main problem in estimating costs is to determine the extent of testing required
per chemical and the number of chemicals to be tested. (MCA had estimated that
thorough toxicity testing could total as much as $800,000 per chemical while U.S. EPA
projected a range of $200,000-$400,000.) GAO also substantially rejected the other
industry cost estimates such as those regarding economic impact (e.g. prices and gross
national product) and "maintenance of innovation" (what the MCA study called the
cost required to maintain the same rate of successful product innovation as before
the imposition of testing requirements and restrictions on production.) With regard to
prices, the GAO concluded that "an accurate estimate of TSCA costs would yield
estimates of price increases significantly lower than those of the MCA study." With
regard to GNP, the GAO concluded that while TSCA "would have some effect upon
GNP," the MCA report "greatly exaggerates that effect." With regard to the "mainte-
nance of innovation" costs, GAO raised three basic objections. First, it concluded that
firms would not necessarily behave in such a way as to incur these extra costs. Second,
it concluded that even if they do incur these costs they should not be counted as costs
of TSCA. Third, it concluded that even if "maintenance of innovation" costs were
conceptually valid, the MCA study estimated them inaccurately. See United States
General Accounting Office. Reporting Letter to the Hon. John V. Tunney, United States
Senate from the Comptroller General of the United States. (Dec. 4, 1975, Washington,
D.C.).
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or the environment. A provision of this type has been discussed above as
one that can contribute to government information-gathering and other regu-
latory activities. 3 A similar provision has been proposed by the European
Economic Community- 4 and is also contained in United States toxic sub-
stances law.4 25
Fourth, consideration should be given to the establishment of a chemi-
cal victims compensation fund to be financed substantially from taxes or fees
from industry based on the risk level, quantities and opportunities for expo-
sure associated with chemicals so listed in a government established register.426
Fifth, consideration should be given to requiring the release by govern-
ment of health and safety studies and any information or tests on emissions
or discharges in its possession regarding any chemical, upon request of any
member of the public. Cost-sharing arrangements for tests on health and
environmental effects should also be considered. Moreover, the chemical
structure of all chemicals used in Canada should be public information.
Current law is inadequate in these respects.427 The federal Access to Infor-
mation Bill, as currently drafted, would not improve the situation.
428
Sixth, consideration should be given to requiring that procedural mech-
anisms be set up permitting all interested, knowledgeable or concerned per-
sons an opportunity to participate in government regulation-making activity.
Seventh, consideration should be given to requiring regulation-making
and advisory committee activity to be initiated in response to citizen peti-
tions. For example, a petition could seek initiation of regulation-making or
advisory committee activity on a substance about which new data has come
to light regarding health or environmental effects. In light of concerns that
have been noted regarding the relatively few toxic chemicals which have been
regulated to date,429 a provision of this type could provide a valuable supple-
423 Supra note 45 and accompanying text.
424 The EEC sixth amendment would require any manufacturer or importer who
originally notified a member state of his intention to market a chemical substance, to
inform the competent authority of new knowledge of the effects of the substance on
humans and/or the environment. Supra note 391.
425TSCA, §8(e), 15 U.S.C. §2607(e).
426 Supra notes 277, 279, 280 and accompanying text. A bill recently passed in the
U.S. Congress requires chemical firms to finance 87.5 per cent of a "superfund" through
a series of taxes on feedstocks, inorganic chemicals and oil. The U.S. government would
finance the rest of the fund.
427Supra notes 100-11, 139, 140, 193, 283, 285, 388-97 and accompanying text.
428 See The Access to Information Act, Bill C-43, 1980 (32nd Parl., 1st Sess).
(First Reading, July 17, 1980), s. 20. This section [s. 20(1)] requires in part that gov-
arnment not disclose third party information (e.g. trade secrets, financial, commercial,
scientific or technical information that is confidential and so treated by a third party).
Section 20(2) requires in part that only the results of government product or environ-
mental testing cannot be withheld. Section 20(2) (a) would allow such testing to be
withheld if it "was done as a service and for a fee." Section 20(2) (b) would allow
such testing to be withheld if the government "believes, on reasonable grounds, that the
results are misleading."
429 See, for example, supra notes 64 and 70 and accompanying text.
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ment to control of toxic chemicals. The notion of a citizen petition is not
unheard of in Canadian law.43 0 Under the proposal here, however, there
should also be a statutory requirement that the agency undertake the regu-
lation-making or related activity or give reasons why such activity is not
warranted, within a reasonable period of time. There should also be an
appeal mechanism available to the citizen petitioner.
Eighth, consideration should be given to creating government and citizen
causes of action for damages or injunction to protect human health or the
environment from damage posed by a chemical or for non-compliance with
environmental statutory requirements. Once either the government or a citi-
zen has proved that a defendant was manufacturing or using a substance or
discharging or emitting it into the air, water or land, and has shown that
human health or the environment has been damaged or statutory require-
ments violated, the burden of proof should shift to the defendant to show
that the harm did not result from his activities. Any citizen should have
standing to sue without first having to demonstrate that he or she has a
proprietary or pecuniary interest in the matter or has suffered some particu-
larly direct damage over and above that incurred by the public at large.
431
Ninth, consideration should be given to requiring the funding of those
individuals or groups otherwise unable to participate in regulation-making
or administrative tribunal activity.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It is trite to say that chemicals are of value to society. Some of them,
however, present a continuing risk of damage to human health and the envi-
ronment due to their properties and quantities, the nature of their uses, and
430 See, e.g., Combines Investigation Act. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, as am. Section 7(1)
of the Act authorizes any six persons resident in Canada to apply to the Director of
Investigation for an inquiry where they are of the opinion that a person has contravened
or failed to comply with orders under the Act; grounds exist for the Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission to issue an order under the Act; or an offence has been or is
about to be committed. Section 7(2) outlines the material the six persons must submit
with their application. Section 8(a) requires the Director to cause an inquiry to be made
upon the filing of the s. 7(1) application. The Act is silent, however, on any further
duties the Director may have pursuant to this application or any appeals avail-
able to the six persons if the Director makes an adverse finding, or no finding at all.
Nor does the Act require the Director to even prepare a report based on his inquiry
or to send a copy of it to the six persons; or to do any of the above in a stipulated
period of time.
431 The B.C. Law Reform Commission rejected the three principal reasons that have
evolved in restricting an individual's standing to sue: the fear of multiple litigation or
of opening the floodgates to litigation; the needs of the adversarial system, and; the need
to eliminate "busybodies". The Commission characterized the first concern as "exag-
gerated"; the second as unconvincing; and the third and generally all three as capable
of being adequately dealt with by the inherent authority of the courts to control their
own process. Supra note 320.
Though beyond the general scope of this paper, other reforms should also address
such matters as limitation periods, costs, principles of fault, class actions and limited
damages (for example, "pure economic loss" not being compensable in negligence).
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the levels of exposure to them. Moreover, little is known about either many
chemicals already on the market, or new ones introduced each year, because
frequently they have not been tested for their human or environmental effects.
Recent incidents in Canada have demonstrated the resulting problems.
As a result of increasing public concern, governments at all levels have
responded with a variety of legislative and administrative actions, which have
proven complementary as well as contradictory in some instances. Govern-
ments have sought to improve controls on the importation, manufacture, pro-
cessing, use, storage, handling, transportation, emission, discharge, and
disposal of toxic chemicals through both statutory and non-statutory mech-
anisms. The effectiveness of controls introduced on particular substances has
been influenced by perceived and actual limitations in constitutional author-
ity, the level of scientific and technical knowledge available and competing
socio-economic concerns. International attempts to achieve harmony in the
requirements of national control law, such as the testing of new chemicals
or the protection of major natural resources from toxic chemicals, are also
in their early stages.
The focus of much of this attention, the chemical industry, has raised
numerous concerns about the prospective impacts on business of this regula-
tory activity. These include concerns regarding the confidentiality of infor-
mation; testing; trade barriers resulting from differing government control
approaches at the international and domestic levels and related matters.
Environmental groups have expressed concerns about inadequate preventive
mechanisms (for example, the lack of pre-manufacture notice or control)
and enforcement; the lack of access to information and regulation-making
involvement; and the absence or only limited availability of victim compen-
sation through statutory provisions or common law remedies.
This review suggests that, given the nature of the dilemma posed by
toxic chemicals to the health and environment of the Canadian public, im-
provements in both the comprehensiveness of government controls and the
role of the public are required.
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